The philosophy of Adam Smith : imagination and speculation Leonardo André Paes Müller To cite this version: Leonardo André Paes Müller. The philosophy of Adam Smith : imagination and speculation. Philos- ophy. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2016. English. NNT : 2016PA01H200. tel-01398360 HAL Id: tel-01398360 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01398360 Submitted on 17 Nov 2016 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne Thèse pour l'obtention du grade de docteur de l'université Paris 1 en cotutelle avec l’Université de São Paulo Présentée et soutenue publiquement par : Leonardo André Paes Müller La philosophie d’Adam Smith : imagination et spéculation Directeurs de thèse : Laurent Jaffro (Paris 1) Pedro Paulo Pimenta (USP) Composition du jury par autres membres : Catherine Larrère (Paris 1) Nicholas Phillipson (University of Edinburgh) Maria das Graças de Souza (USP) Maria Isabel Limongi (UFPR) Date de soutenance : 02/02/2016 Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne Unité de Formation et Recherche de Philosophie (UFR 10) École Doctorale de Philosophie Philosophie, Histoire et Analyse des Représentations Économiques (PHARE) 2 In memory of Ivo André Bay Müller 1957-2014 To my wife, Ana 3 Nunca desembarcamos de nós. Nunca chegamos a outrem, senão outrando-nos pela imaginação sensível de nós mesmos. Fernando Pessoa, Livro do desassossego But Jeannie, in the strict and severe tone of morality in which she was educated, had to consider not only the general aspect of a proposed action, but its justness and fitness in relation to the actor, before she could be, according to her own phrase, free to enter upon it. Sir Walter Scott, The Heart of Midlothian 4 Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 6 Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 7 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. 8 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 9 Chapter 1 – Senses and sentiments ............................................................................. 14 1. Hutcheson’s moral sense – 2. The external senses: a. external senses perceptions; b. language of nature: visual perceptions; c. preconceptions of externality; d. directive function – 3. The internal senses: a. profusion of senses; b. how far the analogy between external and internal senses goes?; c; deflated notion of internal sense: faculties at work; d. reflex senses – 4. Organizing the internal senses: the four kinds of moral judgements – 5. Moral faculties – 6. Moral and nature – 7. Sentiments Chapter 2 – Sympathy and imagination ..................................................................... 52 1. The term sympathy – 2. Imagination and sympathy – 3. Boundaries of sympathy – 4. Types of sympathy: a. passion originated in the body; b. love; c. unsocial passions; d. social passions; e. selfish passions – 5. The perception of fellow-feeling – 6. Sympathy and language – 7. Imagination’s moral theater Chapter 3 – Partiality and impartiality ....................................................................... 86 1. The problem of partiality – 2. Habit: Partiality and precision – 3. Moral substance and antinomical frame – 4. Conscience as a tribunal – 5. The “natural sense of equity” – 6. The role of virtue Chapter 4 – Merit and fortune .................................................................................... 112 1. Merit sentiments: Gratitude and resentment – 2. The objects of gratitude and resentment I – 3. The objects of gratitude and resentment II – 4. Fortune and its effects I: Merit and demerit: (a) intensity decrease; (b) intensity increase – 5. Fortune and its effects II: Propriety and impropriety – 6. Fortune under the eyes of an impartial spectator – 7. Authority of fortune: People, labor and sentiments – 8. The empire of fortune – 9. Fortune vs. conscience – 10. Tranquility and liberalism – 11. Idleness and passions’ extravagance Chapter 5 – Duty and rules ......................................................................................... 161 1. Self-command vs. self-deceit – 2. Natural does not mean simple: Remorse as the sense of justice – 3. Duty and its judgement: The morals of reason – 4. The role of utility – 5. Kinds of artifice – 6. Constitution of a legal grammar – 7. Rules regulatory function: Usury laws – 8. Overturning the natural course of society: Bounties – 9. The nature of society Chapter 6 – Beauty and utility .................................................................................... 208 1. The beauty bestowed by the appearance of utility as a peculiar kind of aesthetic judgement – 2. Utility and utilitarian considerations – 3. Philosophical history of the beauty of utility: a. Epicurus: Utilitarian individualism; b. Hobbes: Deductivist mechanicism; c. Hume: Utilitarian organicism; d. Mandeville: Much ado about nothing – 4. How utility persuades: Ambition – 5. How providence works: The the corn merchant – 6. Species and character – 7. Who thinks abstractly? – 8. Survivance and speculation Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 252 Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 255 5 Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Department of Philosophy of the Universidade de São Paulo, and the Unité de Formation et Recherche de Philosophie (UFR 10) and the École Doctorale de Philosophie of Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne as whole, for the time and support offered. The Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) for two scholarships, the first in Brazil, from september 2012 on, the second, to a period of research in Paris (BEPE, from july 2014 to june 2015). I also thank CAPES- Cofecub (project Ética e estética: sensibilidade e Forma) for a scholarship (between september and december 2013) to a first period of reasearch in Paris. I also would like to thank the secretaries of philosophy (especially to Mariê) and post-graduation (especially to Regina) of FFLCH-USP, and the staff of the Libraries Florestan Fernandes (FFLCH-USP), of FEA-USP, of the Bibliotéque Nationale de France (BnF) and of the National Library of Scotland (NLS). I am very grateful to professor Pedro Pimenta, who took na interest in this Project even before he was consistently delineated, and professor Laurent Jaffro for the invitation to transform my PhD in a double degree. To both I owe more than a simple supervision. I thank professors Fernão Salles Cruz (UFSCAR) and Bruno Simões for the considerations, criticism and suggestion made in my qualification exam and professors Maria das Graças de Souza (USP), Catherine Larrère (Paris I), Maria Isabel Limongi (UFPR) and Nicholas Phillipson (University of Edinburgh) for kindly accepting my invitation to be a part of the board of the present dissertation. I thank my colleagues of Latesfip-USP (Laboratório Interunidades de Teoria Social, Filosofia e Psicanálise), especially the members of the group on Fetishism (Marília, Márcia, Fátima, Caio), and of PHARE-Paris I (Philosophie, histoire et analyse des representations économiques). I’m also grateful to my friends Nathália Marques, Izabel Pereira, Denise Franco, Julio Silva, Bernardo Soares, Daniel Tanis, Julio Lucchesi, Caio Favareto, Bruno Hofig . I’m deeply indebdted to my family, especially my grandmother Alzira, my mother Aridinê and my sister Isabela. And to Ana, above all. 6 Abstract In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith establishes a pluralist scheme to explain moral approbation, with four kinds of moral judgments: 1) regarding the motives of the agent, the judgment determines its propriety or impropriety; 2) regarding the immediate effects of the action, the judgement determines its merit or demerit; 3) analyzing if this act is a particular case of a general rule, the judgement determines if the agent has acted according to his duty; and 4) regarding the remote effects of the action, that is, the way this action is a part of the global operations of society (a judgement that Smith calls the appearance of utility). These four kinds of moral judgments are grounded in imagination and form the totality of the principle of approbation that structure the speculative part of his moral philosophy. Key-words: imagination, speculation, sympathy, duty, utility 7 Abbreviations David Hume (1711-1776) THN A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739-40 Essays Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, 1741 EHU An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748 EPM An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 1751 Adam Smith (1723-1790) TMS or Theory of Moral Sentiments, six editions between 1759 and 1790 Theory WN or An Inquiry into the