The Origins of American Strategic Bombing Theory: Transforming Technology into Military Doctrine by Lt. Col. Craig F. Morris A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Auburn University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Auburn, Alabama May 9, 2015 Approved by William Trimble, Chair, Professor of History David Carter. Associate Professor of History Mark Sheftall, Associate Professor of History Alan Meyer, Assistant Professor of History Abstract Perhaps no other technology changed how Americans viewed warfare in the twentieth century more than the airplane. In the minds of forward thinking aerial theorists this new technology removed the limitations of geography, defenses, and operational reach that had restricted ground and naval forces since the dawn of human conflict. With aviation, a nation could avoid costly traditional military campaigns and attack the industrial heart of an enemy using long-range bombers. Yet, the acceptance of strategic bombing doctrine proved a long and hard-fought process that required the combination of individual efforts, technological developments, organizational factors, and political and economic context to transform the technology of flying into an accepted military strategy. In this way, the story of strategic bombing is not that of any one person or any one causal factor. Instead, it is a twisting tale of individual efforts, competing priorities, organizational infighting, budget limitations and most important technological integration. At no point was strategic bombing preordained or destined to succeed. In every era, the theory had to survive critical challenges. By tracing the complex interrelationships of these four causal factors, this study provides a greater understanding of the origins and rise to dominance of American strategic bombing theory. Thus, it aids in understanding the process of how new technologies spur fresh thinking that offer potentially revolutionary new strategies. ii Acknowledgments A work of this magnitude can never be the sole effort of just one person. I am grateful for the help, guidance, and support of many individuals in the pursuit of this dissertation. I know this short list can never be complete, and I apologize for anyone who may be overlooked in this formal thank you. I want to start out with my dissertation advisor Dr. William Trimble. Bill has been a complete joy to work with from the start of my time at Auburn. He took a green Air Force lieutenant colonel on a short timeline and with only a general concept of a dissertation topic and guided him along a path to ensure not only graduation, but also a relevant research effort. His keen guidance and tireless efforts to improve my substandard grammar are deeply appreciated. The other members of my committee also deserve high praise. Dr. Alan Meyer, Dr. Mark Sheftall, and Dr. David Carter proved outstanding teachers, mentors, and friends. Each played a large role in shaping my thoughts on how outside influences affected the evolution of strategic bombing theory during the often-chaotic World War I and interwar eras. A special thank you goes to Dr. Alan Meyer for his many coffee breaks with me, where he helped this tired old military officer understand the academic process and keep him on track in his studies. Next, I must mention the informal member of my dissertation committee, Mr. Thomas Wildenberg. On countless occasions, Tom’s expert subject matter knowledge and kindly guidance helped keep me on track. I am deeply indebted to him for constantly iii reminding me to look beyond the accepted storyline and seek a deeper understanding of what was going on inside the minds of the key theorists through their writings. Given the three-year time limit imposed on me by the Air Force sponsorship, I had to rely on a great many researchers to help gather the data for this project. The staff at the Air Force Historical Research Agency became a second family, as they helped find documents, pointed out other potentially valuable resources, and most important kept up my morale with their always-friendly banter. While the whole staff deserves praise, Tammy Horton deserves special acknowledgment for her help in garnering electronic copies of documents. Along the same lines, Christopher Shields of the Greenwich, Connecticut Historical Society aided the dissertation by researching and providing electronic copies of the letters of Col. Raynal Bolling from their archives. Of course, this project would have fallen flat without the tireless support of my family. I especially want to thank my two children, Joseph and Virginia, for enduring for too many “vacations” centered on exploring archives. Along these same lines, my ever- suffering wife Kelly should be proclaimed an angel for her support and acceptance of a military officer with an addiction to history. Long before this dissertation, she suffered through vacations to battlefields, museums, and historic sites. Her loving support and sense of humor enabled me to pursue this dream and I am forever grateful. Finally, I cannot end this section without dedicating this dissertation to my father. Lawrence Morris kindled my love of history at an early age. Some of my fondest memories are watching documentaries on the world wars with him. He has been a tireless supporter and I wish to thank him for all he has done to get me to this point. iv The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. v Table of Contents Abstract. ii Acknowledgments. iii Chapter 1: Introduction. 1 Chapter 2: A Late Night Wake Up Call in Mexico. 13 Chapter 3: The War in Europe. 42 Chapter 4: The Birth of American Strategic Bombing Theory. 78 Chapter 5: The Hard Realities of War. 112 Chapter 6: Solidifying Doctrine Through History. 146 Chapter 7: Strategic Bombing to the Periphery. 176 Chapter 8: Marrying Technology and Doctrine. 210 Chapter 9: The Triumph of the Bomber Advocates. 238 Chapter 10: Conclusion. 267 References. 277 vi Chapter 1 Introduction It was a blustery British day, 12 May 1942, when the first B-17s of the 97th Bomb Group arrived in High Wycombe airfield northwest of London. These initial aircraft represented the beginning of a massive buildup of American combat air power in Europe. Less than a month earlier, on 24 April 1942, Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz had provided the strategic direction for these bombers when he established the headquarters 8th Air Force just thirty miles away at Bushy Park.1 At the time, the 8th commanded only a bomber group, a fighter group, and a transportation group, but these initial forces foreshadowed the rise of the “Mighty Eighth” into the formidable air fleets that attacked the Nazi war machine. While the deployment of the first bomber group to England may seem like the beginning of an epic history, in one way it was the end of another narrative. The establishment of the 8th Air Force represented the fruition of a generation of air power dreamers stretching back to World War I. This vision centered on one idea: aircraft could forever change the nature of warfare. In the minds of forward thinking aerial theorists this new technology removed the limitations of geography, defenses, and operational reach that had restricted ground and naval forces since the dawn of human conflict. 1 Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II (New York: Random House, 1993), 240. 1 When married to the concept of the industrialized nation, airplanes offered the ability to strike strategically. No longer did nations have to grapple with an enemy’s army or navy to win a war. With aviation, they could avoid those costly endeavors and attack directly at their industrial heart using long-range bombers. Thus, a new technology spurred fresh thinking that offered a revolutionary vision of warfare. There were practical problems with converting a technological innovation into a new form of warfare, though. First, not everyone agreed that air power was transformational. Many military and political leaders saw aircraft as only one more component of their traditional naval and ground schemes. In their minds, airplanes did not change warfare; they merely provided new capabilities to support tried and true strategies. Next, as with any new technology, the first design evolutions often failed to match expectations. For aviation to transform warfare, technology had to advance to meet the speculative visions. Finally, the theorists’ conceptions had to be turned into a workable doctrine. While H. G. Wells could depict large aerial fleets laying waste to enemy cities, military professionals knew that for air power to be transformational it required organization, training, funding, and logistics planned out in an accepted strategic doctrine. In this way, a long-lasting argument over the proper role of air power in national security started in the early American Air Service. The debate contained two equally important questions: should air power be independent, and what was the best way to employ it? This dilemma was evident in the first Air Service doctrinal manual written by Maj. William C. Sherman in 1921. He wrote, “In deriving the doctrine that must underlie all principles of employment of the air force, we must not be guided by conditions 2 surrounding the use of ground troops, but must seek out our doctrine…in the element in which the air force operates.”2 Perhaps this viewpoint helps explain some of the confusion in the study of early American air power. For decades, historical accounts sought to explain how the two elements of Air Service doctrine interrelated to form the Army Air Corps and then after World War II the independent Air Force.