Notes Delusions of Decline: US Global Power in a Turbulent Era 1. It is thus a misconception that the US presence in the Middle East is primar- ily premised on securing oil specifically for American industry and automobile owners. See, for example, Stokes and Raphael (2010). 2. A logical alternative to an open and rule-based liberal order is one with “illib- eral geopolitical blocs, exclusive regional spheres, and closed imperial systems” (Ikenberry, 2010). 3. While a robust case for free trade cannot always be made, a general presumption in favor of multilateral trade and investment seems justified. While generating losers as well as winners, the broad historical record suggests that relatively unim- peded trade in goods and services tends to promote greater prosperity for most people over the longer-term. Most market failures warrant policy interventions in the form of targeted, domestic tax-cum-subsidies or regulations, as opposed to blunter trade instruments that tend to introduce undesirable distortions to resource allocation (Bhagwati, 1989). 4. The US political system’s promotion of home ownership and the still mounting losses plaguing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac come to mind. 5. Public goods can also threaten certain powers concerned over the predomi- nant state’s outsized strategic leverage. China’s dependence on the US for the safeguarding of oil shipments is a case in point. 6. More generally, a hegemonic power grounded in the principles of openness and the desirability of spreading the gains from globalization would encourage a pro- liferation of value-added transfers from all states as a contribution to greater global stability. 7. While ideology inevitably informs this author’s broad defense of market principles, the broad historical record arguably supports this bias. For a good discussion of the role of ideology in economics see Backhouse (2010). 1 US Power: Past and Prologue 1. A more in-depth analysis of national decline and its relationship to overstretch is provided in Chapter 2. 2. In the event, the US has usually topped most competitiveness rankings. More recently, however, it has fallen behind certain smaller states, such as Finland, Denmark and Singapore. For an in-depth discussion, see chapter 3. 3. These arguments build on Phillips’ earlier reflections on imperial overstretch. The latter incorporate political factors such as an alleged disproportionate influence of evangelical Christiandom on US foreign policy (Phillips, 2006). 4. See Chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion. 5. One can also include in the camp of US decline rejectionists German journalist Josef Joffe (2006, 2009). 242 Notes 243 6. By this Friedman means the reluctance of European states to delegate increasingly greater powers to the supra-sovereign entities of the EU and the EMU, as well as instability related to Russia’s ongoing geopolitical aspirations. 7. The hierarchical structure of global power within which the US uniquely occupies the top rung is persuasively defended in Buzan (2004). 8. In contrast, Joseph Quinlan is representative of those who view the financial crisis as a watershed, marking an unambiguous onset of US decline (Quinlan, 2011). 9. This combination of enduring economic strengths coupled with major political system inadequacies is shared by others, like James Fallow (2010). 10. In showcasing East Asia’s successful adoption of “Western pillars,” such as freer markets, Kishore Mahbubani (2008) serves as a useful accompaniment to Zakaria. 11. Zakaria inspired a range of reactions as, for example, assembled in Clark and Hoque (2011). This publication’s contributors notably disagree over whether Zakaria represents more the optimist or the pessimist on US power. 12. Also see China’s Rise (Bergsten, 2008) and China Shakes the World (Kynge, 2006). 13. For contrasting assessments on China’s re-ascension, see the essays by Subramanian (2011b) and Babones (2011). 14. Ezra Vogel (1979) is perhaps the best known of earlier commentary heralding the inexorable overtaking of the US by a Japanese economic juggernaut. 15. Among those who believe that “empire” accurately captures the exercise of US power, see, for example, Ferguson (2004b), Krauthammer (2002), Odom and Dajarric (2004), Lal (2004), Johnson (2004), Chomsky (2004) and Bacevich (2002). 16. Functioning as an outside balancer involves limiting one’s military intervention in strategic regions to instances when the balance of power appears to be tipping in favor of a rising and potentially belligerent state. 17. See Robert Kaplan (2005). Also, Christopher Layne portrays the forward deploy- ment of US military forces “primarily as a means of preserving unipolarity.” Chalmers Johnson (2004) views the expansion of US bases as the epitome of modern (post-colonial) imperialism. 18. Nichols (2005) shows how a greater willingness to intervene in “failed” states on a preventive basis while invoking the United Nations principle of the “responsibility to protect” has emerged as an operational, international norm. 19. While facilitating greater national and global prosperity, such arrangements typ- ically advantage hegemon-headquartered corporations that are well positioned to exploit their technological lead through FDI, mergers and acquisitions, and the expansion of corporate global reach more generally. In addition, providing the reserve currency offers somewhat greater prospects for national overspending financed by cheap credit and supplemented by the receipt of seigniorage revenue (see Chapter 4). 20. This concentration of industrialized country-bound capital flows in the US can be expected to strengthen as long as the EMU debt crisis lingers. 21. For a critical overview of the earlier US declinist literature, see, for example, Cox (2001). 22. The phrase “unipolar moment” as employed by staunch believers in US global power captures the singularly dominant US strategic position with the end of the Cold War. For an insightful analysis of unipolarity, see Buzan (2004). On US unipolarity more specifically, see Brooks and Wohlforth (2008). 23. Charles Kupchan provided some of the earliest arguments for why US predomi- nance would wane and give rise to competing power centers or “multipolarity” 244 Notes (2002a, 2002b). For an elaboration of this idea with greater application to non-state actors, see Haas (2008). 24. Niall Ferguson (2004b) raises the prospect of a world governed neither by global hegemony nor by a rebalancing of state power but instead by “an absence of power.” 25. For a well-argued call, from a liberal perspective, on how to restore US legitimacy, see Beinart (2006). 26. An common colloquialism is that rising powers are positioned to “eat our lunch.” See, for example, Fehr et al. (2005). 2 Dimensions of US Power, Decline and Overstretch 1. While Kennedy’s assessment of US power has fluctuated over time, an unwavering defense of US primacy can be found in Brooks and Wohlforth (2008). 2. This distinction between latent and realized power remains an important feature of the literature on national and global power. See, for example, the RAND studies (Tellis et al., 2000; Treverton and Jones, 2005). A similar distinction is made in older studies on US power (e.g. Nye, 1990). 3. The US accounts for a full 43 per cent of total world defense expenditure, more than the next 10 countries combined. Some 85–90 per cent of this expen- diture supports military activity abroad rather than homeland security (Haas, 2005, p. 8). 4. A more inclusive measure of defense outlays including off-Pentagon budget items, however, can be several hundred billion dollars higher than the defense budget appropriations alone (see Chapter 8). 5. Yet, large weaknesses in peace keeping and nation building were also showcased. 6. The civilian death toll reported varies depending on the source. Washington claims that the vast majority of those killed are militants, whereas locals claim that victims are disproportionately civilian (Bergen and Tiedemann, 2011). 7. One person’s notion of a public good may be another’s idea of imperialist expansionism. For the latter view, see Burbach and Tarbell (2004) and Chomsky (2003). 8. The US has engaged in a concerted four-year offensive program of cyberwar against Iran’s nuclear program known as “Olympic Games” (Sanger, 2012). 9. The CIA has for many years farmed out the right to torture on its behalf to other states at secret interrogation centers, beginning in the 1950s and continuing in the 1960s under the Phoenix program in Vietnam (Weiner, 2007, p. 481). 10. This case is made by Peter Beinart (2006) in The Good Fight. Among others, Beinart argues that failure to better meet the needs of its own population has eroded US credibility. 11. Russia’s relatively high ranking as an immigrant country is arguably overstated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the impact on ethnic Russians residing in other former Republics of the USSR. Economics broadly conceived to incorpo- rate human and physical capital resources, technology and the myriad of societal and institutional factors that contribute to what economists call “total factor productivity” has long been considered central to the exercise of national power. See, for example, Tellis et al. (2000) and Treverton and Jones (2005). 12. For a detailed discussion, see chapters 3 and 4. 13. The relationship between the military and the broader economy works in the opposite direction as well. For example, under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration (US Department of Defense), early Notes 245 advances were made with the Internet, and the military has pioneered other technologies, including those it later spins off to the broader economy. 14. In 2006, a full year before the onset of the Great Recession, Americans spent some $9.7 trillion. In contrast, China and India, which represent 40 per cent of the world’s population, managed to consume less than one-sixth of this amount. 15. See discussion in Chapter 4. 16. For a broader discussion, see Chapter 4.