U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS IN 2007: TRADE, SECURITY, AND DIPLOMACY Dan Erikson and Kate Neeper1 In July 2006, Fidel Castro passed power to his logue with the Cuban government will be utilized in younger brother and defense minister Raúl Castro pursuit of those concerns. In his 2007 State of the and a team of other ministers on a provisional basis. Union Address, President George W. Bush declared Since then, the U.S.-Cuba relationship has been hov- that “We will continue to speak out for the cause of ering on the brink of the post-Fidel era. There is little freedom in places like Cuba, Belarus and Burma.” question that the tense and estranged relationship The U.S. embargo of Cuba has been accepted as an between the two countries is about to enter a new article of faith and is adamantly defended. U.S. Assis- phase. The unresolved question is whether the fu- tant Secretary of State for Latin America Tom Shan- ture of U.S.-Cuban relations will look much different non dismissed Raúl Castro’s offers to negotiate as from the present. “nothing new” and emphasized the view that “the road to stability in Cuba runs through a successful On December 2, Raúl Castro made a major speech at transition to democracy.” The U.S. is now focusing a celebration commemorating the 50th anniversary of on short term goals that would lead towards a politi- Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, where he de- cal transition, such as freeing political prisoners, the clared that “we take this opportunity once again to development of trade unions and political parties, state that we are willing to resolve at the negotiating and creating a pathway towards elections. With or table the longstanding dispute between the United without Fidel Castro, it appears that the vast chasm States and Cuba.” However, he signaled that Cuba between the U.S. and Cuba will show few signs of would not be willing to compromise its communist closing in the near term. political system, rejected any U.S. overtures to em- brace democracy, and instead was planning to “wait More than one year has now passed since Fidel Cas- patiently until the moment when common sense pre- tro stunned the world by handing over power to his vails in Washington power circles.” He has since re- brother and designated successor Raúl, but the U.S. peated the offer to enter into a dialogue with the and Cuba have evinced little interest or capacity to United States several times, most recently during the develop common ground. Indeed, the United States annual 26th of July address in 2007, where Fidel Cas- has been extraordinarily cautious in its public re- tro was absent. marks, eschewing both a more aggressive or inter- The United States, for its part, has placed democracy ventionist approach while avoiding any efforts to and human rights concerns at the center of its Cuba open up avenues for communication and dialogue policy, but has dismissed any speculation that a dia- with the provisional Cuban government. If anything, 1. This essay is a draft chapter for a forthcoming book on Cuba’s international relations to be published in Spain. 459 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2007 both sides have become trapped by wishful thinking to be a difficult place to find much traction for that has inhibited broader policy changes. The U.S. changing Cuba policy one way or the other. While wants Cuba to drop communism and embrace a the newly Democratic leadership in the U.S. Con- democratic model while the Cuban government gress is hardly sympathetic to the U.S. embargo, wants the U.S. to allow it to remain a communist competing priorities and the remaining uncertainties state while treating it as a sovereign nation worthy of about the shape of post-Fidel Cuba mean that any ef- respect. But neither is ready to pursue the types of forts to refashion U.S. policy are likely to take an in- policies that the other claims to desire, so the stand- cremental approach. off seems set to continue. Perhaps more importantly, the 2008 U.S. Presidential The U.S. position has been complicated by the polit- contest is fast approaching, and Florida will again be ical imperative to prepare for the most desired sce- a key battleground state. In this context, the Cuban- nario: the collapse of Cuban communism followed American constituency will be well primed to work by a subsequent rapid transition to a democratic, its magic on John McCain, Rudy Giuliani, Hillary pro-U.S. government in Cuba. In its public state- Clinton, Barack Obama — or any other presidential ments and high level governmental preparations, no- contender. If a Cuban government led by Fidel or tably including the Commission for Assistance to a Raúl Castro outlasts Bush, then long-simmering ten- Free Cuba (CAFC) report initially released in 2004 sions in Florida’s Cuban-American community will and revised in 2006, President Bush’s Latin America surely rise to the surface during the 2008 team has embraced the assumption that democratic elections — and it will remain to be seen whether Mi- transition will take place in Cuba after Castro. This ami’s new moderate voices have the influence to has left the U.S. government focused on how best to sway the community’s historic embrace of the U.S. handle rapid dramatic democratic change in Cuba, embargo on Cuba. Indeed, after nearly fifty years of while implicitly allowing the unfolding communist enmity, the war of attrition between the U.S. and succession led by Raúl Castro to occur without hin- Cuba appears poised to outlive Fidel Castro’s rule, drance. In addition, the more than four-year-old U.S. and perhaps become his most durable legacy. occupation of Iraq has left the Bush Administration Despite the official embargo, travel ban, and diplo- with little appetite to try to force the Cuban govern- matic non-recognition, there are significant areas of ment into economic collapse and risk a sudden up- interaction, and even occasional cooperation be- heaval. Taken as a whole, the policies of the Bush tween the United States and Cuba. From agricultural Administration suggest that that U.S. policy has be- trade and humanitarian aid to U.S. attempts to speed come almost entirely rhetorical in nature, with few regime change, the U.S. tradition of involvement on new tools or instruments being proposed to advance the island has continued long into the age of the em- the presumed goal of democratizing Cuba. bargo. In Washington, the center of gravity in U.S.-Cuba TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES policy is beginning to shift back to the U.S. Con- U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba have eased and gress, where a bipartisan legislative group led by Rep. tightened numerous times over the decades of the Jeff Flake (R-AZ) and Rep. Charlie Rangel (D-NY) embargo. At this point, all Americans wishing to has proposed a measure to lift the ban on travel to travel to Cuba must be licensed, a process adminis- Cuba, while Rep. Bill Delahunt (D-MA) advocates a tered through a small agency of the Treasury Depart- separate measure to allow Cuban-American family ment, as the stated purpose of the regulations is to travel to Cuba. However, these measures have found deny income to the Castro regime. In general, the it difficult to gain support in the Senate, where Cu- rules make a firm distinction between tourism and ban-American legislators like Sen. Mel Martinez (R- travel for specific, licensable purposes. Educational FL) and Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) hold significant travel, research trips, travel to visit family on the is- sway. Even the House of Representatives has proven land, and travel for religious, humanitarian, and some 460 U.S.-Cuba Relations In 2007: Trade, Security, and Diplomacy business purposes are, broadly speaking, licensable. ban-Americans. In the 2007 Florida International The Bush Administration has been marked by a pro- University poll of the Miami Cuban-American com- gressive tightening of travel rules. In March of 2003, munity, 58.3% of respondents said that they or rela- new guidelines eliminated “people-to-people” ex- tives in the city sent money to relatives in Cuba (FIU change visits, short trips that were not affiliated with Cuba Poll, 2007). Cuban-Americans are more likely any educational institution, and which were allowed to send money through informal channels than are under a 1999 decision by the Administration of Pres- remitters to other countries in the region, largely be- ident Bill Clinton. Following the May release of the cause the cost of sending money to Cuba is signifi- 2004 CAFC report, the Administration further re- cantly higher. In 2001, a full 46% of Cuban remit- stricted travel for Cuban-Americans with family on tances arrived through mulas or viajeros. This picture is the island and students in exchange programs. Final- gradually changing as Cuba’s financial sector mod- ly, in 2005, in response to what it called abuses of the ernizes. licenses by some groups, the Administration tight- ened the requirements for licensing of religious orga- Estimates of total remittance flows are quite contro- nizations (Sullivan, 2007). versial. The 2004 CAFC report noted estimates rang- ing from $400 million to $1 billion annually in remit- Estimates of the number of U.S. visitors to Cuba are tance flows into the country (Sullivan, 2007). The always inexact because of the number of Americans Inter-American Development Bank puts Cuba’s ap- who visit illegally, often traveling via Canada or Mex- proximate remittance receipts at $855 million in 2004 ico.