AFGHANISTAN: FROM PRESIDENTIAL TO PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 23 November 2004 Asia Report N°88 Kabul/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE LEAD-UP TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ........................................ 2 A. MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING OF THE ELECTION...................................................................2 B. VOTER REGISTRATION ..........................................................................................................3 C. SECURITY .............................................................................................................................5 D. POLITICAL MANOEUVRING ...................................................................................................7 III. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION............................................................................. 9 A. WHAT WORKED....................................................................................................................9 B. WHAT WENT WRONG .........................................................................................................10 C. ELECTION MONITORING......................................................................................................12 D. OUTCOME AND IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................................14 IV. PLANNING FOR PARLIAMENTARY, PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ELECTIONS ................................................................................................................. 16 A. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT COUNCILS ......................16 B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................................16 1. The Political Parties Law.........................................................................................17 2. The Electoral Law....................................................................................................18 3. Electoral boundaries ................................................................................................19 C. POPULATION DATA AND SEAT ALLOCATION.......................................................................20 D. REGISTRATION OF NEW VOTERS AND VOTERS ROLL ..........................................................21 E. MANAGEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS......................................................................................22 F. SECURITY ISSUES ................................................................................................................23 1. The militias and DDR..............................................................................................23 2. Taliban and other insurgents....................................................................................25 3. The pervasive influence of drugs.............................................................................27 G. AFTER THE ELECTIONS .......................................................................................................28 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF AFGHANISTAN .......................................................................................................30 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................31 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2001............................................................32 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................35 ICG Asia Report N°88 23 November 2004 AFGHANISTAN: FROM PRESIDENTIAL TO PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The October 2004 presidential election went well, and Assembly seats in each province as well as provincial Afghanistan now has its first ever popularly elected and district council membership -- have to be gathered. president. But the parliamentary, provincial and If these polls are to be credible, the JEMB must be seen district elections now scheduled for April 2005 will as impartial and independent, which requires it to be considerably more complicated, and preparations bring new members on board. And the international are going too slowly. If the parliamentary vote is community -- which has been quick to claim credit for delayed again -- it was originally to have been the presidential election -- must display greater urgency concurrent with the presidential election -- there is a and commitment to this next critical stage of the risk that the Karzai administration's legitimacy will be democratic transition. seriously tarnished. Both his government and the international community need to put in more Overshadowing all the preparations are fears about resources and make more progress in the next few security. Insurgents, principally the Taliban but also months on improving security, cutting down the Hizb-i-Islami forces loyal to Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, power of the warlords, and attacking the spreading have made clear their intention to disrupt the elections. influence of the drugs trade. Yet, as the presidential polls amply demonstrated, Afghans are keen to participate in the electoral process The key lesson from the presidential election is that despite such threats. Afghans strongly want a say in their governance. Afghanistan's constitution establishes a relatively The other, and perhaps, leading risk is posed by the strong presidency and weak parliament. The latter's continued dominance of factional militias throughout primary importance rests on the fact that it will provide the country. Regional and local commanders' control of political representation to all Afghans as well as a military, police, and intelligence resources, sometimes check on presidential power. Given the deep ethnic simultaneously, gives them access to revenue streams polarisation, it is essential that the multi-ethnic, multi- that can generate patronage and undermine the political regional population has pluralistic and participatory space for opposition parties and other political forces. avenues to express its demands and articulate its It is unlikely that all militias can be fully disarmed and grievances through parliamentary elections. A further demobilised in the near future but the process has to delay in those elections would damage the credibility be accelerated and every attempt made to contain the of the new governmental system, particularly if the domestic spoilers. Those who continue to lead militias Karzai administration proves not to be ethnically and must be excluded from the political process, as intended regionally inclusive, with respected representatives by the Political Parties Law and the Electoral Law. of Afghanistan's various communities. Attention should also be paid to the lessons of the The Karzai administration must pick up the pace of presidential election. The 9 October vote was an preparations for the April elections. There are many historic event, the country's first ever-direct election challenges to be overcome if they are to be kept on for its head of state. The high turnout, orderly course. The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), conduct of voters and absence of widely expected the body responsible, must not lose any more time. violence demonstrated the strong desire of Afghans District boundaries must be set, and accurate population to participate in their country's political process. figures -- needed to determine the number of National President Hamid Karzai won convincingly with 55.4 Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections ICG Asia Report N°88, 23 November 2004 Page ii per cent of the vote, well ahead of Younus Qanuni district boundaries based on current cartographic (16.3 per cent). With some exceptions, however, data, increase efforts to obtain official population voting was largely along ethnic and regional lines. figures or estimates for each province and establish a boundary dispute resolution Karzai received the vast bulk of votes in the Pashtun mechanism, with representation from the Afghan east and south as well as a comfortable majority in Independent Human Rights Commission, the the multi-ethnic west and multi-ethnic urban centres, Interim Electoral Commission, UNAMA, and including Kabul. Qanuni received 95 per cent of the all political parties. votes in his native Panjshir province, but picked up less than expected of the Tajik vote from other 3. Undertake a comprehensive public information provinces. The other leading candidates, Abdul Rashid campaign, with particular attention to radio and Dostum and Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq received the television, to educate voters and candidates bulk of the Uzbek and Hazara vote respectively. The about the upcoming elections. remaining 14 candidates shared less than 8 per cent. 4. Strengthen the role of political parties in the political process by amending the Electoral This clearly reflects Afghanistan's deep ethnic Law to replace the Single Non-Transferable polarisation and the continuing undue influence of Vote (SNTV) system with a party list system militia leaders in the political process. Karzai has now and amend the Electoral Law to provide the committed himself to removing the warlords,