W':' S C1 i NG'ON <!fOP ::!f!C~ / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY MEMO~~DUM OF CONVERSA~ION SUBJECT: S~~ary of the Vice President ' s Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping PARTICIPP.. NTS : Vice President Walter Mondale Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affa~rs Richard Moe, Chief of Staff to the Vice President Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affair Michel Oksenberg, St"_aff Member I NSC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chai Zemin, People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United States Zhang Wenjin, Deputy Foreign Minister Han Xu, Director of American Depar~~ent Wei Yongqing, Director of Protocol Ji Chaozhu, Deputy Director of American Depart.:nent DATE, TD1E August 28, 1979; 9:30 a.m. - 12:00 Noon k'lD PLACE: The Great Hall of the People, Beijing, People's Republic of China Vi=e Premier Deng: I heard your speech ;vas war:nly ;.;elcomed. Vice ?res:":ient ~oncale: I W2.S thril2.ed by t.he opportunity to spea2< at your great unive.r·sity anc. -='0 speak to the people. It was an unprecedented occasion, and I t.hank you for that. cpport"..lni ty. DECLASSIFIED \E.O.12958, Sec.3.6 :~_R--I.~~__ NA~ ::T~31m;:J" ,TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/ EYES ONLY 2 Vice Premier Deng: It was published in full in today ' s People's Daily. Vice President Mondal€: Thank you. I am most grateful. And then last night, we attended a cultural event at which we heard two Chinese classics -- Jingle Bells and Do Re Mi. Vice Premier Deng: What you said at Beida -- the $2 billion in credit and other ita~s -- answers the questions of the journalists. Vice President Mondale: A great statesman once said we should learn truth from facts. Vice Premier Deng (turning to journalists): You heard what he said. Journalists (obviously flabbergasted, not knowing what to say) : Yes. Vice Premier Deng: You put us on the spot, so we put you on the spot. Vice President Mondale: No. They never put us on the spot. Vice Premier Deng: True, th.ey are very friendly. (Journalists leave.) Vice President Mondale: Wha.t a thrill it was to talk to those students. I will never forget the night at the Kennedy Center when you went on stage with President Carter and kissed the children. There was not a dry eye in the place or in th€ cot.:ntry. Mr. Vice Premier, may I begin? Vice ?ra~ier Deng: Yes. Vice President Mondale: Yen;, gave us a ser iOllS presentation on Indochina yesterday, and I would like to respond at this ti..'ne. INDOCH!:.rA Vice President Mondale: We wish to begin on the very serious problem of Vie-c.nam. In Indclchi::a I we sha=e ::he sa.~e obj ec":.i.ves : to create an independent K~lpuchea that is ~ ot threateni~g to its neighbors, to prever.t LelOS ':=om ':alling ':urther under Viet~am and Soviet sway, to protect Thailand and ot~er ASE&~ sta::.es, and to show Vietnam that its inc::-easing de?endence ~ • ... 4t • 'P€)F SEC~/SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY 3 We see the root of the probla~ in Vietna~'s desi=e to dominate the Indochina Peninsula and Soviet encouragement to this end. The U.S. has long recognized this danger. We, therefore , understand Thai and other ASE&~ concern with the threat that would be directed against Thailand from a Kampuchea under Vietnamese domination. We are concerned by the Sovi.et military presence in Vietnam. As you well know, they are making port calls and establishing military facilities. We also note with concern persistent Soviet efforts to make calls at ASEAN ports. We have drawn and will continue to draw ou.r concerns directly to Moscow's attention. We are working directly with Japan , Australia, and the ASEAN states to resi.st these pressures. As to Hanoi itself, we belie:ve Vietnam is in a very difficult situation. It faces an inci.pient insurgency movement in Laos. Its forces are bogged down in Kampuchea, the conquered pop­ ulace in South Vietnam is alienated and restless . Its ethnic minorities are persecuted and seek to flee. It is devoting increased military resources to its northern border. Its own economy is in a shambles -- most recently its oil explora­ tions have not met expectations -- yet it must both support full mobilization and assist: Laos and Kampuchea. Its ambitions exceed its capabilities and it increasingly must depend on the Soviet Union to make up the gap . And its standing in Asia and elsewhere in the world has fallen to a new low as a result of its policy on refugees. Your representative at Geneva put the blame exactly where it belongs: Vietnam. We added our condemnation of Vietn~~. They are heartless in expelling their own people. At Geneva, we caused a devastatL.lg blow tc::> Vietnam arourd the 1M:>rld arrl in ;ny own country. ~l7hat can be done to change the situation? Obviously and most importantly the current levE~ l of pressure must be kept on Hanoi. World criticism of Vietnam must continue . No legitimac~;{ must be bestowea. on the Viei:namese puppet regime in Kampuchea or the presence vi Vietnamese troops there. We also think it is i.TIlportant to generate a qreater political opposi":ion to Viet:lam's recent propaganda campaign of ?suedo-flexibili':.y on refugees ana. Kampuchea. Ne 1.lna.erst.:.nd the desire of the Kampuc:hean ?eople to resist Vietna::nese occ:upation a:r.d understand ':he su~port t,:;.is resistance has gained ~rom count=ies other than ~he CoS. ¥,P gECP..iT.!SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 4 A broad coalition in Kampuchea is urgently needed to strengthen the long-term support insidE~ that country for a genuinely independent goverrunent. You know our view that Pol Pot cannot generate adequate support. If Pol Pot is the sole focal point of resistance to Heng Samrin , the situation is likely to get worse. There probably will be a decrease in resistance and external support. We and many others cannot support Pol Pot even though we will not recognize Heng Samrin . We believe the interests of the region and of the u.s. and China would best be served if a search for a political settlement in Kampuchea werl~ ini tia ted, a settlement which resul ted in the removal of :Eoreign troops and the installation of a genuinely non-aligned (:Joverrunent. That this will be difficult is obvious, but I was pleased to note in listening to your presentation yesterday we both share the same objectives . I agree we should maintain close consultation. The U.S. stands ready to work closely with China and with ASEAN in making progress to this end. I noted your comments about Prince Sihanouk with great interest. When you tell us that Prince Sihanouk sometimes pursues his own policies, ~t. Vice premier, you are not telling us something new. Looking to the future, we c.re also unsure of what his role may be, but we agree that he should be encouraged to follow a c l ~urse which could make it possible for him to play a role achieving the objective that ! mentioned earlier -- the installation of a genuinely non-aligned govern­ ment and the removal of foreign troops from Kampuchea , In regard to your comments concerning Japan's aid to Vietnam, you should know that the Secretary of State and the President both raised this issue with the Japanese in their meetings in April, May, and June. I am sure you are also aware of their position. We have made it clear to them, and to many other countries throughout the world, that we feel strongly that because of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, its treatment of its own people and its willingness to accept a Soviet military presence in their country, it is inappropriate for countries to extend aid to Vietnam. W'e have also had substantial success in preventing major loans to Vietnam from the World Bank, the Asian Development Ba:tk., and other i!'lternat:'onal inst:.t::.tions. As :or your comments on the U, S. and Japan working -:.ogether wit~out infor.nins China, I wa~t to assure you again that this is not the case. We have kept you inforillec of our views , ar.d !:;cOP ;;;CP'=''!!LSENSITI'iE/EYES ONLY <TOP SECRE17LSENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 5 prior to and following each contact that we have had with the Vietnamese we have briefed your government fully. We do this, Mr. Vice Premier, because we believe that the more we can work together on this difficult issue, the greater the chances of our reaching our common goal of an independent and non-aligned Kampuchea. I hope that your government will make the same efforts with us. Mr. Vice Premier please excuse me for making this extended statement because of its importance. OUr policies should be spelled out in some detail. I would like to make two related points. It is important that we continue to make efforts to aid refugees, to increase the pressure on Vietnam, and to maintain international outrage at their policy of forced expulsion of their citizens. We will continue to do our part. We are not at all convinced that the Vietnamese have agreed on any permanent position to stop expulsion of their people and their recent decrease may be related to the monsoons.