Essays in Political Economy and Governance: Lessons from the Philippines by Nico M. Ravanilla A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Public Policy and Political Science) in The University of Michigan 2015 Doctoral Committee: Associate Professor Allen Hicken, Co-Chair Professor Dean Yang, Co-Chair Professor Anna Grzymala-Busse Professor Arthur Lupia c Nico M. Ravanilla 2015 All Rights Reserved To the Filipino Statesman ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For encouragement and instruction, I thank Allen Hicken and Dean Yang. For her acumen, Anna Grzymala-Busse. For the challenge and inspiration, Skip Lupia. For seeing me through the bureaucratic maze of graduate school, Mim Jones, Michelle Spornhauer and Julie Haynes at the Ford School of Public Policy, and Elise Bodei and Kathryn Cardenas at the Department of Political Science. For showing me the frontiers of comparative politics and methodology, Rob Franzese Jr., Jenna Bednar, George Tsebelis, and Brian Min. For the pleasures of scholarly conversations and collaborations, Pablo Querubin, Michael Davidson, John V.C. Nye, Desiree Desierto, Caroline Theoharides, Bill Clark, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Jennifer Frentasia, Mark Dincecco, and Nahomi Ichino. For my first ticket to higher studies in the United States, the Fulbright Program. For community and fellowship, the Southeast Asia Research Group (SEAREG). For the fun-filled office environment, Amy Pond and Hakeem Jefferson. For the joys of fieldwork, the staff of Innovations for Poverty Action - Philippines. For life-long friendships forged in graduate school, Vanessa Alviarez and Vichet In. For bearing the yoke with me, and for reminding me of the unum necessarium, my brothers in the Servants of the Word. For being my hero, dad. For her love, mom. For their support, kuya and ate. To God be the glory. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS :::::::::::::::::::::::::: iii LIST OF FIGURES ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: vii LIST OF TABLES :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ix LIST OF APPENDICES :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: x ABSTRACT ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: xi CHAPTER I. Introduction .............................. 1 II. Partisan Motives in Pork Distribution .............. 4 2.1 Introduction . 4 2.2 Theoretical Preliminaries . 9 2.2.1 Mayors as Political Intermediaries . 9 2.2.2 An Augmented Model of Partisan Distribution . 11 2.2.3 Identification: Two Regression Discontinuities . 16 2.2.4 Estimation . 19 2.3 Data and Institutions . 21 2.3.1 Philippine Political System . 22 2.3.2 Parties and Partisanships . 22 2.3.3 Pork Distribution . 23 2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics . 25 2.4 Empirical Results . 26 2.4.1 The Effect of Legislator-Mayor Alignment on Distri- bution . 26 2.4.2 Do Close Races Mimic Random Assignment? . 29 2.4.3 Competition and Partisan Pork Distribution . 30 iv 2.5 Conclusion . 33 III. Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experi- ment in the Philippines ....................... 44 3.1 Introduction . 44 3.2 Context and Overview of Vote-Buying . 50 3.3 Experimental Design and Data Collection . 52 3.3.1 Baseline Survey and Voter Educational Video . 52 3.3.2 Treatments . 54 3.3.3 Post-Election Survey . 55 3.3.4 Initial Hypotheses . 55 3.4 Empirical Strategy . 56 3.4.1 Proxy for Vote-Selling . 56 3.4.2 Regression Specification . 58 3.5 Results . 59 3.5.1 Summary Statistics, Baseline Balance, and Promise Take-Up . 59 3.5.2 Vote-Shares and Candidate Favorability Ratings . 59 3.5.3 Attrition from Baseline to Endline Surveys . 60 3.5.4 Impact of Treatments on Vote-switching . 60 3.5.5 Estimating the Amount of Social Desirability Bias . 62 3.6 Theoretical Model . 63 3.6.1 Promises . 66 3.6.2 Fully Sophisticated Voters . 67 3.6.3 Na¨ıve Voters . 67 3.6.4 Partially Sophisticated Voters . 68 3.6.5 Harmful Promise to Vote Your Conscience . 71 3.6.6 Reported Voting . 72 3.6.7 Predictions: Differentiating Between Theoretical Cases 73 3.6.8 Predictions: Differential Effects Across Races . 74 3.6.9 Test of Theoretical Predictions . 75 3.6.10 Alternative Mechanisms . 77 3.7 Conclusion . 79 IV. Nudging Good Politicians: Evidence from a Field Experi- ment in the Philippines ....................... 87 4.1 Introduction . 87 4.2 Background . 91 4.2.1 Brief history . 92 4.2.2 Powers and privileges of SK . 93 4.2.3 A breeding ground for bad governance? . 93 4.3 Experiment . 94 v 4.3.1 Call for applications for the leadership training work- shop . 94 4.3.2 Pre-workshop session . 95 4.3.3 Leadership training workshop . 96 4.3.4 Deferment of the 2013 SK Elections . 99 4.4 Framework . 99 4.4.1 Assumptions . 100 4.4.2 Model setup . 101 4.4.3 Hypotheses and econometric framework . 103 4.5 Candidate qualities . 105 4.5.1 Public service motivation . 106 4.5.2 Intellectual ability . 107 4.5.3 Personality . 108 4.5.4 Aspiration . 108 4.5.5 Integrity . 109 4.5.6 Summary statistics and baseline balance tests . 109 4.6 Results . 110 4.6.1 Is the leadership training workshop an effective screen- ing mechanism? . 110 4.6.2 Average treatment effects of the leadership training workshop interventions . 111 4.6.3 Treatment effects heterogeneity in the dimensions of quality . 112 4.7 Conclusion . 119 APPENDICES :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 145 BIBLIOGRAPHY :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 177 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Pork Allocation as a Function of Mayor's Past Vote-Share Margin of Victory . 38 2.2 Per Capita Priority Development Assistance Funds by Partisan Align- ment................................... 39 2.3 Graphical Representation of the Regression Discontinuity . 40 2.4 How Competition Facing Mayors Shapes Partisan Pork Distribution 41 2.5 Covariate Balance Across Quartiles of Mayor's Vote-Share Margin of Victory . 42 2.6 Legislator Municipal-Level Vote-Shares Across Quartiles of Mayor's Vote-Share Margin of Victory . 43 3.1 Promise Treatments as Viewed by Participants . 85 3.2 Vote-Switching by Treatment Condition . 86 4.1 Study timeline and intervention flowchart. 123 4.2 Is the leadership training workshop an effective screening mechanism? 124 4.3 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high public service motivation. 125 4.4 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high public service motivation. 126 4.5 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high public service motivation. 127 4.6 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in vil- lage youth programs, among individuals with low and high public service motivation. 128 4.7 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aptitude. 129 4.8 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aptitude. 130 vii 4.9 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high aptitude. 131 4.10 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in vil- lage youth programs, among individuals with low and high aptitude. 132 4.11 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high personality. 133 4.12 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high personality. 134 4.13 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high personality. 135 4.14 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in vil- lage youth programs, among individuals with low and high personality.136 4.15 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aspiration. 137 4.16 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high aspiration. 138 4.17 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high aspiration. 139 4.18 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in vil- lage youth programs, among individuals with low and high aspiration. 140 4.19 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on nomination as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high integrity. 141 4.20 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on designation as a youth leader, among individuals with low and high integrity. 142 4.21 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on change in interest in joining SK since baseline, among individuals with low and high integrity. 143 4.22 Heterogeneous effects of workshop treatments on engagement in vil- lage youth programs, among individuals with low and high integrity. 144 B.1 Cases of instant noodles awaiting distribution under the red house, and campaign workers waiting to pass those noodles out to vote can- vassers as they arrive. 167 B.2 Vote buying packet distributed to voter with voter name and infor- mation written in, and candidate name printed in large bold letters at the bottom. 167 B.3 Candidate flyer attached to package of instant noodles. 168 B.4 Money attached to a letter urging voters to support a particular can- didate. 168 B.5 Sample ballots with money attached. 169 C.1 Call for applications poster for the leadership training workshop. 174 C.2 Leadership training workshop content. 175 C.3 Workshop performance scoring rubric. 176 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics. 35 2.2 Effect of Legislator-Mayor Alignment on Distribution, OLS, DD, and RD Estimates. 36 2.3 Covariate Balance Between Treated (Aligned=1) and Control (Un- aligned=0) in Close Races. 37 3.1 Baseline survey summary statistics and balance tests .