
No. 08-769 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner, v. ROBERT J. STEVENS, Respondent. _______________________________ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, INC., AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS FOUNDATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PRESSES, COMIC BOOK LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ENTERTAINMENT CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION, FILM INDEPENDENT, FREEDOM TO READ FOUNDATION, INDEPENDENT BOOK PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT FILMMAKER PROJECT, INDEPENDENT FILM & TELEVISION ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTARY ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RECORDING MERCHANDISERS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THEATRE OWNERS, INC., AND PEN AMERICAN CENTER IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT R. BRUCE RICH Of Counsel: Counsel of Record JONATHAN BLOOM MICHAEL A. BAMBERGER WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP SONNENSCHEIN NATH & 767 Fifth Avenue ROSENTHAL LLP 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10153 New York, NY 10020-1089 (212) 310-8000 (212) 768-6700 Counsel for Amici Curiae i TABLECited OF Authorities CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . ii INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI . 1 ARGUMENT . 6 I. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR CRIMINALIZING DEPICTIONS OF ANIMAL CRUELTY . 6 A. The Court Has Required a Close Causal Link Between Unprotected Speech and Harmful Conduct . 6 B. The Act Cannot Be Reconciled With the Court’s Precedents Involving Asserted Harm-Causing Speech . 13 1. The Act covers a substantial amount of protected speech . 13 2. The Act is an impermissible attempt to control thought by banning speech . 20 II. THE “SERIOUS VALUE” EXCEPTION DOES NOT RENDER THE ACT CONSTITUTIONAL . 22 CONCLUSION . 26 APPENDIX . 1a ii TABLE OFCited CITED Authorities AUTHORITIES Page FEDERAL CASES American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) . 2 American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff ’d, 45 U.S. 1001 (1986) . 4, 20, 21 American Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) . 23 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) . passim Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) . 11 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) . 8 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) . 9 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) . 8, 10, 11, 12 City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) . 19 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) . 10, 24 iii Cited Authorities Page Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) . 8 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) . 7, 15, 23, 26 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) . passim R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) . passim Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) . 7 United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009) . passim United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1970) . 8 United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008) . 6, 25 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) . 12 FEDERAL STATUTES 18 U.S.C. § 48 . passim Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq. 13, 18 Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 . 23 iv Cited Authorities Page MISCELLANEOUS H.R. Rep. No. 106-397 . 17, 20 Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech 2-10 (1984) . 13 Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 1887 (Dec. 9, 1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 324 . 17 1 INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI Amici represent producers, distributors, and consumers of content in a wide range of media.1 The material that Amici’s members collectively produce, sell, and consume covers the gamut of subjects – factual and imaginary, educational and entertaining – including real-world subjects that, while useful and thought- provoking, some may find distasteful or upsetting. The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are fundamental to Amici’s activities. This filing is motivated by Amici’s deep concern with the serious threat to the First Amendment rights of mainstream content providers, and to First Amendment doctrine more generally, posed by 18 U.S.C. § 48 (“Section 48” or “the Act”) and the arguments the Government offers in its defense. If accepted, those arguments would significantly narrow the reach of the First Amendment. The Government urges the Court to declare that images of violence can be criminalized as a means of combating both the acts depicted and the purported psychological effect of the images on viewers. If the Court were to agree that speech about violence can be 1 A list and description of the Amici is appended to this brief. The parties have consented to this filing; a copy of Respondent’s blanket consent has been lodged with the Court, and the Government’s consent letter is lodged herewith. No counsel for either party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person not affiliated with one of the Amici made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 2 banned in order to discourage violence – in this case, cruelty to animals – it would imperil not just a wide range of speech that engages with the violent world in which we live but also speech concerning other conduct that may be viewed as undesirable and thus potentially subject to restriction. The Court has never approved criminalizing depictions of violence. As the Seventh Circuit has observed: Classic literature and art, and not merely today’s popular culture, are saturated with graphic scenes of violence, whether narrated or pictorial. The notion of forbidding not violence itself, but pictures of violence, is a novelty, whereas concern with pictures of graphic sexual conduct is of the essence of the traditional concern with obscenity. American Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.). There has long been a clear distinction in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence between illegal conduct and depictions of same – child pornography being the sole exception. Maintaining this crucial distinction is essential if speakers in all media are to have the freedom to grapple honestly and directly with the world around them. This freedom would be jeopardized if the Court were to adopt the balancing test the Government proposes. 3 The Government’s reliance on the rationale for banning child pornography articulated in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), is flawed in fundamental respects, as the Court of Appeals explained. Among those flaws is the fact that the Act applies to depictions in which the harm to animals and the creation of the imagery are not inextricably intertwined, as they are with child pornography. Amici are troubled by the prospect of the specific rationale for banning child pornography – protecting child performers from the sexual abuse and psychological harm caused by the performance and its dissemination – morphing into a justification for banning depictions of any illegal or otherwise reprehensible conduct on the premise that the depictions support or encourage the conduct. In Free Speech Coalition, the Court declined to extend Ferber to “virtual” child pornography, and it should decline to extend Ferber to depictions of animal cruelty for many of the same reasons. For the Court to accept the Government’s argument, it would have to sweep away its precedents requiring that a ban on speech to prevent harm be justified by a direct and immediate connection between the speech and the harm – a requirement Section 48 fails to incorporate. Further, endorsing Congress’s broad rationale for the Act also would represent a failure to heed the Court’s own recent admonition that First Amendment freedoms “are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that 4 impermissible end.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253. (2002). As the Seventh Circuit observed, “If the fact that speech plays a role in a process of conditioning were enough to permit governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech.” American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.), aff’d, 45 U.S. 1001 (1986). Antipathy to animal cruelty, which Amici share, should not obscure the extent to which Section 48 contravenes these bedrock principles of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The Act, and the Government’s defense of it, raises the specter of a troublingly open-ended, ad hoc framework for carving new exceptions out of the First Amendment. In positing a balancing test that would deprive categories of speech of First Amendment protection whenever the social value of the speech is deemed to be outweighed by the social value of restricting it, the Government seeks to bootstrap the federal and state laws against animal cruelty into a justification for criminalizing depictions of such conduct. With this argument, the Government encourages the Court to abandon its extremely limited approach to defining categorical First Amendment exceptions. It urges the Court to replace criteria that constrain the use of speech restrictions to inculcate desirable habits of thought and conduct with a new criterion that would allow it – at great potential cost, Amici fear – to freedom of speech. 5 The breadth of the Act magnifies the danger of adopting the Government’s approach. The Government offers false assurance that it applies only to “crush videos” and images of organized animal fighting. On its face, though, the Act is far broader, covering any commercially motivated depiction of a live animal being intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed if the conduct is illegal where the depiction is created, sold, or possessed with intent to sell and it lacks “serious” religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.
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