PRZEGLĄD KULTUROZNAWCZY NR 4 (46) 2020, s. 493–497 doi:10.4467/20843860PK.20.042.12846 www.ejournals.eu/Przeglad-Kulturoznawczy/ OMÓWIENIA I ROZBIORY David j. Gunkel VIRTUAL SUBjECTIVITIES: A REVIEW OF STEFANO GUALENI AND DANIEL VELLA’S VIRTUAL EXISTENTIALISm Stefano Gualeni and Daniel Vella, Virtual Existentialism: Meaning and Subjectivity in Virtual Worlds, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Virtual Existentialism is a short book. aware of these decisive choices and di- Like all the titles in the Palgrave Pivot rectly address the opportunities and chal- series, the text is intentionally formu- lenges of their strategic decisions. But lated to fit somewhere in between the the reasons for and consequences of the- length of a journal article and a mono- se exclusions does, in the final analysis, graph. This concision is simultaneously leave one wanting more than a book of an advantage and a challenge. On the this size can possibly deliver. one hand, a book of this limited length The book is organized into two main allows readers quick and easy access to parts. The first part, which consists of an innovative approach to games and ga- the first two chapters, establishes the mes studies – one that leverages the rich theoretical framework of the analysis. traditions and resources of 20th century The first chapter, “Virtual Subjectivities existential philosophy. Readers are able and the Existential Significance of Vir- to get up to speed with minimal invest- tual Worlds”, introduces the organizing ment in terms of time and effort, and this concept of “virtual subjectivity,” which is something that works extremely well the authors define as the subjective sense for a generation raised on shorter bursts of self that relates to one’s being-in-the- of textual information supplied by digi- -virtual-world. This characterization pro- tal media. On the other hand, the need to ceeds by drawing on the terminology and keep things tightly focused and succinct theoretical resources made available in does require the bracketing or margina- existential philosophy – throwness, exi- lization of important subjects that, for stential projection, being-in-the-world, one reason or another, resist being sideli- etc. Of crucial significance here is the ned. To their credit, the authors are fully notion of nested existential positionality VIRTUAL SUBjECTIVITIES... 493 David j. Gunkel – the idea that players simultaneously in- virtual subjectivities or digital masks that habit a subjective standpoint internal to one may take on and off and play-with the gameworld and their own subjective in the simulated space of a virtual world. standpoint as an individual external to This difference is the defining condition the gameworld. This double perspective of Western metaphysics. It is evident in (or what is also called, later in the book, Platonism, which had differentiated be- a “double consciousness”) is a useful tween actual being, which remains per- contribution to the existing literature as sistently the same, and mere appearances it can help make sense of the way play- that can be multiple and endlessly alte- ers move into and out of the virtual expe- red. It finds expression in the modern OMÓWIENIA I ROZBIORY rience. era with Cartesian dualism, which loca- The second chapter, “En-roling and tes the essence of human identity in res De-roling in Virtual Worlds,” follows cogitans as opposed to the vicissitudes this line of reasoning by investigating of res extensa. And it has been the stan- how users navigate and make sense of dard operating presumption for the way these changing and changeable subject game studies typically explains and un- positions. As the authors correctly point derstands the subjectivity of the avatar: out, there is a significant body of work “While the more fundamental persona- on subjectivities in virtual worlds but re- lity of the real person is still driving in latively little addressing the transitions the background,” Tom Boellstorff (2008: into and out of these multiple and diffe- 132) writes, “it’s filtered through a diffe- rent subjectivities. The second chapter rent surface persona.” considers the processes and the rituals of The authors are not unaware of the what the authors call the “en-roling” into problems and potential risks of deploy- and “de-roling” from virtual subjectivi- ing and defending this metaphysical tra- ties. For this reason, the chapter is less dition, and, in the second chapter, they dependent on the literature and termino- acknowledge it directly by way of citing logy of existential philosophy and more the work of Goffman. “The work of Er- involved with and informed by work in ving Goffman on selfhood, for example, psychodrama and dramatherapy. The could cast a problematic light on this goal of the chapter is “to arrive at a com- idea (i.e. that one can discern a stable, prehensive understanding of the transfor- unified sense of the everyday ‘self’)… mative and therapeutic possibilities and For Goffman, the boundaries between advantages afforded by adopting virtual the various roles we can adopt are blur- subjectivities in virtual worlds” (p. 26). red and porous, and identity is something Pursing this particular course of in- that is always performative and in a state vestigation, however, does require a con- of flux” (p. 27). Later in the book, in the cession that complicates the existentia- final chapter in fact, they will come at it list framework and effects what follows again by way of Eugene Fink’s engage- from it. Specifically, the authors find it ment with the mask, which the authors necessary to differentiate between the explain in the following way: “As is the actual or real “everyday” self and the case with Fink’s notion of play, though, 494 VIRTUAL SUBjECTIVITIES... David j. Gunkel philosophical figure, applying their ideas this is not just about the ability to take OMÓWIENIA I ROZBIORY on one specific other identity. Rather, it is to the concept of virtual subjectivity. about the fact that virtuality destabilizes What is remarkable about these four the idea of a single self in a single world, chapters is their choice of “philosophical and might allow – at least in theory – for figures.” Here one does not find the usu- a more fluid and multifaceted understan- al suspects (i.e. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, ding of selfhood, thus blurring the distin- Nietzsche, Camus, etc.) apart from the ction between the actualized self and its one notable exception, Jean Paul Sartre. potentialities” (p. 105). But even with Sartre, the subject of chap- In both cases, however, the book no- ter 6, the work that has been selected for ticeably struggles against the insights analysis is not Sartre’s magnum opus, supplied by these two theorists and tries Being and Nothing; it is the lesser known to manage or redirect their impact and The Imaginary: A Phenomenological significance. Playing with virtual subje- Psychology of the Imagination. ctivity has the potential to reconfigure The other philosophers included in traditional metaphysical assumptions this second part are Helmuth Plessner and affordances, demonstrating how the (chapter 4), Peter W. Zapffe (chapter concept of a stable, unified sense of the 5), and Eugen Fink (chapter 7). These everyday self situated in the “real world” are not “top tier” existentialist thinkers, may be just as variable and alterable as but they supply, as I think the authors virtual subjectivities appear to be in the demonstrate with exceptional dexterity, space of the game. Instead of pursing much needed perspective for address- this critical opportunity, Virtual Exi- ing the opportunities and challenges of stentialism opts to defend the traditional virtual subjectivity. Plessner, who was way of thinking and its investments in a contemporary of Heidegger and a stu- ontological difference. Here is how this dent of Max Scheler, has remained on the decision is explained and justified in the sidelines of the history of 20th century final chapter: “The existential promise philosophy, and his major contribution, that Fink identifies in play – and that we a book titled Levels of the Organic Life have considered in the virtual as a parti- and the Human was not available in Eng- cular technological manifestation of play lish translation until 2019. Despite this – needs to be qualified. This fluidity of fact, Gualani and Vella make a compel- the self is not absolute, and one’s actual ling case for applying Plessner’s unique self continues to occupy a central posi- brand of philosophical anthropology to tion” (p. 106). Although this assertion is the study of virtual worlds. understandable within the context of the A similar situation befalls Zapffe, analysis, it is simply asserted and not su- the Norwegian philosopher and moun- fficiently established by way of persuasi- taineer, who advanced an innovative ve argumentation or evidence. characterization of the human being as The second part of the book consists a tragic, overdetermined animal that is of four shorter chapters, each of which an exorbitant excess within the natural engages with the thought of a different world. Fink, who may be the best known VIRTUAL SUBjECTIVITIES... 495 David j. Gunkel figure in this threesome, mainly because 1977) and directly engaging that previo- of his affiliation with both Husserl and usly published material would not only Heidegger, completes the second part of help substantiate the provided definition the book. In the final chapter, the authors of technology but would also fill-out focus on Fink’s 1960 book Play as Sym- some of the missing details in its presen- bol of the World. It is remarkable and tation. rather surprising that this text and Fink’s The second concerns the apparent unique analysis of play has not been fea- exclusion or marginalization of intersub- tured more prominently in game studies. jective experience. Virtual Existentialism Fortunately, Gualani and Vella repair this decides to focus its analytical attention on OMÓWIENIA I ROZBIORY oversight, effectively demonstrating how the experience of the individual subject’s Fink’s innovative investigations can in- being-in-the-virtual-world.