University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2017 The Law of Interpretation William Baude Stephen E. Sachs Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, "The Law of Interpretation," 130 Harvard Law Review 1079 (2017). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VOLUME 130 FEBRUARY 2017 NUMBER 4 © 2017 by The Harvard Law Review Association ARTICLE THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1082 I. WHAT’S MISSING FROM THE STANDARD PICTURE .................................................. 1085 A. The Standard Picture ..................................................................................................... 1085 B. Problems with the Picture ............................................................................................. 1088 1. The Limits of Linguistic Guesses............................................................................. 1088 2. Multiple Theories of Meaning .................................................................................. 1089 C. The Skeptical Response .................................................................................................. 1092 II. A TASK FOR LAW ................................................................................................................ 1093 III. OUR LAW OF INTERPRETATION ..................................................................................... 1097 A. Written Law ..................................................................................................................... 1099 1. Substantive Defaults .................................................................................................. 1099 2. Interpretive Defaults ................................................................................................. 1102 B. Unwritten Law ................................................................................................................ 1104 1. Substantive Rules ...................................................................................................... 1105 2. Interpretive Rules ...................................................................................................... 1107 (a) Interpretive Defaults ........................................................................................... 1108 (b) Priority Rules ........................................................................................................ 1109 (c) Closure Rules ........................................................................................................ 1111 3. The Structure of Interpretation ............................................................................... 1112 (a) Defining the Object of Interpretation ............................................................... 1112 (b) Identifying Written Law’s Role ......................................................................... 1114 (c) Choosing an Interpretive Approach .................................................................. 1115 C. Interpretive Rules and the Constitution ...................................................................... 1118 IV. IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 1121 A. Assessing the Canons ...................................................................................................... 1121 1. Their Authority .......................................................................................................... 1121 2. Their Validity ............................................................................................................. 1122 3. Some Examples .......................................................................................................... 1125 B. Assessing Construction ................................................................................................... 1128 1. Concerns About Construction .................................................................................. 1128 1079 1080 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 130:1079 2. Construction and Law ............................................................................................... 1129 3. Resolving the Disputes .............................................................................................. 1130 V. O BJECTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 1132 A. Mutability ........................................................................................................................ 1132 1. What Happens When Interpretive Rules Change? ................................................ 1133 (a) Adoption Rules and Application Rules ............................................................. 1133 (b) Implications for Interpretation ........................................................................... 1134 2. Who Can Change the Interpretive Rules? .............................................................. 1136 (a) The Nature of Interpretive Rules ...................................................................... 1137 (b) Deliberate Change................................................................................................ 1138 (i) By Judges ......................................................................................................... 1138 (ii) By Legislatures ............................................................................................... 1139 B. Indeterminacy.................................................................................................................. 1140 1. Finding the Law of Interpretation .......................................................................... 1140 2. Applying the Law of Interpretation ......................................................................... 1142 (a) The Volume of Indeterminacy ............................................................................ 1143 (b) Resolving Hard Cases ......................................................................................... 1144 (c) The Work of Closure Rules ................................................................................ 1145 3. Residual Indeterminacy ............................................................................................ 1146 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 1147 THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION ∗ William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs How should we interpret legal instruments? How do we identify the law they create? Current approaches largely fall into two broad camps. The standard picture of interpretation is focused on language, using various linguistic conventions to discover a document’s meaning or a drafter’s intent. Those who see language as less determinate take a more skeptical view, urging judges to make interpretive choices on policy grounds. Yet both approaches neglect the most important resource available: the already applicable rules of law. Legal interpretation is neither a subfield of linguistics nor an exercise in policymaking. Rather, it is deeply shaped by preexisting legal rules. These rules tell us what legal materials to read and how to read them. Like other parts of the law, what we call “the law of interpretation” has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private interpreters — even if it isn’t ideal. We argue that legal interpretive rules are conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and actually part of our legal system. This Article thus reframes the theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation, distinguishing purely linguistic questions from legal questions to which language offers no unique answer. It also has two concrete implications of note. It provides a framework for analyzing the canons of interpretation, determining whether they are legally valid and how much authority they bear. And it helps resolve debates over constitutional “interpretation” and “construction,” explaining how construction can go beyond the text but not beyond the law. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ∗ Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. We are grateful for comments from Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Amy Coney Barrett, Kathryn Bi, Saul Cornell, Ryan Doerfler, Oran Doyle, Richard Fallon, John Finnis, Sherif Girgis, Abbe Gluck, Mark Greenberg, James Grimmelmann, Cathy Hwang, Randy Kozel, Kurt Lash, Brian Leiter, Barbara Baum Levenbook, Jeffrey Lipshaw, Yair Listokin, Luca Marzorati, John McGinnis, Caleb Nelson, Will Ortman, Zach Price, Michael Rappaport, Richard Re, Amanda Schwoerke, Reva Siegel, Dale Smith, Larry Solan, Lawrence Solum, Asher Steinberg, Lee Strang, Gregg Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Kevin Walsh, and audiences at Georgetown University Law Center, Northwestern