Notes Chapter 2 1. De Boer and Sanders unfortunately confuse the moral admonitions of Nichiren with the actual, far more gradual and politically centred decline of the regime: socio-political histories of the period give the role of natural disaster little credit in this regard (see, for example, Souyri, 2002 [1998]). 2. Ironically, the city had been almost as devastated by its sacking by Crusader forces supposedly on the same side, during the Fourth Crusade of 1204 (see Harris, 2004), whose armies were equally destructive of the Islamic cities they captured in the Levant during the al-furub al-salibiyyah (crusader wars) (see Hillenbrand, 1999). 3. There were at least three attempts to wall the ‘north-west frontier’: the last being the best known by the Emperor Hadrian (Johnson, 2004); but there were also the Antonine Wall (Hanson and Maxwell, 1983) and the earlier wall along the Gask Ridge, still being investigated (Wooliscroft, 2002). 4. See John Pike’s GlobalSecurity website ‘US-Mexico Border Fence/ Great Wall of Mexico Secure Fence’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico- wall.htm (accessed 20/12/2007). Chapter 3 1. It was not just humans that were regulated. See Blancou (2001) on the history of control of animals and diseases. 2. However, Higonnet (2002) has disputed at least any primarily repressive military motivation for the rebuilding. Chapter 4 1. The amateur historian, Matthew White (2005), uses the term ‘hemoclysm’ (lit. blood-letting) to refer to the massive and unprecedented series of linked wars, massacres and exterminations which characterized the Twentieth Century. As a longue duree´ analysis, this echoes Zygmunt Bauman’s view that the Twentieth Century was characterized by ‘fast and efficient killing, scientifically designed and administered genocide’ (1995, p. 193). 2. Other significant advocates were Basil Liddell-Hart in the United Kingdom, and in Italy, Giulio Douhet. 3. For the official rationale, see Stimson (1947); for a consideration of the different views on this, see Sherwin (1995). 4. These agreements, including the Geneva and Hague Conventions and the multiple agreements and treaties on nuclear weapons, are outside the scope of this book. 264 Notes 265 Chapter 5 1. This idea saw mixed land-use in the city as contributing to greater safety as this would increase the times of day the streets were frequented. 2. Not only did SBD prove successful in reducing criminality but were also often able to elicit a significant discount on household insurance (Conzens et al., 1999). 3. During the first years of the ‘Troubles’ (1968–1970) the commercial core of the city was seen as a relatively neutral space within the segregated sectarian landscape and was relatively unaffected by terrorism. All this changed in July 1970 when a large bomb was detonated in the area without warning. 4. This initially led to fears that these measures would destroy the city centre in a way the Provisional IRA never could, by keeping the customers out (see Brown, 1985; Boal, 1995). 5. It is believed that the term ‘ring of steel’ was first used in 1976 to refer to the amalgamation of the four individual security zones around Belfast City Centre into one large security sector ringed by seventeen 10–12 foot high, steel gates (Coaffee, 2003). 6. Place promotion campaigns were also been used to re-image the stigmatized Central Belfast area in an attempt to shake of its image of terrorist violence (see Gold, 1994; Neil, 1995). 7. Soffer and Minghi highlight that the security landscape evolved over the course of the Twentieth Century but intensified after 1948 with the estab- lishment of the state and again in the late 1960 and early 1970 linked to a series of Middle Eastern regional conflicts. 8. For a detailed account, see Segal and Weizman (eds.) (2003). 9. For a detailed account of the history of CCTV in Britain, see Norris and Armstrong, 1999. 10. Furedi (2006), utilizing the work of criminologist David Garland (2001), referred to the lack of statistics relationship between crime figures and fear of crime as part of a ‘crime complex’ that ‘encompasses a cluster of attitudes that are shaped by the belief that high crime rates are a normal part of life’ and that ‘these attitudes are expressed through a consciousness of crime that is moulded by popular culture and institutionalized in the organization of everyday life’ (p. 3). Chapter 6 1. Jones and Newman also illuminated how there existed a ‘benign co-existence’ (p. 181) between the local police force and the private security agencies who tended to operate in different geographical spaces – the police in the public realm and the private security professionals in the spaces of commerce. 2. The City at this time employed around 130,000–140,000 people and gen- erated an estimated output of £10–15 billion a year for the UK economy (Corporation of London, 1995). 3. Locally the ring of steel was often called ‘the ring of plastic’ as initially access restrictions were based on funnelling traffic through strategically placed rows of traffic cones (Coaffee, 2004). 4. This cordon was again expanded in August 2005. 266 Notes 5. Here preparation involved assessing the likelihood of terrorist attack on your organization; preparing your staff for the possibility of telephoned bomb threats; choosing the mix of protective measures that best suits your premises and that will deter or detect the terrorist; encouraging your staff to remain vigilant; and testing security plans regularly. Chapter 7 1. See also Harvey and Delfabbro (2004) for an overview. 2. The rhetoric of resilience in the media is also often emotive in this way, build- ing on the positive psychological sense of strength gained from exposure, thus underpinning much of the ‘spin’ of resilience as a metaphor which can be deployed strategically in a broader framework of policies. 3. Institutional resilience to change in the context of cross-national collabora- tion and convergence is another approach to resilience not discussed here in depth; for an example of this see Jordan (2003). 4. Whilst economic resilience is useful in itself, its conceptual orientation often excludes socio-cultural and spatial factors (underpinning the reason for adopt- ing a resiliency approach) at the cost of over-privileging the orderly flow of capital. 5. It has also been noted that the risk and frequency of disease outbreaks is increasing, affecting every corner of the globe (see, for example, Hayman, 2004). Chapter 8 1. This demonstrates the global scale of natural hazards planning alongside the global terror threat, but also the need to operate proactively across several scales efficiently (international, national, regional, local). 2. Cited in Walker and Broderick (2006, p. 24). 3. There was also another booklet called Emergency Response and Recovery which dealt with further aspects of IEM published at the same time. 4. A discussion of the detail of the CCA legislation lies beyond the scope of this chapter (for a detailed expose and commentary on the Act, see Walker and Broderick, 2006). 5. A discussion the resiliency arrangements lie beyond the scope of our discussion here. For further information see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/ Topics/Justice/emergencies; http://www.walesresilience.org/; http://cepu. nics.gov.uk/. 6. National Government’s further commitment to this fledgling ‘warning and informing’ strategy was to formalize, from 2003, a National Media Emergency Forum (subsequent regional and local variations have since emerged). This was initially a voluntary body set up in 1996. 7. For example, the urban riots in a number of northern English towns dur- ing the summer of 2001, some of the worst in 20 years, were sparked in part by accusations of racial segregation. This increased concerns regard- ing existing approaches to area-based regeneration and the need to pri- oritize measures that would improve the integration of different ethnic groupings. Notes 267 8. To date this aspect of countering radicalization has involved numerous meetings and discussions between Government misters and senior mem- bers of UK Muslim communities, detailed work undertaken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in local communities, and the development of grass-roots projects to engage with Muslim youth. 9. The ‘MI’ in MI5 and MI6 stands for ‘Military Intelligence’ and is a hang- over from a much older system of classification of the British intelligence community. 10. This Act uses a clause in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Article 5) which allows the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for ‘derogating’ order. The 2005 Act has in recent years been challenged in the UK courts, where under Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair hearing) it was successfully argued that this, in certain circumstances, amount to a ‘deprivation of liberty’ (HM Government, 2006, p. 20). 11. Notably this included the creation of a new European Union Counter- Terrorism Strategy in 2005; achieved whilst the United Kingdom held the rotating EU presidency. 12. At present, Project Semaphore – a pilot system – is assessing how this might best be done, and this will be superseded after 2008 with a roll-out of a full e-borders system. 13. CPNI was formed in early 2007 from the merger of the National Infrastruc- ture Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) and a part of MI5 (the Security Service) – the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC). 14. Depending on the nature of the event, different representatives will attend the meeting and advise on contingency arrangements. 15. Under such powers, Parliament could, in theory, be suspended and a bank holiday declared to shut down businesses. Property could be destroyed or requisitioned, mass assemblies banned and freedom of movement limited. In extreme cases, the armed forces can be mobilized and special courts set up to deal with suspects if it was felt another atrocity was planned (The Independent, 2007).