New York Task Force on Racehorse Health and Safety OFFICIAL REPORT Investigation of Equine Fatalities at Aqueduct 2011-2012 Fall/Winter Meet TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 II. Scope of Investigation and Methodology ........................................................................... 7 III. Historical Perspective ........................................................................................................... 11 IV. Review of the 2011-2012 Aqueduct Fatalities .............................................................. 15 V. Factors Common to the Fatally Injured Horses ............................................................ 35 VI. Other Potential Contributing Factors .............................................................................. 37 VII. Overall Conclusions Regarding the Fatally Injured Group ....................................... 71 VIII. Additional Matters Addressed by the Task Force ....................................................... 75 IX. Recommendations of the Task Force .............................................................................. 87 X. References ................................................................................................................................ 97 XI. Exhibits ................................................................................................................................... 101 1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank 2 I. INTRODUCTION Between November 30, 2011 and March 18, 2012, 21 horses died or were euthanized as a result of conditions sustained while racing at Aqueduct Race Track (hereinafter “Aqueduct”) in Ozone Park, New York. The incidence of racing fatalities was approximately double that recorded in the previous two years, and well exceeded the North American average for racing fatalities. This unusual cluster of injuries generated widespread public and industry concern. In a letter dated March 14, 2012 from the Office of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to New York Racing Association (hereinafter “NYRA”) President Charles Hayward, NYRA was advised to “hire a qualified independent investigator or team of investigators to review the circumstances involving these breakdowns, analyze the cause or causes and recommend any necessary action to (prevent) equine breakdowns at NYRA facilities.” The letter further advised, “The scope of the review should include existing policies on disclosure, necropsies, track conditions and pre-race examination of horses. The rules on claiming, veterinary procedures and drug use must be examined to determine what we can do to promote equine safety.” On March 22, 2012 the New York State Racing and Wagering Board, (the “NYSRWB”) upon the recommendation of NYRA, announced the appointment of a team of respected industry experts to conduct the investigation. The team, which was named The New York Task Force on Racehorse Health and Safety, was comprised of the following members: Alan M. Foreman, Esquire. Mr. Foreman is a well-known equine and racing law attorney from Owings Mills, Maryland. His more than 30 years’ experience in the racing and performance horse industry includes service as a former Assistant Attorney General of Maryland and as counsel to many industry organizations. In addition to his private law practice, he is Chairman and CEO of the Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, representing more than 20,000 owners and trainers across the country. Mr. Foreman is a founding director of the National Thoroughbred Racing Association (the “NTRA”) and also serves as Vice Chairman of the Racing Medication & Testing Consortium (the “RMTC”). Jerry Bailey. Mr. Bailey is widely considered to be one of the greatest jockeys in the history of the sport. He rode in more than 30,000 races, was a seven time Eclipse Award winning jockey, is second in all-time earnings of $296 million in purses and served as President of the Jockeys’ Guild. He is currently a television analyst with NBC and ESPN. Mr. Bailey was instrumental in promoting the requirement of protective safety vests for jockeys. Mary Scollay-Ward, DVM. Dr. Scollay-Ward is the Equine Medical Director of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission. From 1988-1995 she was a regulatory veterinarian at Balmoral Park, Sportsman’s Park, Hawthorne Race Course, and Arlington Park in Illinois. From 1995-2008, she was the senior association veterinarian at Calder Race Course and Gulfstream Park in Florida. While in Florida, 3 Dr. Scollay-Ward developed an innovative equine injury reporting system that evolved into The Jockey Club’s Equine Injury Database. Scott Palmer, VMD. Dr. Palmer is an internationally known equine surgeon. He is the hospital director and staff surgeon at the New Jersey Equine Clinic, where he has practiced for more than 36 years. During much of this time he also worked as a private practitioner in the backstretch of Freehold Raceway and The Meadowlands Racetrack. He is a Past President of the American Association of Equine Practitioners (the “AAEP”) and currently serves as Chair of the AAEP Racing Committee. The New Jersey Association of Equine Practitioners twice named Dr. Palmer “Veterinarian of the Year”. Dr. Palmer chaired this Task Force. The Task Force’s mandate was to: • Investigate the cause or causes of the 21 equine fatalities at Aqueduct’s inner track meet between December 2011 and March 18, 20121; • Examine the physical condition of Aqueduct’s inner track; • Review and advise on policies relating to public disclosures, necropsies, track conditions and pre-race examinations, and; • Examine rules and practices relating to claiming procedures, veterinary procedures and equine drug use. In approaching this investigation, the Task Force was aware of the considerable speculation and theories that have been advanced to explain the occurrence of the fatal injuries during the Aqueduct meet. Included in these theories are: • The enhanced purses resulted in an economic model in which the purse was of greater value than the horse, thus establishing the horse as a disposable commodity to be consumed in pursuit of high value purses. • The inflated purse structure attracted an increased number of lower level and lesser quality claiming horses to race at Aqueduct, elevating these horses to a level of competition that was beyond their ability. • The horse population racing during the Aqueduct meet was of inferior quality and diminished soundness than previous meets. • Lame or injured horses were treated with illicit performance-enhancing drugs to mask unsoundness. • Excessive and inappropriate use of medication masked unsoundness and permitted the racing of lame or injured horses. • Redundant medical treatments in claimed horses (as medical records are not transferred with claimed horse) obscured the trainer’s ability to accurately assess the condition of the horse and make informed decisions on veterinary care. 1 The original mandate was to investigate 20 fatalities that occurred at Aqueduct from November 30, 2011 to 4 • The use of extra-corporeal shockwave therapy masked unsoundness and permitted the racing of lame or injured horses. • The unusually warm and dry winter weather during the Aqueduct meet affected the racing surface. • The mild weather resulted in fewer cancellations and eliminated the enforced rest associated with cancelled racing and training, thus allowing horses to be over-trained and over-raced. • Horses were raced with inappropriately short intervals between races The Task Force examined these and all other possible factors and conducted a thorough, objective, and comprehensive investigation. 5 This Page Intentionally Left Blank 6 II. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION AND METHODOLOGY In order to fulfill its mandate, the Task Force: • Conducted more than 75 interviews including, but not limited to, NYRA employees, past and present; the owners and trainers (and in some cases assistant trainers) of the fatally injured horses; trainers of uninjured horses who raced at Aqueduct and Belmont Park; the jockeys of the fatally injured horses; other members of the jockey colony at Aqueduct and Belmont Park; practicing veterinarians at Aqueduct and Belmont Park; NYRA veterinarians, past and present; paddock farriers; the Paddock Judge; the Stewards; NYSRWB personnel; the Director of the New York Equine Drug Testing and Research Program; the Vice President for Racing (the Racing Secretary); the Vice President of Facilities and Racing Surfaces (the track superintendent); and many others who reached out to the Task Force with comments or information. • Reviewed the daily racing programs for each of the race days on which a fatality occurred for indications of horses potentially at risk of injury. • Reviewed the past performances and workouts of the each of the fatally injured horses. • Reviewed and analyzed the race videos of the races in which fatalities occurred • Created comprehensive individual case histories for each fatality. • Reviewed NYSRWB investigation records for each fatality. • Reviewed the medical records of injured and uninjured horses as were provided to the Task Force. • Performed a risk factor assessment of each fatality. • Reviewed trainers’ claiming history during the 2011-2012 Aqueduct meet. • Reviewed Aqueduct Condition Books. • Conducted Aqueduct site inspections. • Conducted paddock inspections of foot conformation and shoeing practices. • Analyzed the regulatory procedures employed