Article The Necessity of Impure Sovereignty Mike Grimshaw University of Canterbury Abstract This essay arises from an engagement with the reflections and letters of Jacob Taubes to Carl Schmitt (Taubes 2013); central to these writings is the question of the sovereign. If the sovereign is the one who decides the exception, then sovereignty is focused on this decision of what is/is not the exception – and who gets to decide. An engagement with these writings of Taubes as a Jew and friend-enemy of the Nazi jurist offers a way toward what I term the necessity of impure sovereignty. For Taubes the central question is what does pure mean and thus, dialectically, what does impure mean? To engage with this question, I begin with a discussion of Weimar and the situation that gave rise to Schmitt’s work on sovereignty. I make use of the diaries of Count Harry Kessler and also of an essay of Schmitt’s from 1926. I then turn to the writings of Taubes to Schmitt. In my view, sovereignty as understood by both Schmitt and Taubes is problematic because of its central decision for homogeneity and dictatorial democracy. Therefore, I argue for three counter-decisions. Firstly, for the necessity of the impure sovereign-decision for heterogeneity. Secondly, against the Schmittean katechon, I argue for identification with the chaotic, impure Antichrist. Finally, against history, I argue for hope and so we must make the alternative sovereign-decision to remain impure. Keywords Weimar, Schmitt, Taubes, sovereignty, sovereign-decision, impure, katechon, democracy, liberalism A Prefatory Note on the Impurity that Follows This is a deliberately discursive thought-piece that undertakes a series of digressions and conjectures en route in order to wrestle with the concept of sovereignty as is to be found in the writings of Jacob Taubes to Carl Schmitt (Taubes 2013). It deliberately leaves its wrestling with the questions evident on the page, not seeking to tidy them up or sweep them away, rather exposing the tensions that thinking seriously on sovereignty entails. For sovereignty is not an easy question to deal with, nor is it a singular issue. What is presented here could perhaps be best described as an annotative approach to the question of sovereignty, a type of thinking and writing that seeks to undo the singularity and surety that bedevil so much current academic thought and writing. If this essay is in the end an argument for the necessity of impurity, it is perhaps apposite that it occurs in an impure fashion. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/jea.6271 Journal of Extreme Anthropology, 2018: 1-14, ISSN: 2535-3241 !1 Introduction Our modern thinking about sovereignty has been profoundly influenced by Carl Schmitt. However, less often do we think of sovereignty as a concept developed in reference to Weimar, that ‘laboratory of modernity’ (Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg 1994, xvii) wherein occurred the tensions between ‘a nascent modernity and the remnants of a persistent past’ (Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg 1994, xviii). As Perry Anderson observed, ‘in the Weimar Republic, the Westphalian Schmitt began his career as the most original catholic adversary of socialism and of liberalism’, undertaking what Anderson succinctly describes as Schmitt’s ‘polemics of electric intensity’ (Anderson 2005, 4). Not only is Schmittean-derived sovereignty framed in reference to Weimar, but today we too easily forget that to be modern is still to live in (the wake of) Weimar; not least because the mass emigration of German culture and intellectual workers that occurred after 1933 made so much of modern culture exist in reference and in debt to an exiled Weimar. To help us understand the context our engagement arises from, I wish to first engage with a record of the time drawn from two sources; the first is the diaries of the aesthete, intellectual and diplomat Count Harry Kessler (1868-1937). Kessler’s diaries of the years 1918-1937 provide a fascinating overview of the context that gave rise to Weimar – and to its decline (Kessler 1999). The second source I will selectively draw upon is The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg 1994) which contains an essay by Schmitt that enables a further contextualization and discussion. Following this scene setting, I then engage with the question of impure sovereignty as can be read out of the letters and reflections of Jacob Taubes to Carl Schmitt (Taubes 2013). Weimar… The Weimar Republic (1919-1933), in the words of historian Eric Weitz ‘still speaks to us’ (Weitz 2007, 1); in particular in its cultural and artistic creations, in its philosophic debates and sociology, and yet perhaps most importantly, ‘as a warning sign’. This warning of the ever-possible collapse of democracy and the rise of the totalitarian option from within – yet against liberal modernity – is one disturbingly prescient today almost a century on from the establishment of Weimar. As Kniesche and Brockman noted, ‘Weimar presented the specifically German manifestation of a more general crisis of modernity’ (Kniesche and Brockman 1994, 12). Yet while Germans of that last century recognized ‘that they were living amid the throes of modernity’ (Kniesche and Brockman 1994, 3), today we seem more likely to fail to recognize just what we are living amid the throes of – and more so, just when precisely we are living. Are we living still within modernity? Within post-modernity? A neo-modernity? We perhaps find ourselves in a long interregnum that arose at the end of that short twentieth century defined by Eric Hobsbawm as running from 1914-1991, book-ended by World War One and the collapse of Soviet Communism and the Soviet Bloc (Hobsbawm1994). Yet, within our interregnum, do we not find ourselves within a series of decisions such as those in Weimar grappled with, seeking ‘to unravel the meaning of modernity and to push it in new directions, some emancipatory and joyous, others frightfully authoritarian, murderous and racist’ (Weitz 2007, 4)? This unravelling and pushing in new directions required decisions to be made and, most importantly for our discussion, !2 decisions as to what would or could be the exception? It was in this context that Schmitt perceived that ‘the decisive question’ was ‘who decides?’ (Ulmen 2003, 15). Following on from this, is decision making, that is decision making that makes an exception to the norm in not ratifying the expected decision, an act of sovereignty? Here we might raise our first query, which asks: to what, is the decision made in reference to? That is, the why of the decision cannot be separated from the who of the decision maker. And to understand this, we have to seek to understand the context of the sovereign decision- maker. Yet if we want to think seriously about making the decision of the exception in regard to Weimar we also need to continually remember Walter Benjamin’s aphorism regarding modernity: ‘That things go on “as usual” – that is the catastrophe’ (Kniesche and Brockman 1994,12). In light of this, a question arises: if a sovereign decision is not made, is that actually the catastrophe? Does this mean that the sovereign decision – rightly or wrongly at both the time and in retrospect – is the decision to attempt to forestall the catastrophe of modernity? This is why Weimar remains central for our understanding of modernity, for if ‘modernism is the sobering recognition of instability and the improvised management of uncertain circumstances, then it is Weimar that best describes the modern’ (Fritzsche 1994, 30). Kessler’s Notes on Weimar (and that of Others, Including Schmitt) Count Harry Kessler may seem a strange choice to draw upon for any discussion on sovereignty. Yet his diaries offer a unique perspective on Weimar from what could be termed an insider-outsider. Born to a German banker and an Anglo-Irish mother, educated in France, England and Germany, Kessler was an aesthete, a decorated soldier, a cultural and economic diplomat, a homosexual, founder and publisher of art books with the Cranach Press, a journalist, a supporter of Nietzsche, and member of the left- liberal German Democratic Party. In this brief context setting, I draw upon his interwar diaries, a fascinating, all-too distracting record of a world aware that decisions were and had to be made. As Ian Buruma observes: What infuses Kessler’s descriptions of 1920s Berlin, Weimar, Paris, and London with such melancholy beauty is the author’s own awareness that, even as he was writing, his world was doomed to almost total destruction. It was decadent in the most literal sense (Buruma 1999, ix). Here is Kessler writing of a Spartacist rally in 1919: Fanaticism and power in the service of a nebulous fresh hope are faced, far and wide, by nothing more than the fragments of the old ideologies (Kessler 1999, 52). In such a context, in this post-war political and social turmoil, the sovereign decision is, in fact, one demanded of each person: Do I make a decision that is an exception to the norm; or perhaps more politically, can I – or do I feel that I can – make a sovereign decision? The exception in this case is do I go with the new, the modern, in the form of Bolshevism ‘surging in from the East [that] resembles somewhat the invasion by Islam in the 7th century’ (Kessler 1999, 52) – or do I make a stand for a type of counter-modern revolution? In either case, at this time, any decision is a sovereign decision because it is !3 made as exception to a failed status quo. Of course, the decision is itself neither a guarantee of success or of correct choice, as Kessler observes also in January 1919: The problem is whether sentiments and ideas of sufficient power and profundity are on hand as to be capable, if allowed free reign, of transforming prevailing conditions; or whether, having failed to win the war and make a material profit on it, we are buoying ourselves up with mirages of a paradise (Kessler 1999, 57).