MEMORANDUM RM-4718-PR AIR FORCE DECLASSIFICATION OFFICE Classification Re'ained__--------------- —.„. J A N U A R Y 1966 Classification Changed To: jp / Q l No Classified AF Equities \J --------—- Refer To:___________ Reviewers Declassified from SECRET by the Air Force Declassification Office on 23 Oct 2018 CONVENTIONAL MISSILE ATTACKS AGAINST AIRCRAFT ON AIRFIELDS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS J. G. H a m m e r an d W . R. E ls w ic k PREPARED FOR: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND 7 ¿ e RJMD(fyyfotatca# SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM RM -4718-PR JANUARY 1966 CONVENTIONAL MISSILE ATTACKS AGAINST AIRCRAFT ON AIRFIELDS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS J. G. H a m m e r an d W . R. E ls w ic k This research is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND—Con­ tract No. AF 49(638)-1700—monitored by the Directorate of Operational Requirements and Development Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development. Hq USAF. Views or conclusions contained in this Memorandum should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the United States Air Force. ■7& IUIIII) 1700 S r • Sant O N I C A l l F o R • 90406 -11- Published by The Rand Corporltion — i i i — PREFACE This Memorandum considers the possibilities of specialized non­ nuclear b a llis tic missile attacks against U.S. airpower based on South Vietnam a irfield s and on board aircraft carriers operating in the vicin ity of the Gulf of Tonkin. The subject should be of interest to those concerned with non­ nuclear weapon systems and their role in limited war situations. It is one phase of a general problem treated in Ref. 1. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of their colleagues M. B. Schaffer and D. B. Wilson. Jones, W. M. , and J. R. Schlesinger, A Possible Soviet Deployment in Southeast Asia (U) (Short T it le ), The RAND Corporation, RM-4613-PR, October 1965 -V - SUMMARY A ballistic missile attack using warheads containing many small fragmentation bomblets is considered, with special application to the war in Vietnam. The aircraft on two U.S.-operated airfields in South Vietnam and a U.S. carrier in the vicin ity of Tonkin are used as the basis for evaluating the cost of such an attack in terms of numbers of fixed-payload missiles required and required total payload of bomblets. It is shown that large boosters adapted to short ranges could carry payloads large enough to damage exposed, parked aircraft. - v i i - CONTENTS PREFACE.....................................................................................................................i i i SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. v LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................. ix Section I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1 I I o THE THREAT.............................................................................................. 3 I I I . UoS. TARGETS AT R IS K ......................................................................... 7 IV. RESULTS.................................................................................................... 13 Vo DISCUSSION OF PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS................................. 22 VI. CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................... 26 APPENDIX............................................................................................................. 29 REFERENCES 39 - ix - FIGURES Target areas at Da Nang ................................................................. 8 Target areas at Bien Hoa ............................................................... 9 Assumed target area to include carrier that has had time to steam a distance S ................................................................. 11 Bomblet payload required against land targets and single shot missile delivery capabilities (0.7 coverage, 15 PK “ ° ' 7) ........................................................................................... Bomblet payload required and achievable versus missile range (CEP = 600 ft ) ................................................................... 19 Bomblet payload required and achievable versus missile range (CEP = 1500 f t ) ................................................................. 20 Bomblet payload required and achievable versus missile range (CEP = 3000 f t ) ................................................................. 21 Radius of equivalent circular target area versus carrier speed and missile range ............................................................. 31 Required pattern area for 70 per cent coverage of area targets ............................................................................................... 32 Effectiveness of bomblets against 3000-psi concrete .... 35 Perforation of homogeneous armor plate versus weight and L/D of bomblet ................................................................................ 36 -1- I . INTRODUCTION Because of the obvious constraints on the use of nuclear weapons, the question of using IRBMs and ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads has been examined many times in the past. The idea has usually been dis­ missed as impractical and inefficient. Analysts have usually thought in terms of long ranges, poor target intelligence, hard targets or large area targets, and a small unit payload of the order of 3000 to 7000 lb. Under this set of assumptions, target k i l l expectancy and economic payoff were usually quite low, and there was usually little payoff in refinement of guidance and reduction of CEP. As a conse­ quence, non-nuclear warheads associated with such systems have appeared to be ineffective. This study suggests that there is a situation where missiles armed with non-nuclear warheads may find application under certain conditions. The war in Vietnam is different from any anticipated conflict, and the applicable tactics and techniques, or "ground rules," are not the same for both sides. Specifically, for example, while the use of missiles carrying non-nuclear warheads offers no particular advantage to the United States, such a system might be used effec tiv ely against U.S. and Government of South Vietnam (GVN) forces. The missiles could not only be used e ffectively , but for the purpose postulated in this study, could be a better choice in many respects than nuclear­ armed missiles. The Vietnamese situation presents the enemy with an unusually favorable set of circumstances: 1) Targets are lucrative; large numbers of unsheltered U.S. aircra ft are parked close together on hardsta.nd areas, especially during the rainy season, and on flig h t decks of aircraft carriers in the vicinity of Tonkin Gulf. 2) Firing ranges are short, 50 to 600 miles. Therefore, larger payloads can be lofted by IRBMs and ICBMs, and inertial guidance errors can be reduced. 3) Targets are compact: aircra ft parked on a ramp or flight deck rather than scattered about an airfield. Thus, improvements in missile guidance and lower CEPs would have decided value. -2- 4) The intelligence-firing cycle time is short compared to the time required for response or evacuation of a target area. A rtille ry spotting techniques may be possible against fixed targets. It thus appears that one of the primary sources of U.S. techno­ logical superiority in Vietnam, combat airpower, presents an inviting, soft target that could be vulnerable to a special kind of non-nuclear attack. In the sections to follow are a description of the threat, the results together with a. discussion of parameters and assumptions and the conclusions of the analysis. The method of analysis and graphic displays of some of the relationships are presented in the Appendix. -3 - I I . THE THREAT The weapon system with which this Memorandum is concerned is achievable with present technology by the United States--and presumably by the Soviet Union--a.nd could pose a credible threat to the U.S. position in South Vietnam. Of course the Soviets probably would not conceive of this exact system, and might not choose to use such a system, but it is important to recognize that the system appears to be appropriate for attack of such U.S. targets as areas of parked air­ craft and carrier decks laden with aircraft. As we conceive of the weapon system, it would consist of a delivery vehicle (the missile booster), a payload package or reentry vehicle, and a. warhead containing many small fragmentation bomblets. At a pre­ determined altitude over the target, the bomblets would be released to fa ll in a pattern of predetermined size. The number of bomblets in the pattern would be determined by the desired level of damage and by the lethal radius of the individual bomblets against the type of tar­ get considered. As w ill be shown later, a respectable expected lethality can be achieved within a very large pattern of bomblets; and the entire pattern can be placed over one of the postulated targets with a high value of expected coverage. The seriousness of the threat posed by such a system seems to depend on (1) the U.S. vulnerability and (2) the objectives, capabilities, and ingenuity of our enemies. The first can be described; the second can be inferred to some extent. U.S. land-based airpower in South Vietnam has been vulnerable to nany types of attack from the time aircra ft were fir s t employed against the Viet Cong, but the recent successful mortar attacks