POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (IV): TUNISIA’S WAY Middle East/North Africa Report N°106 – 28 April 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. BETWEEN POPULAR UPRISING AND REGIME COLLAPSE .............................. 3 A. THE UPRISING’S TRAINING EFFECTS ............................................................................................ 3 1. The provincial revolt: From the socio-economic to the political ................................................. 3 2. The UGTT’s call for insurrection ................................................................................................ 5 3. The virtual erupts into the real ..................................................................................................... 6 4. The limited role of political parties .............................................................................................. 8 B. A REGIME WITH CLAY FEET ........................................................................................................ 9 1. The RCD resignation ................................................................................................................... 9 2. From a one-party state to a predatory regime ............................................................................ 10 3. The fragmentation of the security apparatus .............................................................................. 11 III. INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY OR REVOLUTIONARY RUPTURE ............... 12 A. WHAT INSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WHAT COUNTERVAILING FORCES? .................................... 12 B. FEAR OF A POWER VACUUM ...................................................................................................... 15 C. FEAR OF THE PAST ..................................................................................................................... 16 IV. REASONS FOR HOPE AND PITFALLS TO AVOID ............................................... 18 A. THE LONG ROAD TO COMPROMISE ............................................................................................ 18 B. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REALITIES ............................................................................................ 21 C. THE ISSUE OF ISLAMISM ............................................................................................................. 25 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 30 APPENDICES A. MAP OF TUNISIA .............................................................................................................................. 32 B. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 33 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 35 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2008 ... 36 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 38 Middle East/North Africa Report N°106 28 April 2011 POPULAR PROTESTS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (IV): TUNISIA’S WAY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Tunisia is where it all began. It is also the country where networking sites – from Facebook to Twitter – helped the democratic transition arguably has the greatest chance spread the movement to young members of the middle of success. There are many reasons for this, but the most class and elite. At the same time, violence perpetrated significant lies in the country’s history of political activism against protesters helped forge a link between socio- and social mobilisation, which decades of regime repres- economic and political demands. The image that the re- sion never fully stifled. This politically activist tradition gime projected of itself was of an indiscriminate police served the nation well during the uprising, as workers, the repression, so it was only logical that the demonstrators unemployed, lawyers and members of the middle class perceived it that way. Nothing did more to turn the popu- coalesced into a broad movement. It will have to serve lation in favour of the uprising than the way Ben Ali the nation well today as it confronts major challenges – chose to deal with it. namely, balancing the desire for radical political change against the imperative of stability; finding a way to inte- As for the regime, its bases of support shrivelled in dra- grate Islamism into the new political landscape; and tack- matic fashion. In his hour of greatest need, President Zine ling immense socio-economic problems that are at the el-Abidine Ben Ali found himself basically alone without origin of the political revolution but which the political support. Over time, what had been a one-party state had revolution on its own is incapable of addressing. become the private preserve of the president and the first family. Economic resources that had been previously shared In hindsight, Tunisia possessed all of the required ingre- among the elite were increasingly monopolised by Ben dients for an uprising. Notwithstanding the so-called eco- Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, and the private sector paid nomic miracle, vast expanses of the country had been sys- a hefty price. The ruling party, the Rassemblement consti- tematically neglected by the regime. The unemployment tutionnel démocratique (RCD), no longer served as a source rate was climbing, especially among the young and uni- of patronage; it was unable to organise a single pro-regime versity-educated. The distress triggered by these socio- demonstration despite repeated calls by the president’s economic, generational and geographic disparities was entourage. Likewise, the army suffered under Ben Ali, who epitomised by the self-immolation, on 17 December 2010, did not trust it in the least; in the end, the military was of a young, unemployed, vegetable seller, from a small loyal to the state, not the regime. Even the security ser- town, who was supporting his sister’s university studies. vices were distrusted by Ben Ali, with the exception of His suicide quickly came to embody far wider grievances; the presidential guard, whose privileged treatment only notably, it was widely reported and believed by most fostered greater resentment. demonstrators that Bouazizi was a university graduate. In the wake of his death, young demonstrators took to the The uprising was fuelled by these contrasting dynamics, streets in the south and centre of the country, demanding which stimulated increased support for the revolution amid jobs, economic opportunities and better educational and increased defections from the regime. All in all, the coun- health services. try experienced mounting popular resentment, the mobili- sation of young citizens using social networking sites, The uprising spread both geographically and politically. growing involvement of political parties and trade unions, Trade unions played a crucial role. Initially hesitant, the and a weakened power structure, which had alienated its principal trade union, the Union générale des travailleurs traditional sources of support. At every stage, the authori- tunisiens (UGTT), soon after assumed the leadership role. ties’ response – from the use of lethal violence to Ben Pressed by its more militant local branches and fearful of Ali’s delayed and disconnected reactions – helped trans- losing the support of its base, the UGTT mobilised ever form a largely spontaneous and localised popular move- greater numbers of activists in a growing number of cities, ment into a determined national revolution. including Tunis. Satellite television channels and social Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°106, 28 April 2011 Page ii When Ben Ali hastily fled on 14 January, the game was A difficult economic situation was made worse. In the ab- far from over. The country faced three fundamental chal- sence of strong domestic steps and generous international lenges; of these, it has made headway in managing one, assistance, there is every reason to expect renewed social taken initial steps to tackle the other and has yet to address unrest coupled with an acute sense of regional imbalance, the third. and a sense of political disconnect between the north and southern and central regions of the country. The first task was to devise transitional institutions that could address competing concerns: fear of a return to the Such concerns notwithstanding, Tunisia remains for now past versus fear of a plunge into chaos. There were many cause for celebration rather than alarm. The transition is hurdles to overcome. The post-Ben Ali government’s first not being led by a strong army any more than it is by a incarnation seemed to many to be a carbon copy of the handful of politicians. Rather, a heterogeneous blend of old, with remnants of the RCD including holdovers from institutions, political forces, trade unions and associations the last cabinet. The opposition responded by establishing is finding its way through trial and error, negotiations and a council claiming to embody genuine revolutionary legiti- compromise. For the