Kebbi and Hausa Stratification Author(s): M. G. Smith Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1961), pp. 52-64 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/588016 . Accessed: 25/10/2013 22:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley and The London School of Economics and Political Science are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The British Journal of Sociology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.128.216.34 on Fri, 25 Oct 2013 22:36:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KEBBI AND HAUSA STRATIFICATION M. G. Smith r NHE BACKGROUND to this paper is simple. In July I959 I publishedan essayon Hausastratificationl which MissE. R. - Yeldrecently discussed in a paperon Islamand Social Stratification in J%orthernJVigeria.2 Miss Yeld'spaper is unsatisfactorywith regardto much of its data, and misleadingwith regardto their application. THE PROBLEM MissYeld set out to do a numberof things.Firstly, to examine'only the Fulani-dominatedHausa Emirates, chief among which are Sokoto, Gwandu,Kano, Katsina and Zaria-with oneof theindependent Hausa Emirates,that of Kebbi, as a control in consideringsuch factorsas whether the traditionalHausa status system has been significantly affectedby factorsof Fulaniethnic domination, or by a relativelylonger period (abouta century)of direct Islamicinfluence on politicallife'.3 She also undertookto analyse 'the changes brought about under Britishadministration, which affectthe statushierarchy and the possi- bilities for mobility'.4 However, she focused her main analysis on 'political and occupationalstatus in the urban capitals of Hausa Emirates'.5 In short, Miss Yeld undertookfive taskssimultaneously: firstly, to describethe traditionalHausa status system withoutwhich we should be unableto determinethe eXectsof Fulanirule or Islam;secondly, to determinethe effectsof Fulani rule on this 'traditionalHausa status system';thirdly, to do likewisefor Islam and to comparethis with the Fulani eXects;fourthly, to do likewisefor Britishcontacts; fifthly, to analysepolitical and occupationalstatus in Emiratecapitals, presum- ably at the presentday. To assessMiss Yeld's analysis, we musttherefore consider ( I) whether her problemsare distinctand resolvable;(2) whetherher methodology is appropriate;(3) whetherher data are appropriate;(4) whetherthese data correctlyrepresent the variousEeld situationswhich she isolates forstudy; (5) andfinally whether her conclusions are tenable or relevant to her problems.This procedureis especiallynecessary in view of the multiplicityand interrelationof MissYeld's objectives. Of these objectives,the fourthneed hardlydetain us. After a brief 52 This content downloaded from 129.128.216.34 on Fri, 25 Oct 2013 22:36:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KEBBI AND HAUSA STRATIFICATION discussionof Westerninfluences in Hausaland,Miss Yeld concludes that 'the traditionalsocial hierarchy remained virtually unaltered until the expansionof Governmentactivity in technicaldepartments during the last ten years.... Politicalstatus and channelsof mobilityhave thereforeremained virtually 1lnchanged within the Emirates.'6 This being so, our main attentionis directedto Miss Yeld'scomparison of status systems among the independentand the Fulani-dominated Hausa;and on 'whetherthe traditionalHausa statussystem has been significantlyaffected by factorsof Fulani ethnic domination,or by a relativelylonger period (about a century)of direct Islamic influence on politicallife'.7 However,discrimination is not easy,since Miss Yeld begins by saying that 'exceptwhere differences are expresslybrought out, materialon social stratificationapplies to both Fulani-Hausaand independent HausaEmirates'.8 This meansthat insteadof comparssonshe provides a collationof'Dr. Smith'swork on Zaria, supplementedby personal experienceof altogethersix yearsspent in NorthernNigeria, chiefly in Sokotoand Niger provinces,while for the independentKebbi I have only personalinformation acquired durlng two years spent there'.9 Thus, MissYeld has constructeda stratificationmodel embracing data from Kebbi and Fulani-ruledHausa. The statusof this constructis highly obscure.It can representcor- rectlyneither Kebbi or Fulani-ruledHausa, nor the 'traditionalHausa statussystem' which 'has been significantlyaffected by factorsof Fulani ethnic dominationor by a relativelylonger perlod (about a century) of directIslamic influence on politicallife'. Nor can it be saidto repre- sent Niger Province,where only I0 per cent of the populationare Hausa.10 The utility of this model is also marginal.It can neitherhelp us to determinethe effectof Fulanirule or of Islamon the traditionalHausa statussystem, nor to comparethese effectswith one another.It is in- capableof servingeither purpose, because it claimsto representboth the traditionalHausa status system and this systemas affectedby Islamand Fulani rule. It is also difficultto understandhow Miss Yeld can use Kebbi 'as a control'after combiningKebbi data with Hausa-Fulani materialin a compositestatement purporting to representboth. If Miss Yeld had set out to comparestratification in Kebbi and Fulani-dominatedHausa society, this should have been simple. Pre- sumablyshe controlsthe Kebbi data, and I have summarizedthe rest. It is thus quite easy to show in what ways these two bodies of data differor correspond. THE POSITION OF REBBI Apart from methodology,the most importantobjection to Miss Yeld'sprocedure centres on the positionof Kebbi vis-a-vis Hausa.She 53 This content downloaded from 129.128.216.34 on Fri, 25 Oct 2013 22:36:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions M. G. SMITH saysof Kebbithat 'the officialacceptance of Islamicreligion and juris- prudencewas, in part at least, due to motivesof political prestige, followingon Britain'sacceptance of the theocraticauthority of the Fulanirulers as legitimate'.llIn this, Kebbiwas probablyunique, and the assertioIlthat 'the officialacceptance of Islamicreligion and juris- prudencewas only broughtabout in the independentHausa states after Britishrule' 12 iS certainlyfalse. Current Kebbi represents only current Kebbi. Having recentlyadopted Islam, it no longerrepresents tradi- tional pagan Kebbi; and traditionalpagan Kebbi was distinguished fromthe pre-BritishHausa societies, whether independent or underthe Fulani,by severalcenturies of Islamicacculturation in the latter. Hausa ethnologyis quite complex,and in this it reflectsthe com- plexityof Hausasociety and history.Even the boundariesof thissociety are somewhatobscure. This conditionhas led MissYeld to generalize about Hausa on the basis of data SfromNiger and Kebbi. Professor Greenberghas indicatedhow the pre-MuslimHausa-speaking people of NorthernNigeria have changedtheir social organization under the influenceof Islam. Instancesof this processof change are currently observableamong pagan Hausa-speakingMaguzawa of Kano.l3 In Greenberg'sview, Maguzawaand other pagansin this region,whose nativelanguage is Hausa,share a commonogigin with MoslemHausa, who differentiatethemselves on religious, historical, cultural and oliticalgrounds. If thisis so, then the 'traditionalHausa status system' may referto two mutuallyexclusive societies. Either it may denotethe stratificationof pagan Hausa,or that characteristicof NloslemHausa beforethe Fulaniconquest. These two systemsdiffier sharply. Thus, if Kebbiwas paganuntil rgoo)it differsfrom Moslem Hausa. NIiss Yeld's 'traditionalHausa status system' is thusnot derivablefrom Kebbi data, simplybecause the Hausahave for centuriesbeen Moslem. When Maguzawaadopt Islam, they abandon a society based on patrilineages,having hereditary spirit cults and a predominantlysub- sistenceagriculture, for one with bilateralkinship which emphasizes occupationalspecialization, market production, exchange, urbanism, officialhierarchies and occupationalclass. Maguzasva are only the best- knownofthe Hausa-speakingpagan tribes. In SokotoProvincethere are severalothers, of whom the BungawanTurmawa or Masu-wuta-bauta (Slavesof fire)were said to be the firstand mostnumerous inhabitants. These Bungawatribes extended as far as Illo, Zaberma,and Arewa; they were eventuallyabsorbed by the rulersof Kebbi and Sokotointo their Hausasubjects.l4 Hausa speech,Hausa ethnic status,and MoslemHausa culture are threequite different things. Maguzawa and Bungawaknow only Hausa speech.They may or may not shareHausa ethnic status, according to the senseof this term;but they do not practiseMoslem Hausa culture, and the MoslemHausa describe these groups as arna (pagans)or simply 54 This content downloaded from 129.128.216.34 on Fri, 25 Oct 2013 22:36:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KEBBI AND HAUSA STRATIFICATION by name. Likewise,in Maradi and Gobirtoday, the ruling Moslem Hausa describetheir pagan subjectsas azna (pagans).In Kebbi until I900, rulersand subjectsalike seem to have been pagans. Of MissYeld's six yearsin NorthernNigeria, two werein