HEIDEGGER’S ANALY TIC Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time TAY LOR CARMAN Barnard College, Columbia University published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, ny 10011-4211, usa 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarc´on 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http: //www.cambridge.org C Taylor Carman 2003 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2003 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge Typeface New Baskerville 10.25/13 pt. System LATEX 2ε [tb] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Carman, Taylor, 1965– Heidegger’s analytic : interpretation, discourse, and authenticity in Being and time / Taylor Carman. p. cm. – (Modern European philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-521-82045-6 1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. Sein und Zeit. 2. Ontology. i. Title. ii. Series. b3279.h48 s459 2003 111–dc21 2002067417 isbn 0 521 82045 6 hardback CONTENTS Acknowledgments page xi Abbreviations xii Introduction 1 1 What Is Fundamental Ontology? 8 2 The Critique of Husserl 53 3 Interpreting Intentionality 101 4 Heidegger’s Realism 155 5 Discourse, Expression, Truth 204 6 Authenticity and Asymmetry 264 References 315 Index 325 ix 1 WHAT IS FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY? God does not philosophize. Heidegger The central theme of Heidegger’s philosophy is the question concern- ing the meaning (Sinn) of being (Sein).1 The “fundamental ontology” he advances in Being and Time departs dramatically from traditional on- tology in that it asks not what there is, nor why there is what there is, nor even why there is anything at all and not nothing. The last of those questions, most famously associated with Leibniz and Schelling, is what Heidegger calls “the fundamental question of metaphysics.”2 It is a deep and im- portant question, but it is not the question of fundamental ontology, for what it asks about is the totality of entities, not the meaning of being. Heidegger’s question, then, is not, Why is there anything? but rather, What does it mean for something to be? – or simply (redundantly), What is it to be? “What does ‘being’mean?” Heidegger asks in his lectures of 1928. “This is quite simply the fundamental question of philosophy” (MAL 171).3 So, whereas traditional ontology was merely “ontic,” in that it occupied itself exclusively with entities, or what is (das Seiende), Heidegger’s own project is “ontological” in a radically new sense in 1 I translate Sein as ‘being’and Seiende as ‘entity’or ‘entities,’thus avoiding the common but confusing and unnecessary distinction between uppercase ‘Being’and lowercase ‘being.’ 2 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, chapter 1. 3 Ernst Tudenghat objects that Heidegger conflates the question of the meaning of being with the question of the meaning of (the word) ‘being’(see SZ 1, 11). Heidegger does admittedly use the two formulations interchangeably, but the distinction strikes me as irrelevant to his treatment of the question, since his argument has nothing to do with linguistic usage as such. For Heidegger’s purposes, asking about the meaning of (the word) ‘being’is simply another rhetorical way of asking what it means to be. 8 what is fundamental ontology? 9 asking not just about what there is, but about being as such. Funda- mental ontology is fundamental relative to traditional ontology, then, in the sense that it has to do with what any understanding of entities necessarily presupposes, namely, our understanding of that in virtue of which entities are entities. Heidegger’s originality consists in part in having raised the question at all, perhaps more explicitly and sys- tematically than ever before. Philosophy begins in wonder, Plato and Aristotle say,4 and in the course of his inquiry into the meaning of being, Heidegger can fairly be credited with reminding modern philosophy of what may be the most wondrous fact of all – that there is anything, and moreover that we understand something definite, however obscure, in understanding that there is. Over and beyond having posed the question of being, though, Heidegger continues to command our attention because of the origi- nality with which he approaches it, the philosophical strategy and the style of thought he thinks it demands, and finally the conclusions he draws in pursuing, if not exactly answering, the question. For the ques- tion of being, as Heidegger conceives it, is inseparable from questions concerning the understanding and the existence of those entities for which, or rather for whom, the question of being can be a question at all, namely, ourselves, human beings. The argument of Being and Time therefore begins by referring ontology back to what Heidegger calls an “existential analytic of Dasein,” that is, an account of the basic structures of human existence: “fundamental ontology, from which all oth- ers can first arise, must ...be sought in the existential analytic ofDasein ” (SZ 13), which offers a means of “uncovering the horizon for an inter- pretation of the meaning of being in general” (SZ 15). For Heidegger, “An analytic of Dasein must therefore remain the principal matter of concern in the question of being” (SZ 16).5 But how are we to understand such a project? What does the mean- ing of being have to do specifically with the existence of human beings? What unique link between being and human being requires that funda- mental ontology proceed by means of an analytic of Dasein? Heidegger 4 Plato, Theaetetus, 155d. Aristotle, Metaphysics, A 2, 982b12. 5 But compare Heidegger’s remark earlier in the text that “even the possibility of carrying out the analytic of Dasein depends on the prior working out of the question concerning the meaning of being in general” (SZ 13). Although an adequate answer to the question of being calls for an analytic of Dasein, that is, the analytic of Dasein in turn presupposes some initial articulation of the question of being itself. Heidegger’s project is therefore inherently, but not viciously, circular. 10 heidegger’s analytic tries to answer this question in the opening pages of Being and Time, but it is worth reminding ourselves of the strangeness of the very idea of fundamental ontology if we are to gain philosophical insight into Heidegger’s enterprise. For while the question of being, with its echoes of ancient and medieval ontology, lies at the very heart of his thinking, early and late, Heidegger was no less preoccupied with philosophical questions concerning the conditions of intentionality and the ontolog- ical status of agency and subjectivity, uniquely modern problems that lend his work a degree of contemporary relevance unmatched by all but a few philosophical texts of the same period. What, then, is the con- nection between these two central motivating concerns in Heidegger’s thought? Why should the renewal and explication of the question of being demand a critique of the concepts of subjectivity and intention- ality? How does Heidegger propose to ground ontology as a whole in an account of the phenomenal structure of everyday experience, and why does he insist that “Ontology is possible only as phenomenology” (SZ 35)? Why, in short, does Heidegger pursue the question of being in the context of an “analytic of Dasein” at all? The best short answer to these questions, I believe, lies in an unmis- takable analogy between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in Being and Time and the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy Kant claimed to have brought about in the Critique ofPure Reason (KRV Bxvi). Heidegger offered lectures on Kant’s philosophy throughout the 1920s and 1930s. He even published a book, Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics, in 1929, just two years after the publication of Being and Time itself, which I shall discuss further later in this chapter. In a word, Heidegger’s existential “analytic” of Dasein is a self-conscious allusion to the Tran- scendental Analytic that makes up the central constructive core of the first Critique. The reference is crucially important, for an “analytic” in Kant’s sense is not an analysis of the contents of our thoughts, but a kind of “dissection” (Zergliederung)–a“critique” in the original sense of the word – of the faculty of understanding (KRV A64–5/B89–90).6 6 Herman Philipse is therefore wrong to assimilate Heidegger’s phenomenological inter- pretations in Being and Time to the sort of conceptual analysis practiced by J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and P. F. Strawson. See Heidegger’s Philosophy ofBeing, 321, 341, 386. Heidegger’s substantive positions do at times coincide with theirs, but his methods are cru- cially different. What Heidegger sets out to interpet is neither ordinary language nor the logic of our concepts, but the prelinguistic, preconceptual forms of understanding and interpretation that linguistic practices and conceptual categories presuppose. For a more detailed critique of Philipse, see my “On Making Sense (and Nonsense) of Heidegger.” what is fundamental ontology? 11 Admittedly, the analogy is not perfect. For example, although fun- damental ontology and the analytic of Dasein are distinct, they are apparently coextensive: Fundamental ontology must be sought in, and so must proceed as, an analytic of Dasein. The analytic of Dasein, then, unlike Kant’s Transcendental Analytic, is not one discrete chapter in Heidegger’s project but describes the enterprise as a whole.