ABSTRACT Competing Schemas within the American Liberal Democracy: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Differing Perceptions of Church and State Shannon Holzer, Ph.D. Mentor Francis J. Beckwith, Ph.D. The current understanding of liberal democracy in many academic circles includes a set of restraints on the types of justification that are accepted for the creation of coercive legislation. There is much debate over which sources should be accepted to publically justify laws touching on education and morality. Many believe that religious beliefs are outside of public reason, and they are, thus, inadequate to justify the formation of coercive laws. The reason for this is that many people perceive religious reasoning as irrational, divisive, and dangerous. Because of this perception, religion has by and large been relegated to the private sphere. The perception of religious reasoning as irrational, divisive, and dangerous has also become firmly engrained in the legal community. Because of this, state and federal courts tend to treat legislation that is organically connected to religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause. This dissertation argues that this perception of religion is incomplete. Those who perceive religion as irrational, dangerous, and divisive somehow do not recognize its reasonable, peaceful, and unifying aspects. Furthermore, the problems popularly attributed to religious reason are not unique to religion. Secular reasoning can also be irrational, dangerous, and divisive. Ultimately, religious reasoning may indeed have a place in the formation of coercive legislation that is tolerable to its detractors. The incorporation of religious reasoning does not entail an all-out theocracy as many might fear. Given that the fundamental principles of liberal democracy are often grounded on religious premises, to require restraint of religious reasoning would be to remove the foundation of liberal principles on which this country stands. Furthermore, it would violate a key tenet of liberal democracy that all should be treated free and equal by placing a burden on the religious citizen that is not shared by the non-religious citizen. Copyright © 2013 by Shannon Holzer All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………….xi Dedication ……………………………………………………………………………….xii Chapter One: Introduction 1.1. Schemas: Perceiving As verses Perceiving That……………………….…….1 1.1a Schema of the Theologico-Political Problem....................….……….2 1.1b Schema of the Secular-Political Solution……………………………3 1.2 Rawlsian Schema of Liberal Democracy………………………………......…3 1.3 Purpose of This Dissertation…………………………………………………..7 1.4 Methodology…………………………………………………………………..7 1.5 Chapter Breakdown………………………………………………………….11 Chapter Two: The Courts’ Perception of Religion…………………………………….17 2.1 Religious Reason as Irrational and Subjective………………………………18 2.1a James Hitchcock………………………………………….…………18 2.1b Francis Beckwith…………………………………………………..20 2.2 Religious Reason as Divisive and Dangerous……………………………….23 2.3 Religious Reason as Coercive Indoctrination………………………………..26 2.4 The Courts Interpretation of the Establishment Clause……………………33 2.4a Religious Reason as Private………………………………………..34 2.4b Secularism as the Default Position………………………………....36 2.4b1 The Principle of Neutrality………………………………...37 2.4b.2 Secularism Enforced……………………………………...40 2.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………..47 Chapter Three: Historical Schemas …………………………………………………….48 3.1 Separation vs. Accommodation……………………………………………...52 3.1a Separation………………………………………………….………..52 3.1b Accommodation………………………………………….…………52 3.2 Jefferson as a Secularist…………………………………………….………..53 3.2a Kramnick and Moore’s Construal of The Origins of Separation…..55 3.2b Roger Williams…………………………………………….……….56 3.2c John Locke………………………………………………………….61 3.2d Separationist Construal of Jefferson’s Conclusions…….....………63 3.2e Separationist Construal of Religion………………………………...65 3.2f Accommodationist Concessions………………..………………….66 3.3 Jefferson as an Accommodationist…………………………………………..67 3.3a Jefferson’s Public Religion and Truth………………………………67 3.3b Jefferson’s Rejection of the Social Contract………………………..69 3.3c Jefferson’s Perception of Government as a Guide towards Virtue…69 Chapter Four: Autonomy, Neutrality, and the Diminishing of Religious Conviction…...72 4.1 Federal Courts, Strict Separationism, and the Autonomous Self…….………72 4.2 Federal Courts, Autonomy, and Neutrality…………………………………..73 4.2a Protecting the Garden from the Wilderness………………………...73 4.2b Protecting the Wilderness from the Garden………………………...76 4.2c Adoption of Neutrality………………………………………….…..78 4.2d Neutrality to Avoid Civil Strife…………………………………….80 4.3 Autonomy, Choice, and Coercion……………………………………………81 4.3a Necessity of Coercion ……………………………………………...82 4.3b Doxastic Voluntarism and the Notion of the Good………………...84 4.3c Has Neutrality Delivered its Promise ................................................87 4.4 Religious Conviction and Religious Choice…………………………………87 4.4a Sandel on Conviction, Choice, Original Intent……………………..87 4.4b Autonomy and the Depreciation of Religious Claims……………...90 4.5 Applying Neutrality………………………………………………………….92 4.5a Categorizing the Debates……………….…………….…………..93 4.5a.1 Pro-Life: Theological Debate or Different Answer ….…..94 4.5a.2 Marriage and the De Re/De Dicto Distinction….……..….97 4.5a.3 Diminishing Religious Conviction…………………..…101 4.6 Summary………………………………………………………………….102 4.6a Equivocal Language……………………………………………….102 4.6b Points of Agreement ...……………………………………………104 Chapter Five: Rawlsian Liberal Democracy..…………………………………………..106 5.1 Rawls and the Nature of Liberal Democracy………………………………106 5.2 Rawlsian Principles and Their Detractors…………………………………..115 5.2a Stephen Macedo and Public Reason………………………………115 5.2a.1 Macedo’s Schema ……………………………………....115 5.2a.2 Macedo’s Religious Restraint Applied………………....118 5.2b George and Wolfe on Macedo’s Public Reason Criteria……….…124 5.3 Ronald Dworkin and Justificatory Liberalism……………………...………129 5.4 Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff………………………………..…...138 5.4a Robert Audi………………………………………………………..138 5.4b Nicolas Wolterstorff………………………………………….……141 5.4c Agreement between Robert Audi and Nicolas Wolterstorff………144 5.4d Disagreement between Robert Audi and Nicolas Wolterstorff…...145 5.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………149 Chapter Six: Intellectual Revolutions…………………………………………………..153 6.1 The Structure of Intellectual Revolutions…………………………………..153 6.2 Paradigms within the American Liberal Democracy……………………….156 6.2a Traditionalism……………………………………………………..156 6.2b The New Intellectualism………………………………..…………161 6.3 Is Kuhn Correct? ...........................................................................................164 Chapter Seven: Analysis of Two Competing Schemas…………………………...……167 7.1 The Schema of the Federal Courts………………………………………….168 7.2 The Legal Culture’s Version of Liberal Democracy……………………….169 7.3 Religious Reasoning as Irrational? ………………………………………..170 7.3a Theistic Reasoning is wider in Scope……………………………..170 7.3b Theistic Schemas Solve Internal Conceptual Problems…………..172 7.3c Theistic Schemas Solve External Conceptual Problems………….176 7.3d Theistic Schemas possess more Explanatory Power….…………177 7.3d1 Grounding Human Rights in the Imago Dei……………..178 7.3d2 More Qualitative and Quantitative Explanations………...184 7.4 Does Religious Reasoning Lead to Civil Strife? ..........................................187 7.4a Religious Reason as Unifying……………………………………..187 7.4b Morality and Justice……………………………………………….193 7.4c Secular Reasoning and War……………………………………….195 7.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………198 Chapter Eight: Conclusion……………………………………………………………...200 8.1 Summary of Goals………………………………………………………….200 8.2 Findings…………………………………………………………………….200 8.2a Legal Culture’s Perception of Religious Reason………………….200 8.2b Differing Historical Schemas……………………………………...203 8.2b1 Separationist Schema…………………………………….203 8.2b2 Accommodationist Schema…………………………...…205 8.2c Sandel and Original Intent………………………………………...207 8.2d Rawlsian Unreasonableness……………………………………….210 8.2e Power and Reason…………………………………………….…...210 8.2f Confronting the Myths……………………………………………..211 8.3 Implications: Two Liberal Democracies in One……………………………211 8.4 Suggestion…………………………………………………………….…….212 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply grateful to all those who encouraged me throughout the process of writing this dissertation. I specifically want to thank Suzanne Sellers for goading me on to finish. I also want to thank Alexandra Coolidge for her confidence in me when my own confidence was absent. I am especially thankful to William Mitchell for the help and support he gave me in moving through the final phase of my degree. Finally, I want to express my thanks to Francis Beckwith for inspiring my work throughout the program. I hope to continue that which you began in me. xi To My Dad Thank you for being my hero CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1.1 Schemas: Perceiving As verses Perceiving That Psychologists use the term schema to represent the different ways individuals perceive the world around them. There are two possible analogies of schemas; first, a schema is like a type of filter that allows certain beliefs to enter one’s noetic structure while disallowing other beliefs to enter. Second, schemas can also be likened to a doxastic sieve that strains out certain beliefs while retaining others. These filters or sieves affect one’s beliefs about the nature of noetic structures as well. Schemas are epistemically prior to as well as included