Review of the Netherlands’ Humanitarian Assistance 2009-2014 Commissioned by Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Written by Glyn Taylor, Paul Harvey and Elisabeth Couture Humanitarian Outcomes April 2015 Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Humanitarian Outcomes Contents Executive summary ....................................................................... 5 1: Introduction .................................................................................... 10 1.1 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 11 2: The international context for humanitarian action: a changing landscape? ............................................................................ 15 2.1 Trends in funding of humanitarian action ................................................... 15 2.2 ‘Mega-challenges’ for humanitarian action .................................................. 18 2.3 Innovation or transformation? ...................................................................... 26 2.4 Summary, conclusions and implications for humanitarian donors .......... 28 3 Dutch humanitarian assistance: policy and funding ..................... 29 3.1 Overview of the Netherlands’ Policy: funding levels and funding modalities .................................................................................................................... 29 3.2. Analysis of Netherlands’ funding modalities and practices ...................... 35 3.3 The Netherlands’ management structures for humanitarian assistance and benchmarking with other donors .................................................. 39 3.4. Comparison with other donors (benchmarking) ........................................ 43 3.5 Key policy areas ............................................................................................... 45 3.6 Conclusions: Netherlands’ humanitarian policy ............................................. 52 4: Assessment of system performance ............................................... 53 4.1 Humanitarian effectiveness ............................................................................ 53 4.2 Evaluation findings: themes in effectiveness .............................................. 65 5. Conclusions, implications and recommendations for Dutch policy ............................................................................................ 81 Annex 1. Terms of reference ................................................................................... 86 Annex 2. Abbreviations ............................................................................................ 99 Annex 3. Definitions of DAC criteria .................................................................. 101 Annex 4. Evaluation criteria .................................................................................. 102 Annex 5. List of Interviewees ................................................................................ 104 Annex 6. Bibliography ............................................................................................ 107 Humanitarian Outcomes List of tables Table 1. Targeted recipients of inter-agency appeals ........................................... 18 Table 2. Financing channels 2009-2014, regular budget ..................................... 32 Table 3. Core and earmarked funding from regular budget, UN agencies and Red Cross movement 2009-2014 ............................................. 33 Table 4. NGO funding from regular budget 2009-2014 (€ millions) ................ 34 Table 5. Donor benchmarking ................................................................................ 43 List of figures Figure 1. International humanitarian emergency responses 2007-2014 ............ 18 Figure 2. Logical framework of the Netherlands’ Humanitarian Policy: more effectiveness through less duplication and more coordination ................ 30 Figure 3. Annual expenditure humanitarian assistance 2004-2014 .................... 31 Figure 4. Annual expenditure humanitarian assistance 2009-2014 .................... 31 Humanitarian Outcomes This report presents the findings from an evaluation of Netherlands’ Executive humanitarian action from 2009 to 2013. It was commissioned and supported by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) summary Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of the report is to evaluate the 2011 policy by providing insight into the development of Netherlands’ humanitarian policy, its implementation, and whether or not the envisaged results have been achieved. The report also examines the broader effectiveness of the UN-led humanitarian system, and considers the Netherlands’ humanitarian policy within the context of the challenges faced by this system. The central evaluation question is: To what extent has the central objective of the Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance policy been realised? The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)-led system is facing an unprecedented caseload and, while funding is at a record level, so is the ‘gap’ between funding and appeals. Humanitarian assistance has arguably reached a point where need has surpassed the system’s absolute capacity to deliver effectively and comprehensively in accordance with its collective ideals; at the very least it is possible to state that the limits of the IASC-led core humanitarian system are increasingly clear. In conflict contexts with high levels of global political interest, faith in and respect for the universality of humanitarian principles have diminished, and maintaining access for humanitarian actors is a significant challenge. In natural disasters, principally those in middle-income countries, there is an emerging consensus on the importance of nationally led response, and calls for the transfers of response capacity at a transformative scale to governments, national civil society, communities and the private sector. A range of alternative practices and models have been put forward, but these require consistent relationships with national actors and between the humanitarian and development components of actors across the system. The core humanitarian system is currently not configured, funded, nor linked to development and transitional programming in such a way that the necessary partnerships are being built. The response to super-Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 was, by and large, a success story. Although the IASC-led system provided only a proportion of the assistance, it is clear that this was timely, at scale, in keeping with assessed priorities and with reasonably consistent coverage. In keeping with Level 3 (L3) protocols, cluster coordination was scaled up very quickly through a timely surge response. In the context of this largely positive evaluation, questions and criticisms nevertheless arise, most notably around the failure of the international system to work in full partnership with national actors. The relative weight of the international surge set up a typically asymmetrical relationship with the Government of the Philippines, a willing and Humanitarian Outcomes capable partner. Recognising the extent to which effectiveness is increasingly seen as contingent on the centrality of the host government – as well as connectedness with national response systems and risk reduction, preparedness and recovery programming – the case for critical reflection is clear. In considering the strength of responses to large-scale, chronic crises, the International Rescue Committee and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) both note the extent to which humanitarian action should be evaluated against reasonable expectations of performance and not “condemned to permanent failure” as a result of unrealistic expectations where the real failure is that of political process. There is also concern that low levels of field presence beyond capitals and easily accessible areas are the result of risk-averse behaviour and a lack of drive to reach those most affected. This combination of inherent systemic weakness and external pressure has clearly undermined effectiveness in Syria, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan where serious gaps in coverage and capacity are noted. Funding shortfalls are seen as having restricted coverage and/or diluted assistance levels. While there is some evidence that the Emergency Relief Coordinator’s (ERC’s) declarations of an L3 emergency in CAR and South Sudan went some way towards addressing shortcomings, challenges in leadership and coordination in Syria and Turkey speak to inter-agency politics and the challenging debate around cross-border operations. There is, however, no basis on which to judge the longevity of the effects of the L3 declaration or their impact. Perceptions of the ERC’s transformative agenda are largely positive to date. It can be argued, however, that in the prevailing political climate, the system is reaching the limit of what can be achieved by iterative, incremental improvements of existing practice. The new HPC and Strategic Response Plan do appear to go beyond this critique, in that they are seen as initiatives which offer at least a partial solution to the problem of addressing the power differential between the UN-led system and governments of affected states. While pooled funds have positive and mutually