NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies SPRING 2015 VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2 FROM THE EDITORS Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Matthew R. Dasti ARTICLES Graham Priest Alethic Values Stephen Phillips Seeing from the Other’s Point of View Shalini Sinha Self: Agency and the Good in Classical Vaiśesika K. S. Prasad Mind and Cognition: The Nyāya Perspective Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, R. Venkata Raghavan, and Don Wallace Freeman Dcruz Lost in Translation? The Upanisadic Story about “Da” and Interpretational Issues in Analytic Philosophy J. Barton Scott Philosophy and Anticolonialism Dan Flory Race, Indian Philosophy, and the Historiography of Western Philosophy C. K. Raju Eternity and Infinity: The Western Misunderstanding of Indian Mathematics, and Its Consequences for Science Today CALL FOR PAPERS VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2 SPRING 2015 © 2015 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708 APA NEWSLETTER ON Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies PRASANTA S. BANDYOPADHYAY AND MATTHEW R. DASTI, CO-EDITORS VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2 | SPRING 2015 taken in radically different ways by three sets of listeners. FROM THE EDITORS Bandyopadhyay, Raghavan, and Wallace Dcruz consider contemporary theories of meaning and argue that the work Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay of Paul Grice provides the best resources to make sense of MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY this story. Matthew R. Dasti Another current of inquiry seeks to understand the way BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY in which European receptions of Indian thinkers and, indeed, the very notion of Indian philosophy, have been The topic of this newsletter is “Indian philosophy and determined by colonial and post-colonial contexts. This culture,” chosen to allow for a rich diversity of contributions is illustrated in our next three essays. J. Barton Scott’s that illustrate some of the major approaches or currents of paper examines the myriad—and often problematic— philosophical investigation into Indian philosophy, Indian ways in which the concept of Indian philosophy has been cultural production, and the status of Indian thinkers as intertwined with religion and religiosity in the eyes of both legitimate interlocutors within the global philosophical pioneering European Indologists and in the work of anti- community. colonial Indian philosophers themselves. Dan Flory’s paper examines Western approaches to the notion of Indian One of the most visible and influential of these currents philosophy as genuine philosophy, and argues that there has been the ongoing excavation of classical Indian are underappreciated reasons why Indian philosophy was philosophy, carried out by those with an eye for both denied such status during and after the Enlightenment. philological accuracy and philosophical relevance. This is Focusing on Kant and Hegel, he argues that Enlightenment illustrated by our first five essays. Graham Priest provides a views of race and the limited capabilities of non-European historical investigation into the question “How many truth races informed the dubious refusal to take Indian values are there?” Leading answers to this question, as philosophy seriously. C. K. Raju’s paper engages in both charted by Priest, include responses given by Madhyamaka the classical excavations noted above and critical, historical and Jaina philosophers. In his essay, Stephen Phillips examination of colonial attitudes and ways in which they calls attention to the way that Indian philosophy tends to led to distortions and denigrations of India’s intellectual be categorized into hard divisions based on schools of contributions. He contrasts the practical, empirical approach thought (e.g., Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya), but he seeks to to mathematics in classical India with a more theoretical, “soften the categories” and offers a test case in the form “religious” approach in the Christian West, often taken by of a reexamination of the standard view of the influential its own adherents to be clearly superior. Raju argues that polymath Vācaspati Miśra (tenth century CE). Phillips this is far from the case. argues that Vācaspati is not merely a scholastic, elucidating school-bound commentaries delimited by the resources We have received a large number of quality papers for this of this or that tradition, but rather an original thinker who issue, and have consequently decided to divide it into two. articulates common themes and positions that harmonize Therefore, our fall 2015 newsletter will continue this theme, across his commentaries on the core texts of different and will have a large portion of papers devoted to a third schools. Shalini Sinha’s essay is devoted to the concept of current of inquiry, investigating modern Indian philosophy self within the venerable and influential Vaiśeṣika tradition and culture. of Indian realism. She illustrates the way in which the self, in Vaiśeṣika ontology, is the source of agency and Finally, we would like to thank Nalini Bhushan, Jay Garfield, normativity, reason and law, and the good itself, within Leah Kalmanson, David H. Kim, and Erin C. Shepherd for nature. K. S. Prasad’s paper provides an articulation of mind suggestions, assistance, and guidance in the editing of this and cognition within Nyāya, a “sister school” to Vaiśeṣika, newsletter. focusing on the relations between knower, thing known, and act of knowing, along with Nyāya’s account of the “inner organ” or “mind” (manas) which governs cognitive functioning. The papers primarily devoted to classical Indian philosophy close, fittingly, with reflections on translation and interpretation. P. S. Bandyopadhyay, R. V. Raghavan, and D. Wallace Dcruz reflect on a famous Upanishadic story, where a single syllable uttered by the creator, Prajāpati, is APA NEWSLETTER | ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES We do not need to scrutinize the reasoning. It suffices ARTICLES here to note that it puts the view that N=1 on the table. And however plausible it is, one cannot deny that it is the Alethic Values simplest of views!2 Graham Priest N=2 THE GRADUATE CENTER, CUNY, AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE For the next answer in ascending order, we remain in Ancient Greece, but turn to Aristotle (384–322 BCE): N=2. The Asian philosophical traditions are rich and sophisticated. Aristotle adds a second alethic value: falsity (f). So there are Most Western-trained philosophers, however, know very now two values, t and f, and truth-bearers take exactly one little of them. The situation is slowly changing as more of these. This picture is encapsulated in the Principles of Western philosophers are coming to read the Asian texts, Excluded Middle (PEM) and Non-Contradiction (PNC). The and more Western philosophy departments are teaching PEM says that a truth-bearer must have one of these values; Asian material. The present essay is a small contribution to the PNC says that they cannot have both. this felicitous trend. Aristotle defends these principles in Book G of the The question which will concern us here might be posed as, Metaphysics. What, exactly, his arguments are, and how “How many truth values are there?” I will not be concerned successful they were, may be disputed. The arguments for to answer this question. Rather, the point is to survey some the PNC in Book 4, in particular, are a motley and opaque of the answers to the question advanced by some thinkers bunch. However, this need not concern us here.3 and traditions, both East and West. The Eastern traditions that will concern us here are both Indian in origin: Buddhism N=3 and Jainism. The next answer in ascending order is that N=3. And for It should be said straight away that we will be looking at this, we turn to Aristotle again. some seminal texts, both East and West. Such texts are always subject to disputes of interpretation, and here is not In the somewhat notorious Book 9 of De Interpretatione, the place to defend my interpretations. Those I shall give Aristotle argues that truth-bearers whose contents are are the ones that strike me as most plausible, however.1 contingent states of affairs about the future, such as that it will rain in Melbourne at some time on 1/1/3001, are * * * neither true nor false (n). So now we have t, f, and n. N=1 Aristotle argued that if such truth-bearers were either true or false, the consequence would be fatalism, which he Let me start this exercise in the history of ideas by making rejects. How good Aristotle’s arguments are, again, need the question more precise. We are concerned with truth as not concern us. Perhaps of more concern is the relationship it applies to propositions, sentences, statements, beliefs, between the position in De Interpretatione and the defense or whatnot (rather than, e.g., friends or coins). Which of of the PEM in the Metaphysics. Aristotle gives us no guide these sorts of things are the primary bearers of truth— to this question in either of these places—or any other. In indeed, what such a claim might mean—is a knotty issue. the end, I suspect, the two texts are just inconsistent with However, nothing much here will depend on resolving it. each other. So I shall just speak of truth-bearers, in a non-committal fashion. However, of more importance here is the fact that the endorsement of a third alethic value in De Interpretatione Truth-bearers can be true; but according to most traditions, is clearly driven by metaphysical considerations, namely, they can take other values: most notably falsity. As we shall the open and indeterminate nature of aspects of the see, they may be thought to take other values as well. To future. The answer to our target question is, then, no mere forestall any quibbles about whether values are really of bloodless dispute about the nature of logic. Logic is driven a kind with truth, I will simply call them alethic values.