ORGANIZATIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN SOVIET DEFENSE DECISIONMAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES by JOHN WILLIAM RIX LEPINGWELL S.B., Physics, MIT (1981) S.B., Philosophy, MIT (1981) SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY September 1988 (c^> Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1988 Th&s'/s ORGANIZATIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN SOVIET DEFENSE DECISIONMAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES by JOHN WILLIAM RLX LEPINGWELL Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 1, 1988 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science ABSTRACT How do the different organizations in the Soviet defense decisionmaking apparatus interact and influence each other in the decisionmaking process? What role do bureaucratic and organizational politics play in the deci- sionmaking process and how do they influence Soviet defense policy as a whole? This dissertation addresses these questions through a case study of the Soviet air defense forces (the Troops of the Air Defense- -VPVO) usixu^CBH^tl- level model of the Soviet defense decisionmaking structure jiff yf'fV' f as . In this model the General Staff is assumed to act as a unitary strategic actor, while the military services behave as organiza- tional and bureaucratic actors , attempting to influence the adoption of policy, and mediating its implementation. This case study examines the evolution of the Soviet air defense forces from their formation as a service in 1948 to the present. Particular at- tention was paid to the interaction of the VPVO with the General Staff during several periods of doctrinal and strategic change. It was found that while in several instances the VPVO was able to influence policy through biased representations of its capabilities and advocacy of its in- terests, these attempts were generally unsuccessful. In most instances the General Staff and VPVO either had shared interests or the General Staff was able to tnttli* VPVO objections to a proposed policy change. Only in one instance was persistent advocacy of the VPVO able to reverse a policy decision by the General Staff. Thus, the study indicates that while Soviet military services do attempt to influence policy by advocacy of their interests, these attempts are not usually successful due to the predominance of the General Staff in the Soviet defense decisionmaking structure. Despite the lack of success of its advocacy the VPVO was found to exhibit many of the characteristics expected of a bureaucratic organization: In- -2- cremental decisionmaking, conservatism, suboptimal learning behavior, and some inter-branch conflict. Substantial evidence also indicates that problems of inter-service coordination have proven difficult to resolve and that significant inter -service rivalry and conflict took place during World War II and may still occur today. This dissertation therefore indicates that there are limits on the ap- plicability of organizational and bureaucratic politics models of Soviet defense decisionmaking as they do not incorporate the unique contributions of the General Staff. Nevertheless, organization theory does provide a good model of the internal behavior of the VPVO has a distorting influence on the implementation of strategy and operational art. The model of Soviet defense decisionmaking used, f0t§^0^^f0tlf^acy^txa.tm$i.c motor model vith the organizational and bureaucratic bohavior of the VPVO, thus provides a richer and more accurate representation of the Soviet defense decisionmaking process than either model alone. Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Stephen M. Meyer Title: Associate Professor of Political Science (V 3- . - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Creating an acknowledgements page for a dissertation may be the hardest task of all, as there are so many who have helped in its writing in one way or another. During my years in the Department of Political Science and at the Center for International Studies I have been fortunate enough to receive material and moral support from many faculty members, staff, and students, and first of all I should like to thank them en masse For long-term and generous funding and support I am greatly indebted to the MIT Defense and Arms Control Program, and particularly its Direc- tor, Professor Jack Ruina. For funding during certain periods of my work here I grateful to the Ford Foundation Dual Competence Program for its support, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, MIT Project Athena, the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Net Assessment. For the opportunity to meet its members, use its resources, and participate in a number of seminars and confer- ences, I would like to thank the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs and its Director, Professor Joseph Nye. My dissertation committee, Irofessors Stephen Meyer, Donald Black mer, and Condoleezza Rice, deserves much of the credit (but none of the blame) for the finished product. Their comments and criticisms have al- ways been cogent, insightful, and helpful, and have contributed tremendously to improving the dissertation. I would particularly like to thank Professor Stephen M. Meyer, from whom I have learned a great deal -4- . and whose advice, comments, and guidance have been of tremendous as- sistance. Professors Loren Graham and George Rathjens, while not on my dissertation committee, have also provided valuable advice and assistance over the years Perhaps my greatest debt is to my fellow graduate students, particu- larly to the "old guard" of the Soviet Security Studies Working Group: Peter Almquist, Jeffrey Checkel, Cristann Gibson, Matthew Partan, Eugene Rumer, and the "honorary members," Fran Scanlon and Natalie Weinberger. Their support, assistance, advice, and comments have truly been invaluable and I feel very fortunate to have had them as comrades For some reason it is traditional to acknowledge one's family at the end of the acknowledgements page, perhaps to counter their priority in real life. This project would have been impossible without the tremendous, patient, and enduring support of my wife, Irene. Through the past two years she has had to put up with a preoccupied, tense, and overly busy husband while coping with an energetic toddler, and she has done a wonderful job. Anna, our daughter, has been a great encouragement to me, constantly reminding me that there are more important things in life than dissertations . For a lifetime of support and patience I must thank my . mother, who more than anyone is responsible for my getting this far. I dedicate this dissertation to my father, with the wish that he was here to see it. -5- CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Why Air Defense? Over the past 40 years the USSR has built up and maintained an im- mense air defense force consisting of over 9,000 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), some 2,200 interceptors and a netvork of 10,000 radars.* Herbert York has estimated that since 1948 the Soviets have spent over $^0 bil- lion dollars on air defense, compared to $50 billion for the U.S.. In an era when the ballistic missile is dominant what purpose does this force serve? Do the Soviets expect it to allow them to fight and win a nuclear war, and if so how? Is it just a reaction to the remaining large U.S. bomber force? Is it an example of bureaucracy run amok, continuing to maintain forces despite a diminishing threat and poor prospects for effec- tiveness? While there have been many such conjectures concerning the Soviet air defense forces (Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony--VPVO, or Troops of the Air Defense) there have been very few studies of the evolu- tion of this fores and the reason! behind its existence. 3 In this dis- 1 Department of Defense (1987; 59). 2 York (1987; 9, 24). 3 The Air Defense Troops underwent a reorganization and name change in 1981, previously they were referred to as the National Air Defense Troops (VPVOS) . I shall use the acronym VPVQ when referring to the post-1981 service or to the service in general' and the VPVOS acronym when discussing th« pre- 1981 service or tfas, QQSMlsns^sAr- defense eonponsnt. The only major work to go beyond the ABM treaty debate is Deane (1980). Articles and other works include Lord (1986), Petersen and Clark (1985), Monks (1977), and the serlss of chapters by Jones (and later Breightner) in the Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual. -6- s '"' sertation I investigate the factors behind the creation tod evolution of the VPVO, its forces and operational art. To do so requires more than a historical examination of forces and literature- -we need a model of how the Soviet defense decisionmaking system works In ordar to frimeour ques- tions and answers. Thus the second theme of this dissertation is the for- mulation and application of a model of Soviet defense decisionmaking that incorporates considerations of both strategic military analysis and orga- nizational behavior. Before turning to the theory, let us briefly examine the development of the VPVO over the past forty years. The modern VPVO may appear to be something of an anomaly, but it did not always appear so. At its inception in 1948 the U.S. bomber threat was very great- -and not only the nuclear threat. Given the relatively small stockpile of nuclear weapons in the late 1940s to early 1950s U.S. strategic bombing plans called for a prolonged nuclear and conventional bombing campaign against targets in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Against such a threat (turboprop bombers with conventional weapons) a strong air defense force could be expected to have a significant effect. As the nuclearization and modernization of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) progressed, though, bombers became more difficult targets and each could carry several multi-megaton bombs.