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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. How InsurgencIes end Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki Prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. The research was conducted in the National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. 978-0-8330-4952-0 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Carol Earnest © Copyright 2010 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html). Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Insurgencies have dominated the focus of the U.S. military for the past seven years, but they have a much longer history than that and are likely to figure prominently in future U.S. military operations. Thus, the general characteristics of insurgencies and, more important, how they end are of great interest to U.S. policymakers. This study constitutes the unclassified portion of a two-part study that examines insurgencies in great detail. The research documented in this monograph focuses on insurgency endings generally. Its findings are based on a quantitative examination of 89 cases. James Bruce is the overall project manager. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Marine Corps Intelli- gence Activity (MCIA) and conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center (IPC) of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified- Com batant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s Intelligence Policy Center, contact the Director, John Parachini. He can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5579; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. vii Tables .............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix Abbreviations .................................................................... xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Purpose of This Monograph ...................................................... 2 A Note on Contemporary Threats and Operations ............................ 4 Research Approach ................................................................. 4 Graphs Used in This Monograph ................................................ 6 Conventional Wisdom ............................................................. 6 How This Monograph Is Organized ............................................ 11 CHAPTER TWO Classifying Outcomes and Selecting Cases ................................. 13 Outcomes .......................................................................... 13 Type I: Government Loss ...................................................... 14 Type II: Government Victory ................................................. 17 Type III: Mixed (Stalemate/Negotiated Settlement) ....................... 18 Type IV: Inconclusive or Ongoing Outcome ............................... 20 The Tipping Point: Explanation by Way of Example ....................... 21 Key Indicators: A Note of Caution .......................................... 23 v vi How Insurgencies End CHAPTER THREE Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Time and External Factors ....... 25 Assessments of Time and External Factors .................................... 27 Duration of Conflict........................................................... 27 Sanctuary Available ............................................................ 34 Outside Intervention in Support of Government ........................... 49 Outside Intervention in Support of Insurgencies ........................... 62 CHAPTER FOUR Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Internal Factors ................... 77 Structure .......................................................................... 77 Thailand and the BRN and the PULO ..................................... 84 Urbanization ...................................................................... 88 Uruguay and the Tupamaros ................................................. 94 Insurgent Use of Terrorism ..................................................... 99 Insurgent Strength .............................................................. 110 System of Government ......................................................... 114 CHAPTER FIVE Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Other Factors ..................... 127 Force Ratios ...................................................................... 127 Civil-Defense Forces ............................................................ 141 CHAPTER SIX Conclusions ..................................................................... 151 APPENDIXES A. Case Studies: Methodology ............................................. 157 B. Supplemental Findings .................................................. 165 C. Multivariate Regression Analysis ...................................... 195 D. Insurgencies Not Examined for This Publication .................. 199 E. Categories Used for the Spring 2006 Survey ........................ 203 F. Unavoidable Ambiguities ............................................... 209 G. Questions Used for the Autumn 2006 Survey ....................... 215 Glossary ......................................................................... 219 Bibliography .................................................................... 223 Figures 2.1. Arc of State Defeat ................................................... 15 2.2. Arc of Insurgent Defeat ............................................. 17 2.3. Concept of the Tipping Point ...................................... 21 3.1. Insurgency Durations and Outcomes ............................ 27 3.2. History of the Tamil Tiger Insurgency ............................ 31 3.3. Hypothetical Trajectory of Tamil Tiger Insurgency: