COLLAPSE IN KOSOVO 22 April 2004 ICG Europe Report No155 Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. CLASHING VISIONS OF KOSOVO'S FUTURE...................................................... 2 A. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY POLICIES................................................................................2 B. BELGRADE'S POLICIES ..........................................................................................................3 III. INCREASING FRICTIONS.......................................................................................... 5 A. PRIVATISATION .....................................................................................................................6 B. PARALLEL STRUCTURES .......................................................................................................7 C. THE POLITICAL HERITAGE OF THE WAR................................................................................8 IV. FORESHADOWING THE VIOLENCE..................................................................... 10 A. VIOLENCE AND SECURITY...................................................................................................10 B. THE FUSE IS LIT ..................................................................................................................13 V. SPONTANEOUS OR ORGANISED VIOLENCE?.................................................. 15 VI. A SECURITY SYSTEM NEAR COLLAPSE ........................................................... 19 VII. REACTIONS AND RESPONSES............................................................................... 24 A. KOSOVO ALBANIANS ..........................................................................................................25 B. THE INTERNATIONALS ........................................................................................................27 C. ON THE GROUND ................................................................................................................30 VIII. KOSOVO ALBANIAN SOCIETY - THE NEED FOR RENOVATION ............... 32 IX. RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE................................................ 36 A. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE ECONOMY.......................................36 B. PARALLEL STRUCTURES .....................................................................................................39 C. SECURITY COORDINATION ..................................................................................................40 X. LOOKING AHEAD ..................................................................................................... 42 APPENDICES A. A CHRONOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: 17-19 MARCH 2004 ..........................................................44 B. MAP OF KOSOVO ................................................................................................................53 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................54 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ON EUROPE SINCE 2001............................................55 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................57 ICG Europe Report N°155 22 April 2004 COLLAPSE IN KOSOVO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS On 17 March 2004, the unstable foundations of four political, developmental and security measures alike - and a half years of gradual progress in Kosovo - Kosovo risks becoming Europe's West Bank. buckled and gave way. Within hours the province was immersed in anti-Serb and anti-UN rioting and The violent explosion revealed Kosovo Albanian had regressed to levels of violence not seen since society to be deeply troubled, lacking institutions, 1999. By 18 March the violence mutated into the leadership and the culture to absorb shocks and ethnic cleansing of entire minority villages and contain its violent, criminal minority. In its current neighbourhoods. The mobs of Albanian youths, state, this society will continue to push out extremists and criminals exposed the UN Mission in minorities and ultimately consume its own wafer- Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led peacekeeping thin layer of liberal intelligentsia. Its large number force (KFOR) as very weak. Kosovo's provisional of young people threaten to sweep aside the fragile institutions of self-government (PISG), media and institutions of the older generation. Since 1999 a civil society afforded the rioters licence for mayhem. migration from the undeveloped countryside has The international community urgently needs new swamped the capital and the modernised elements policies -- on final status and socio-economic of society. UNMIK has not come near to making development alike -- or Kosovo instability may infect good Kosovo's development deficits, particularly the entire region. the decay in education and literacy. The rampage left nineteen dead, nearly 900 injured, UNMIK's structure and mandate are now exposed as over 700 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes, up to ten inappropriate to prepare Kosovo for the transition public buildings and 30 Serbian churches and two from war to peace, from socialism to the market monasteries damaged or destroyed, and roughly 4,500 economy, and from international political limbo to people displaced. The riots were more spontaneous final status. The international community had than organised, with extremist and criminal gangs beguiled itself into believing that the patchy half- taking advantage, particularly on day two. Frustration promises of its November 2003 undertaking to begin and fear over the international community's intentions reviewing Kosovo's final status by mid-2005 for Kosovo, UNMIK's inability to kick-start the represented a complete policy. Unable to agree on economy and its suspension of privatisation, and what that final status should be, it relied on the naïve Belgrade's success over recent months in shredding assumption that delaying the decision would allow Kosovo Albanian nerves all built the tension that was passions to cool. It also failed to take security released with explosive force by the inciting incidents concerns seriously and deal with parallel structures of 16 March. and criminal groups. This lack of resolve left the majority Albanian and minority Serb communities Regional security implications are serious and locked in a confrontation that was suppressed, never widespread. KFOR and NATO have lost their aura of resolved. invulnerability and invincibility. The perception of international weakness and lack of resolve will not be With status uncertainty deterring investors, and lost on extremists in Kosovo and elsewhere in the without the myriad club memberships open only to Balkans, including newly resurgent nationalists in nation states, Kosovo's development is stunted under Belgrade. If the underlying causes of the violence are the current UN rule. Its GDP -- dependent on the not dealt with immediately and directly -- through waning contributions of prematurely disengaging Collapse in Kosovo ICG Europe Report N°155, 22 April 2004 Page ii donors and with only 4 per cent of imports covered Commissioner and the OSCE in finding a way by exports -- is unsustainable at even the current low forward, including by reforming the level. With many families dependent on remittances management and board of the public from their migrant children, Kosovo is engaged in a broadcaster, RTK, and seeking sustained humiliating demographic war of attrition with technical assistance from experienced European Western Europe. As Kosovo Albanians furtively broadcasting professionals. cross their borders and enter their labour markets, these nations seek to throw them back. For the more 3. Go beyond the PISG commitment to help than 50 per cent of Kosovo's labour force that is rebuild homes, monasteries and churches unemployed, including the 30,000 to 40,000 who destroyed in the rioting with government funds join it every year, the present interim dispensation by launching a broad initiative to raise money for Kosovo is not enough. from all corners of society for this purpose, and otherwise taking the initiative to develop It is crucial that all concerned face up quickly to the Kosovo Serb infrastructure including education implications of 17-18 March. The international and healthcare. community's institutions in Kosovo need new ways of operating and, in the case of UNMIK, a new 4. Continue the process of dialogue with Serbia structure and mandate. If the notion of partition is initiated in October 2003. to be rejected -- as ICG believes it still should be except in the unlikely event that both interested To the Contact Group Countries (U.S., UK, sides freely choose it (in which case it would be France, Germany, Italy and Russia) and Other consistent with the Helsinki principles) -- this can Members of the International Community: no longer be out of hand or on faith but only 5. Re-engage seriously with the Kosovo issue, by: because new international policies and new honesty among Kosovo Albanians about their society (a) taking action to enhance the security of produce changes on the ground that make Kosovo a Kosovo's minority communities, especially much more viable place for all its communities. the Serbs; If this is to happen, a real political, social, (b) beginning