DIFFERENCES REGARDING TOGO’S SURPRISE ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR Aizawa Kiyoshi In the first half of the twentieth century, Japan fought two wars— the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 and the Pacific War of 1941– 1945—against Russia and America respectively, the two great powers that would go on to divide the world during the second half of the century. Moreover, in both of these conflicts Japan opened hostili- ties with a surprise naval attack. In challenging great powers like Russia and America, Japan considered it essential to take advantage of surprise to inflict initial physical and psychological damage because of the limits the Japanese economy imposed on war making cap- abilities. The initiative gained, it was hoped, would carry Japan through to victory. Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and Pearl Harbor attack planner Yamamoto Isoroku, opened the Pacific War with America with the following observations: We have much to learn from the Russo-Japanese War. The lessons concerning the opening of hostilities are: 1) favorable opportunities were gained by opening the war with a sudden attack on the main enemy fleet; 2) it is regrettable, but true, although there are exceptions, that the morale of our torpedo division was not necessarily very high and its capabilities were insufficient; and 3) both the planning and implementation of the blockade operation were not sufficiently thor- ough. We must make efforts, based on these successes and failures, to handle the opening of the war with America much more successfully. Furthermore, we must be prepared to act decisively to secure victory on Day One of hostilities.1 1 National Defense College, War History Office (Boueichou Bouei Kenshusho Senshishitsu), War History Series: The Hawaii Operation (Senshi Sousho Hawai Sakusen), (Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1967), p. 84. Yamamoto graduated from Naval Academy in November 1904, in the last stages of the operation on Port Arthur, and the fol- lowing year he became one of the last officers to participate in the Russo-Japanese War, as crew on board the first-class cruiser Nisshin in the main forces of the Combined Fleet that took part in the Battle of Tsushima. 82 aizawa kiyoshi Admiral Togo Heihachiro, Commander of the Combined Fleet that attacked Port Arthur and of the subsequent blockade operation, emerged from the Russo-Japanese War as the man who led Japan to victory, particularly after the decisive victory in the Battle of Tsushima. But, as Yamamoto noted, he held serious doubts about Togo’s operations at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war. This can be seen through his use of words like “regrettable,” “not sufficiently thorough,” “failures,” and his argument that Japan needed to handle operations at the opening of the war with America “much more suc- cessfully.” Yamamoto, therefore, went into the Pearl Harbor opera- tion believing that he had to do much better than Togo despite the larger than life reputation the latter had obtain as a result of the “victory” against Russia. In fact, even before the Russo-Japanese War, the Naval Staff had expressed doubts about Togo’s fitness to command the forces that launched the surprise attack on Port Arthur.2 However, ultimately, the operation was implemented under Togo’s command. What then were the differences of opinion between Togo and the Naval Staff ? The aim of this paper is, firstly, to outline the status of the Japanese Navy in the Far East prior to the outbreak of war, to clarify the differences in the views of Togo and the Naval Staff, and finally to consider the impact of this clash of opinions on the subsequent devel- opment of the campaign, both on land and at sea. A Comparison of Naval Power at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War A comparison of the total national force or power of Japan and Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, shows that Russia’s forces were clearly superior. However, a comparison limited to naval forces in the Far East when the Russo-Japanese War began in early 1904, shows Russian and Japanese Naval forces to have been quite evenly matched. Russia’s Pacific Fleet consisted of 7 battleships and 4 first-class cruisers, totaling approximately 190 thousand tons, while the Japanese fleet consisted of 6 battleships and 6 first-class cruisers 2 See Bruce Menning, “Miscalculating One’s Enemies” in Wolff et al., eds., The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, Vol. 2, for the Russian Navy’s unflattering evaluation of Togo as commander..