I S S U E 1 0 M A Y 2 0 2 1 SNIPPETS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MONTHLY NEWSLETTER BY NEHGINPAO KIPGEN CENTER FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES (NKCSEAS) In This Issue MAY GALLERY ASEAN and the Myanmar Military Coup: A Discussion with Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran Increasing Covid-19 Cases in Southeast Asia Of Liabilitty Shieds and a Ranging Pandemic Cambodia's Vaccination program receives $11 Million from the US Picture Courtesy: The Indian Express Vietnam in talks with the Russian Government to produce Sputnik V Covid-19 Vaccine locally Growing Economic Crisis during the Pandemic in Southeast Asia Possible Dissolution of Myanmar's National League for Democracy Suu Kyi appears in person in Court for the first time since the Military Coup Picture Courtesy: Think Economic and Financial Analysis Singapore could introduce an amicable divorce making the entire process less acrimonious MESSAGE FROM THE NKCSEAS TEAM Greetings... Cambodia and Singapore reaffirm commitment In this edition, we are happy to present you an interview with Dr. Prashanth to fortify relations Parameswaran, a fellow with the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, where he produces analysis on Southeast Asian political and security issues, Asian defense affairs, and U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. Since its inception in 2016, the core Increasing tension in the South China Sea objective of NKCSEAS has been bridging Southeast Asia with the rest of the world through teaching, research and publication. We would like to thank our readers around the world for sharing your invaluable comments on our previous newsletters, and we look forward to receiving them in the future including from In the News institutions and organizations interested in establishing a partnership with us. Sincerely, Team NKCSEAS 0 1 S S A | I S S U E 1 0 A S E A N A N D T H E M Y A N M A R M I L I T A R Y C O U P : A D I S C U S S I O N W I T H D R . P R A S H A N T H P A R A M E S W A R A N Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran is a fellow with the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, where he produces analysis on Southeast Asian political and security issues, Asian defense affairs, and U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. In this issue, we have Shivangi Dikshit, Research Analyst at NKCSEAS, in conversation with Dr. Prashanth Parameshwaran on ASEAN and the Myanmar Military Coup. Picture Courtesy: Dr. Prashanth Parameshwaran What is your assessment of ASEAN's reaction to Myanmar's Military Coup? Why is there a split in reactions among the member-states? ASEAN's reaction is still playing out and has been mixed so far. There have been some incremental steps taken, such as the convening of a summit-level meeting to discuss the issue, the adoption of a five-point consensus, and statements sent by individual Southeast Asian states on the coup and the humanitarian consequences. At the same time, ASEAN has not yet taken some of the more forward-leaning measures related to pressuring the junta and directly questioning its legitimacy given the challenges some of the other members of the bloc have faced on this score and the fact that the institution operates by consensus. 0 2 S S A | I S S U E 1 0 Splits in reactions among member states is a consistent feature of ASEAN diplomacy given the vast diversity of the region and the fact that it operates by consensus, and this has gotten more challenging once ASEAN expanded to include more countries in the 1990s, including Myanmar which joined only in 1997, thirty years after the grouping was originally founded. ASEAN was designed this way by its founders so as to not exclude the views of individual member states and also to ensure that power remained vested in individual countries rather than in a regional institution. The result is a push and pull dynamic between individual member states on more controversial issues. Why was ASEAN criticized after the Special Summit? Where did it fail to answer the demands of Myanmar citizens and the international community? ASEAN has been criticized by some for not taking a stronger and more united position on the coup. Some of that criticism is fair given the seriousness of the coup, its implications for Myanmar, and the potential for negative consequences for Southeast Asia as a region as we have seen in previous periods where the country has been unstable. But some of it also expects too much of ASEAN given what and where it is and misses the reality that any response it takes will be limited by its institutional constraints and the realities of the situation in Myanmar, where the institution has some leverage but not enough to directly shape outcomes firmly and quickly. The biggest gulf between the expected response from ASEAN from more forward-leaning members in the international community and the institution’s actual actions to date is on regime legitimacy and pressuring the junta. As the crises escalate in Myanmar, there will be spillover effects on other Southeast Asian countries. Is there is a mechanism within ASEAN to tackle the spillover effects, or will each member have an individual policy? An escalating crisis in Myanmar could have serious spillover effects on other countries in the region, whether it be the potential uptick in illicit activity and transnational crimes, the rebalancing of Naypyidaw’s external relationships even further away from Western countries and towards others like China and Russia, or the reputational damage ASEAN would incur from an exposure of its limitations in resolving a major international issue involving one of its member states. There are a mix of mechanisms available to manage these spillover effects that individual Southeast Asian states can use themselves as well as in cooperation with others and within the ASEAN framework. Some of these effects are not new since ASEAN has seen them in past, and we can expect a mix of unilateral, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral approaches to addressing them. What are the expectations of ASEAN from the International Community? What kind of support do they need? The expectations of ASEAN tend to be different depending on the perspective in question, but in general, it involves at the very least addressing the humanitarian situation as well as the legitimacy deficit that the junta is seen to be facing following the coup. Individual Southeast Asian states understand that ASEAN will likely need help in various levels if the situation in Myanmar does not improve anytime soon, be it in terms of aid or leverage for diplomatic talks. 0 3 S S A | I S S U E 1 0 There has been a rise in authoritarianism and threat to democracy in Southeast Asia in recent years. Why is ASEAN failing to prevent such developments? Democracy in a contemporary sense is quite new to Southeast Asia and took off in the 1980s and 1990s: most of its members still have challenges on this score to some degree and we have tended to see ebbs and flows in its development within individual countries rather than linear progress. In recent years, we have seen a period of what I’ve called democratic discontent – which includes not just troubled transitions in Myanmar or Malaysia, but also authoritarian resurgence in Cambodia and Thailand and concerns about rollback and erosion in the Philippines and Indonesia. ASEAN is a regional institution operating in an environment with a spectrum of regime types – including absolute monarchy, military juntas and everything in between. ASEAN advances priorities such as cooperation, integration and peace and stability, and while it has taken some steps in the direction of greater respect for rights through new inroads such as the ASEAN Charter, it does not directly play a role in promoting specific regime types. The ASEAN Charter lays down several principles, including non-interference, consensus-based decision, protecting human rights and promoting democracy. But we see some principles get preference over others. Why does this happen? The gaps between what the ASEAN Charter, signed in 2007, says and how the grouping operates are part of a broader challenge of implementing what Southeast Asian states have already agreed to. As that has continued to take shape, we have seen an imbalance between some principles over others in line with various dynamics including the balance of power among Southeast Asian states and the internal and external issues they confront. Does ASEAN’s current framework need to change? What are your suggestions? The core challenge with respect to changing ASEAN’s current framework is that while there are a number of good ideas that have been floated and debated over the past few years, some of the more far-reaching proposals are not within the comfort of all its members. The most critical structural issue is finding more flexible ways of adhering to consensus while also speeding up how ASEAN’s membership – which is larger and more diverse than when it was founded – can respond to wide-ranging challenges and fulfil the added responsibilities it has taken on over the years, including its role as a shaper of regional institutionalism in the AsiaPacific region. 0 4 S S A | I S S U E 1 0 • P. 2 INCREASING COVID-19 CASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA - Ishita Dutta Picture Courtesy: The Japan Times The COVID-19 cases are surging in Southeast Asia, the lack of healthcare services in the countries is leading to panic. In 2020, the coronavirus pandemic was well managed by the Southeast Asian countries, the early public health measures prevented the spread of the virus in the region.