Notes Introduction 1. From John Bullitt (2005) ‘What is Theravada Buddhism? A Thumbnail Sketch’. In http://www.accesstoinsight.org/theravada.html. This link may be helpful to read- ers who are unfamiliar with Buddhism (although a more detailed account of the central teachings is offered in this project). 2. The tradition of Advaita Vedanta is generally associated with the leading figure of S´am. kara who lived in India around 788–820 CE. The teachings of Advaita Vedanta (that S´am. kara and various sages such as Ramana Maharshi and Nisargadatta Maharaj re-interpreted) are based upon the Upanis.ads, some of which predate the Buddha. References to Advaita Vedanta will be relatively scarce in this project. 1. Some central distinctions and the Four Noble Truths 1. A published variation of this online paper appears in Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1997. Since the online version (which appears on a JCS discussion thread) is more suited to this chapter’s discussion, it is the version I shall stick with. As no information is provided about its year of appearance, I shall assume the year to be 1997. 2. ‘Qualia’ is the plural term (singular: ‘quale’) that philosophers give to raw felt qualities of sensation such as the itchiness of hay fever or smell of fresh coffee or sadness of a memory. 3. The best one can hope for, if one is a physicalist, is some kind of identity, reduc- tion or elimination of the witnessing perspective to brain-process, meaning that when the relevant brain-process is observed by a third party, then so is the wit- nessing perspective – should it exist. But note that the observed object would no longer be a subject qua subject, but merely (at the most) a subject qua brain- process. The subject–object distinction would not be obviously transgressed. 4. The division of conditioned co-dependency into explicit ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ dimensions is my own. However, both are implied in an abstract for- mulation of the doctrine, expressed in the suttas (and quoted in Harvey), hence ‘That being, this comes to be; from the arising of that, this arises; that being absent, this is not; from the cessation of that, this ceases’ (Peter Harvey, 1990, 54). On this, Harvey comments: ‘This states the principle of conditionality, that all things, mental and physical, arise and exist due to the presence of certain conditions, and cease once their conditions are removed: nothing (except Nibba¯na) is independent’ (Harvey, 1990, 54). 5. See Armstrong, Martin and Place (1996) especially 71–87 and 184–191. 6. A good explication of these laws can be found in Bhikkhu Payutto’s book Good, Evil and Beyond: Kamma in the Buddha’s Teachings (1993, 1–2). 7. See for example Harvey (1990, 32) who writes, ‘The Buddhist view, in fact, is that there is no known beginning to the cycle of rebirths and the world … However far back in time one goes, there must have been a prior cause for whatever beings existed at that time’. 211 212 Notes 8. Descriptions of the five khandha¯s can be found in most Buddhist texts, including Harvey (1990, 49–50) and Gethin (1998, 31–32). 9. The notion of ‘real’, in relation to the concept of ‘illusory’, will be properly analysed in Chapter 5. 10. This kind of belief in the self’s existence is thus notably different from an intel- lectually motivated belief in the self’s existence. With an intellectual belief (such as that which may be had on the basis of philosophical argument) the proposi- tion believed is the content of a thought or idea that can be focused upon by the subject that appears to hold it. We must not confuse a thought or idea about X with a direct perception or conscious impression of X itself (compare the object of attention in a thought about a chair with that of a perception of a chair). 11. Suttas, drawn from the Pali Canon, are the closest we have to original teachings by the historical Buddha. Many of the Pali words have similar-sounding Sanskrit translations, for example, nibba¯na (in Pali) is nirva¯na (in Sanskrit); kamma (in Pali) is karma (in Sanskrit). 12. Adapted from a translation by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2006). I translate the Pali term dukkha¯ as ‘suffering’ rather than ‘stress’. 13. Readers wishing to gain another overview on the Four Noble Truths can consult Buddhist sources such as Gethin (1998, 59–84), Harvey (1990, 47–72) and Luang Por Sumedho (1992). 14. It may be pointed out that sometimes threads of pain or suffering can actually enhance the overall hedonic tone of an experience, as the pain of a mountain- climber might add to his overall elation at having climbed the mountain. This does not undermine our account of dukkha¯, however, since Buddhism is not com- mitted to denying that dukkha¯ can play this kind of role. 15. In the spectrum of ethical theories, Buddhism fits most closely with virtue ethics. The moral value of an action depends upon the state of mind (virtuous or vicious) from which the action springs. A very good book on kamma (with citations from various suttas) is Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto, Good, Evil and Beyond: Kamma in the Buddha’s Teaching. Thailand: Buddhadhamma¯ Foundation Publications, 1993. 16. So on the Buddhist position, rebirth does not involve some essential soul sub- stance being reborn into another body; it rather involves the continuation of a causal process among the five khandha¯s. Such a process will ‘carry’ kammic imprints from one life to the next. 17. The Stoics seem a notable exception, however. 18. My interpretation of the concept of nibba¯na, supported by citations from various suttas, will be elaborated in Chapter 2. 19. In Chapter 2, I provide evidence from the suttas to suggest that there may well be witnessing for the Arahant who dies; such witnessing would lack any object or external limitation by conditioned parameters. 2. Nibba¯na 1. I nonetheless confess to preferring Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s translations, hence, I rely mainly upon these in Chapter 3 where nothing too controversial hinges on them. The main controversy lies in my reading of the nibba¯na suttas that I bring to the no-self doctrine – so it is important that the bulk of these are not translated by scholars, such as Thanissaro Bhikkhu, whose position I sympathise with. When I do refer to Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s translations in this chapter, it is either uncon- troversial or in a context where I appeal explicitly to a point that he has raised. Notes 213 2. Since nothing too controversial hinges upon this sutta, I use Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s (2005) interpretation here. 3. Translated by John Ireland (2006). 4. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 5. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). A similar refrain occurs in AN IX. 36: ‘Having viewed them thus, his mind then turns away from those states and focuses upon the deathless element: ‘This is the peaceful, this is the sublime, namely, the stilling of formations, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibba¯na.’’ (ibid). In a later section, my analysis will imply that the term ‘focusing’, in this context (on nibba¯na), cannot be taken literally if understood to mean ‘paying attention’. ‘Is percipient of’ is more accurate. 6. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 7. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 8. Buddhist suttas do not specifically deploy these Kantian terms to describe the manner in which nibba¯nic consciousness is unconditioned; the description of nibba¯nic consciousness in these particular Kantian terms is my own. 9. Translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1993a, 32). 10. Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000). 11. Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000). 12. Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000). 13. Translated by John Ireland (2006). 14. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 15. What if, for the sake of argument, all living beings were to be destroyed? Would there still be nibba¯nic consciousness? Given its timeless non-dependence upon any khandha¯, mental or physical, the answer must be ‘yes’. It is just that the mind of the Arahant, when freed from tan. ha¯ and other ‘covering’ khandha¯s, is uniquely conducive to fully experiencing (and indeed, being) its intrinsic nature (nibba¯nic consciousness) as it is in itself. 16. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 17. Nibba¯na would hence not be physical, since it would not depend in any way upon the body or brain. Why then, its association with properly functioning brains (as opposed to say tables or dead brains) or, in Buddhist terms, the psycho-physical khandha¯s, for example, those of an Arahant? Any role played by the khandha¯s must be understood in terms of their holding in the right relations to allow for the various degrees of revealing (rather than creating) the intrinsic nibba¯nic consciousness. The khandha¯s hence serve to cover, in various degrees, what is timelessly ever-present. 18. Translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1993a, 28). 19. A detailed depiction of the Arahant’s general mindset, supported by suttas, can be found in Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1993a, 95–120). Warpola H. Ra¯hula (1996, 43) also gives a nice depiction. 20. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 21. Translated by Venerable Nyanaponika Thera¯ and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1999). 3. The definition and status of self in Buddhism 1. It is reminded here that the indexical term ‘itself’ is not meant to convey the reality of a self.