No. 38 September 2012 The EU’s Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means Clara Portela froze the assets held in European accounts in Since May 2011, the EU has launched one order to prevent ousted leaders from accessing of its most far reaching and sophisticated state funds. In Libya, sanctions were quickly sanctions operations in support of the followed by a multinational military operation protests against the current regime in Syria. under NATO command which precipitated The present brief examines the measures the defeat of government forces. By contrast, wielded by the EU, its expected impact and in Syria neither have the protests succeeded in its implications for the EU’s relations with ousting President Bashar Al-Assad, nor has the its global partners. While seriously use of force been seriously contemplated. The undermined by the lack of support of Syrian leadership consistently refuses to step Russia, the sanctions are having a down or to negotiate with opposition groups, noticeable economic impact. Yet, the opting instead for a strategy of repression choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the which has been the subject of widespread bloodshed. The sanctions have also served international condemnation. Since the to (re)define partnerships with other eruption of violence in March 2011, the powers, both in the Middle-East and situation has been characterised by stalemate, globally. until protesters started making progress against government forces in July 2012. In the face of continued violence, the United Nations One year and a half after the beginning of the Security Council (UNSC) remains deadlocked: anti-regime protests, the European Union’s Russia has indicated its readiness to yield a (EU) response to the Arab Spring has taken veto against any proposal to intervene. A some unprecedented traits. The popular military operation to put an end to the uprisings in the Arab world have led the EU to crackdown on protesters remains unlikely for employ an instrument it had been traditionally fear of a domino effect that could exacerbate reluctant to use in this region: sanctions. They conflicts in this volatile region. The UK along were imposed against targets in Tunisia, Egypt with the US and some of Syria’s neighbours and Libya in the early days of the Arab Spring. (Saudi Arabia and Qatar), has resorted to However, they fulfilled different roles: In arming opposition forces. Yet, the EU is still Tunisia and Egypt, where leaderships were far away from reaching an agreement on unseated after only few weeks of protests, military intervention – even though calls in giving way to transitional governments, the EU that direction proliferate among European EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 1 politicians. In the absence of policy alternatives, 2012). The sanctions package comprises a set sanctions currently constitute the core of the of very diverse measures which can be EU’s response to the conflict in Syria. The EU expected to affect the regime and Syrian first asked Al-Assad to negotiate with the society very differently. Also, these measures opposition, then to cease repression, and as display different level of “targetedness”, from August 2011, to leave office (Balfour defined in terms of their capacity to 2012). These demands were supported by discriminate between targets. A brief overview2 sanctions imposed alongside those of the US, of the main prohibitions follows: and tightened in reaction to successive • A first set of sanctions targets the Syrian crackdowns on civilians. government: EU sanctions prohibit disbursements and assistance by the The sanctions against Syria are European Investment Bank (EIB) as well unprecedented. To begin with, the EU as new grants or loans by the member deployed the virtual entirety of measures in the states. The EIB had some 17 project sanctions toolbox within less than a year. In its underway in Syria in 2011, and reportedly past practice, it usually wielded an arms a portfolio worth €1.3 billion (Norman embargo and a visa ban on the leadership and 2011). In the same vein, measures are their associates. The tightening of sanctions in designed to ensure that private actors in subsequent rounds often consisted in Europe do not issue loans for those lengthening the blacklist and applying an assets cooperation projects that have been freeze to the featured individuals. While this interrupted by the EU – notably, the process often took years, the sanctions against construction of power plants. The issuing Syria have accumulated the whole set in just a of insurance to the Syrian government few months. Most notably, they entail an and the opening of new subsidiaries of energy embargo, namely a ban on the import of Syrian banks in the EU are banned, as is oil from Syria – a rare measure for the EU to the opening of new offices of European adopt in the absence of a UNSC mandate given banks in Syria. The assets of the Syrian that the EU imports this oil to meet its own central bank in the EU are frozen and it is energy needs. Prior to the embargo, the EU’s forbidden to trade public bonds to and import of Syrian crude was worth over €3 from the Syrian government, public billion a year, and went mostly to Italy and bodies and financial institutions. Germany1. Finally, sanctions were agreed at the request of the League of Arab States (LAS), a • A second set of sanctions targets those regional organisation that had encouraged such individuals directly involved in the measures against one of its members only once exercise of repression, with the intention before in its history – against Iraq in the early of affecting them and their associates 1990s. personally. They are prohibited from entering the territory of the EU, and the A WHOLE SET IN LESS THAN A YEAR assets they hold in Europe are frozen. The declared objective of the EU is to increase These individuals feature in a blacklist pressure on the Assad regime to end currently comprising 155 entries, while repression, withdraw the Syrian army from the blacklist of entities to which they are besieged towns and cities, the implementation linked numbers 53. The freezing of assets of democratic reforms and an inclusive national and the visa ban on the leadership and dialogue. The sanctions wielded against Syria their associates fulfils a double objective: encompass 17 sets of restrictive measures, cutting them off from financial assets so according to the EU’s own counting (Council these cannot be used for repression and EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 2 making the conduct of their business in • A fourth set of sanctions specifically Europe more difficult. Family members of targets the energy sector, with the the Syrian leadership are simultaneously intention of cutting off the government’s heading state companies and entities sources of revenue, and thus weaken associated with the regime – a personal repression. These entail a ban on the connection that warrants their listing. In import of oil and petroleum products addition, they stigmatise blacklisted from Syria, but also a prohibition on individuals and inconvenience them in a providing insurance to this sector, private capacity. supplying technology for the oil and natural gas sector, as well as providing • A third set of sanctions is directed towards loans to enterprises engaged in the oil the repressive apparatus of the regime. industry. The purchase or increase in Some measures concern the arms sector: participation in Syrian enterprises engaged the transfer of weapons and equipment in the oil sector is prohibited. The that can be used for internal repression is electricity sector is also affected: banned. The arms embargo is participation in the construction of new supplemented by technical and financial power plants for electricity generation, the assistance related to these items. The initial provision of technical or financial arms ban was broadened to encompass assistance and the creation of joint some dual-use items in the tightening that ventures to that end is also banned. The took place in April 2012. An innovative ban on oil and petroleum products from measure not covered by standard EU Syria is the single most powerful measure embargoes consists in banning the supply in the package, given that fuels and mining of software for the interception of internet products constitute over 89% of the EU’s and phone communications; in other imports from Syria.4 The ban on insurance words, the sort of equipment necessary for has serious economic implications, since the security forces to locate opposition oil shipments now have to be insured by forces and monitor their activities. The authorities in the recipient states, which latest reinforcement of the embargo might not be prepared to bear the costs. consists in the decision to inspect vessels and aircraft suspected of transporting • A fifth category concerns trade weapons to Syria via Europe, a measure restrictions. Measures affecting bilateral along the lines of UNSC sanctions regimes trade include a ban on cargo-only flights, against Iran and North Korea. and a ban on the export of certain goods: The EU arms embargo is not bound to luxury products, gold, diamonds and have any major effect: Syria’s top weapons precious metals. Aside from the oil suppliers are Russia, Iran, Belarus and embargo, the trade measures are modest. North Korea, while supplies from The EU merely imported some textiles European countries stopped already in the and agricultural products from Syria, early nineties. Russian arms exports to sectors representing respectively 4.8% and Syria have more than tripled in the period 2.7% of total imports from Syria. The from 2008 to 20113, and continue into restrictions affecting trade are geared 2012. Nevertheless, the mere prohibition towards preventing conspicuous upgrades of software can have some limited impact, in the limited trade flows that remain after as alternative suppliers can offer similar the import of oil, which made up most technology, but of lower efficacy.