UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara Self-instantiation in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Michael James Augustin Committee in charge: Professor Voula Tsouna, Chair Professor Richard McKirahan Professor Richard Bett Professor Thomas Holden June 2018 The dissertation of Michael James Augustin is approved. _____________________________________________ Thomas Holden _____________________________________________ Richard Bett _____________________________________________ Richard McKirahan _____________________________________________ Voula Tsouna, Committee Chair June 2018 Self-instantiation in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist Copyright © 2018 by Michael James Augustin iii For my late grandfather, Irwin Lee Klundt He was a philosopher in the true sense of the word, a “lover of wisdom,” and told me that my graduate studies would be “the most enjoyable time of your entire life.” You were not wrong, Grandpa. iv VITA OF MICHAEL JAMES AUGUSTIN June 2018 EDUCATION Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Arizona State University, May 2009 (summa cum laude) Master of Arts in Philosophy, Georgia State University, May 2012 Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara, June 2018 (expected) PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT 2012-13: Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara Summer 2013: Teaching Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara 2013-15: Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara 2015-16: Teaching Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara Spring 2016: Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara Fall 2017: Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara Winter 2018: Teaching Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara Spring 2018: Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara PUBLICATIONS “Epicureanism and the Health of the Soul,” In Ancient Thought, edited by Nathan J. Barnes, Josh Carroll, Oliver Langworthy, and Erlend MacGillivary. 2017. “Weight in Greek Atomism,” Philosophia, 45 (2015), 76-99. AWARDS Academic Senate’s Doctoral Student Travel Grant, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2018 Charlotte Stough Memorial Prize, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2017 Regents Special Fellowship, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2016 Graduate Student Association’s Travel Grant, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2016 v Paul Wienpahl Award for Teaching Excellence, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2016 Graduate Student Association’s Travel Grant, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2015 Charlotte Stough Memorial Prize, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2013 Graduate Student Association’s Travel Grant, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2013 Regents Special Fellowship, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012 Phi Sigma Tau (Zeta) — Scholar Travel Stipend, Georgia State University, 2012 Philosophy Department’s Professional Development Travel Grant, Georgia State University, 2011 Phi Sigma Tau (Zeta) — Scholar Travel Stipend, Georgia State University, 2011 Sun Angel Excellence in the Humanities Research Scholarship, Arizona State University, 2008 FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Ancient Philosophy vi ABSTRACT Self-instantiation in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist by Michael James Augustin The present project brings together two areas of Platonic scholarship. One area is Plato’s Parmenides, the dialogue that appears to cripple the theory of Forms. Yet though the theory meets with several seemingly devastating criticisms, Parmenides himself tells the young Socrates that it is in fact possible to save the Forms. Scholars are divided over just how, if at all, this rescue happens. The other area concerns “self-predication,” a particular sort of predication displayed in statements of the form “the F is F,” where the subject term names some Form. Scholars are divided here too, and in two ways. First, there is disagreement about just how we should understand the very notion of self-predication. What does a statement of the form “the F is F” even mean? Second, there is debate over whether Plato himself endorses (or should endorse) some particular understanding of self-predication. My focus here is an interpretation of self-predication on which statements of the form “the F is F” say that the Form is characterized by the very quality it constitutes, or “self- instantiates” as I will often put it. The majority position in the literature is that Plato no longer subscribes to (or should no longer subscribe to) this particular understanding of self- predication after the Parmenides. The reason is simple: self-predication understood in this vii way is largely responsible for the theory of Forms’ being sunk in the Parmenides. Saving the theory of the Forms requires, it is often claimed, jettisoning from the theory this special sort of predication. I find myself part of a small group of scholars that reject the majority positon. My own reading is that self-instantiation, far from sinking the theory of Forms in the Parmenides, is essential for saving the theory from Parmenides’s criticisms; the theory survives into the late dialogues largely because of this special sort of predication. In addition, I maintain that Plato himself was aware of how to disarm the objections presented in the dialogue, that self- instantiation plays this important role, and that the arguments are marshalled in part to compel us, his readers, to appreciate this for ourselves. The chapters that follow are principally concerned with the former part of my position, establishing the importance of self-instantiation for the theory of Forms post-Parmenides. I shall at times say some things about the latter, but it does not receive a full defense here. Still, I believe that it is nonetheless important to state this part of my view too. Chapters I and II focus on a pair of regress arguments from the Parmenides. It is widely thought that these arguments are successful precisely because of self-instantiation, and that the only way to disarm them is by dispensing with this tenet of the theory of Forms. I argue that this is wrong for both arguments, and offer alternative interpretations of them. Collectively, Chapters I and II show us that we must take seriously questions concerning how some Forms are characterized by the very qualities they constitute, and why this special sort of predication is part of the theory of Forms. Chapter III engages with the Parmenides’s bewildering dialectical display, which is said to be the method of training that will allow a young Socrates to save the theory of Forms. I consider and reject a prominent interpretation of the exercise, and then develop my own that viii sheds light on the importance of self-instantiation, reinforces earlier conclusions, and paves the way for consideration of Plato’s Sophist. It is in this dialogue, I maintain, that we find answers to the how and why questions. Chapter IV answers these questions. I argue that some Form is an instance of itself just in case that Form participates in itself. In addition, I show that self-participation, and so self- instantiation, is limited to certain Forms. These conclusions naturally invite consideration of the why question. Here my position is that some Form participates in itself just in case that Form plays a “structuring role” in the intelligible and sensible realms. Chapter V considers a question raised by this answer, namely, Does the Form of Change play a structuring role in the intelligible realm? If so, then the Forms, after the Parmenides, lose their immutability. This, interestingly, is another majority position in the literature. I side with the minority once more, arguing that the Form of Change does not play a structuring role in the intelligible realm. The result is that whatever changes the theory of Forms undergoes following its critique in the Parmenides, self-instantiation remains part of the theory and the Forms are still stable, unchanging entities. ix I. Parmenides’s initial regress argument A. Introduction This chapter is concerned with Parmenides’s third criticism of the theory of Forms.1 It is often called “the Third Man Argument,” but I shall refer to it as “Parmenides’s initial regress argument.” The argument’s success requires that the Forms are characterized by the very qualities they constitute or “self-instantiate.” The dominant response in the scholarly literature is that Plato should jettison this tenet from the theory of Forms — the assumption here is that Plato did not know how to prevent the regress — or that he is here signaling that this tenet is to be jettisoned — the assumption here is that he did know how to prevent the regress. Whichever is ultimately the case, it is widely maintained that the lesson to be learned from this argument is that the Forms no longer self-instantiate. Here I shall argue against this line of response. My argument is straightforward: this cannot be the argument’s lesson because some Forms must be characterized by the very qualities they constitute. Specifically, those Forms that I call the “structuring Forms.”2 I maintain that Plato himself is aware of this — the entire critique of the theory of Forms in this dialogue’s first part is too precise