1. AKRASIA AND MORAL EDUCATION Roger Ralph Streurten Thetis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education, Institute of Educe tion, University of London, 1977. 2. ABSTRACT Recent approaches to morel education have tended to emphasise the development of morel reasoning rather than the performance of morel actions. The logical relationship between the formation of morel judgments end their translation into action, however, cannot be ignored within the context of moral education; but equally it cannot be fully and properly explored in isolation from wider, philosophical issues. Akresia, or "weakness of will", has generated a cluster of classic, philo— sophical problems concerning whether it is possible fora men to fail to do whet he sincerely believes he ought to do (given the ability end opportunity), end how apparent examples of this phenomenon should be interpreted end explained. The denial of the logical possibility of ekresie, as represented by the arguments of Socrates and Here, is considered in Chapter II end found to be unconvincing. The concepts of "ought" end of "conscience" are analysed in Chapter III and shown to possess features which provide sufficient grounds for believing that akresia both can end does occur. More precise criteria for akrasie are proposed in Chapter IV, end a number of common explanations are examined in the light of these criteria. A particular interpretation of ekresia is developed in Chapter V as a special case of doing x rather then y because one wants to do x rather then y, end three central, explanatory features of ekrasia are picked out, involving dishonesty, language end immediacy. Finally this analysis and interpretation is applied to 3. the particular concerns of moral education. Children as well as adults are shown to be capable of ekresie; various general approaches to end specific methods of "teaching morality" are reviewed as possible means of combatting ekrasia in children; and the three explanatory factors are used to suggest ways in which children may be encouraged to act upon their moral judgments. 4. ACKNOWL...DGMENTS I wish to thank Dr. Robert Deerden for his invaluable criticisms end suggestions, and also for his encouraging support at times when this thesis seemed in danger of falling victim to my own akresia. My initial interest in the philosophical aspects of morel education (and indeed in most matters philosophical) was aroused by the work end teaching of Professor Richard Peters, end his indirect influence upon the methodology and content of this thesis has been considerable. 5. CONTOITS PaAe CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL EDUCATION AND AKBASIA 10 1. Training and Education 10 2. Moral Training end Morel Education 12 3. Objections to the "Judgmental" Account of Morel Education 16 4. Wilson's Account of the Morally Educated Person 19 5. KRAT and Akresis 22 6. Morel Education end Akresia 24 CHAPThH II — IS AKRASIA A PROBLEM? 29 1. Two Philosophical Traditions 29 A. The Competitive Tradition 30 B. The Conformist Tradition 34 2. The Socratic Argument 43 A. Summery of the Argument 43 B. Critique of the Argument 45 (i)The Attempted Identification of "Good" with "Pleasant" 46 (ii)"Ignorance" end "Knowledge" 54 C. Conclusions 64 3. Hare's Argument 67 A. Summary of the Argument 67 B. Critique of the Argument 72 (i) Terminological Oddities 73 (ii)Terminological Stipulations and "Central Uses" 79 C. Conclusions S9 6. Page CHAPTER III — "OUGHTS", "CONSCIENCE" AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AKRASIA 95 1. Features of "Ought" 95 A. Implied Backing of Justificatory Reasons: the Distinction between Justifying and Motivating Factors 96 B. Implied Uncertainty of Outcome 105 C. Implied Likelihood of Counter— vailing Factors D. The Centrality of A, B end C 2. "Oughts" and "Conscience" A. "Conscience" end the Logical Features of "Ought" 116 (i)Justificatory Reasons and Principles 117 (ii)Motivation and Counter— veiling Factors 123 (iii)Uncertainty of Outcome 124 (iv)Prescriptivity and Authority 125 B. "Conscience" and Akresia 12c3 CHAPTER IV — INTERPRETATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF AKRASIA 136 1. Clarification of the Concept 136 A. Its Explanatory Function 136 B. Descriptive Criteria 144 (i)Inconsistency Criterion 144 (ii)Decision Criterion 153 (iii)Ability Criterion end the Challenge of Actualism 155 C. An Illustrative Example of Akrasia 169 2. Possible Explanations of Akrasia 174 A. Psychological Compulsion 174 7. Pee B. Descriptive "Ought"—judgments 175 C. Hypocrisy, Insincerity and Special Pleading 176 D. Overriding Wants end Desires 180 E. Lack of Feeling 186 F. Lack of Knowledge 188 G. Logical Necessity 193 CHAPTER V — A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF AKRAS1A 198 1. Doing x rather than y 199 A. Actions end Alternatives 199 B. Wanting 201 C. Preferring 205 D. Seeing as Desirable 207 E. Reasons for Action 210 2. Akresie as a Special Case of "Doing x rather then y" 218 A. Sincerely Believing that One Ought to Do y 219 B. ... Yet Doing x 224 (i)The Dishonesty Factor 227 (ii)The Language Factor 236 (iii)The Immediacy Factor 243 CHAPTER VI — IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION 257 1. Can Children be Akresiac? 258 A. Ability Criterion 258 B. Inconsistency Criterion 260 8. PeAe 2. How are Conceptions of Morel Education Related to Conceptions of Akresie? 267 A. The "Repressive" Approach 269 B. The "Good Habit" Approach 271 C. The "Linguistic" Approach 274 D. The "Cognitive" Approach 276 E. The "Affective" Approach 278 3. Is there a Particular Method of "Teaching Morality" most likely to cotbet Akresia? 282 A. "Verbal" Methods 284 (i)Exhortation and Preaching 284 (ii)Rational Instruction 290 (iii)Discussion:— 295 a) Hypothetical Morel Situations 296 b) Neutrally—chaired Discussion 301 c)Leaderless Discussion 304 B. "Practical" Methods 310 (i)Rewarding end Punishing 310 (ii)Example—following 317 (iii)Role—play and Drama 319 (iv)Disciplined Activities:— 321 a) Sporting 322 Co—operative 325 c1 Communal 327 d) Individual 329 9. Pose 4. How cen Akresie best be Combatted? 331 A. Methodological Implications of the Three Fectors (i)The Dishonesty Factor 332 (ii)The Language Factor 339 (iii)The Immedisty Fector 344 B. Some Generel Conclusions 352 Bibliography 365 10. CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL EDUCATION AND AKRASIA This introductory chapter will attempt to identify the particular educational problem to be investigated in this study, end to indicate the broader philosophical context within which it is located. The conceptual distinction between morel training end morel education will first be used to illustrate the judg— mental end behavioural aspects of morality end of moral education (1 — 3), end Wilson's analysis of these aspects will be briefly considered (4). Failure to act upon one's moral judgments end beliefs (ekresia) will then be shown to con— stitute, prime facie, a necessary concern of morel education (5). Finally, the differing degrees of importance which moral educationists appear to attach to the problem of akrasia will be taken to suggest that the relationship between judgment end action within morel education cannot be discussed in isolation from the wider philosophical issues which akrasie raises (6). 1. Training end Education The reasons why certain concepts at certain times come into fashion or go out of it present an interesting field of study. The concepts of "training" and"education" are a case in point, end a recent analysis has examined the apparent trend 1 away from the former and towards the latter. Teacher training colleges have become colleges of education, physical training (P.T.) has become physical education, and morel (or "character") training has become morel education; a similar emphasis upon 11. education rather than training, instructing or informing can be noted in the fields of religion, art and sex. Peters has argued that "'trained' suggests the development of competence in a limited skill or mode of thought whereas 'educated' suggests a linkage with a wider system of beliefs", end he floes on to apply this distinction to some of the examples just mentioned, e.g. "'Physical training' suggests merely disciplining the body in relation to a narrowly conceived end such as physical fitness; 'physical education' suggests the cultivation of physical fitness as a necessary foundation 2 for a balanced way of life." A thorough examination of the distinction and all its implications would be lengthy and at this stage unnecessary. It will suffice to note that "training" certainly seems to be directed towards more "limited" ends than does "education', but this raises further questions as to just how "limited" an end has to be, end in what way, for it to suggest "training" rather than "education". Peters proposes at various points that "limited" could imply "specific ends", "specialised skills" and "circumscribed moves". An important feature of such "limited ends", not directly mentioned by Peters, is that they are quantifiable; they can be tested and evaluated with e fair degree of pre— cision. The success or failure of "training" can thus be determined much more easily than the success or failure of "education"; it is much easier to test whether or not a child can do a forward roll than to test whether or not he conceives "the cultivation of physical fitness as a necessary foundation 12. for a balanced way of life". The conceptual swing from "training" to "education" therefore suggests, among other things, a greeter degree of difficulty in evaluating the achievement or non—achievement of aims end objectives, and consequently also in identifying particular factors that may determine that achievement or non— achievement. This is a major problem in the area of moral education. 2. Morel Training and Morel Education The significance of the swing from "training" to "education" and the reasons for it will vary according to the particular area of learning, although some general factors may also be involved.