-JCOPYl b~l~l EcOF B 2 COPIES AD-A24111111liJiilI~IIII 1111 11r11 III IIlii II820 " - IDA MEMORANDUM REPORT M-144 DUEL BETWEEN AN ASAT WITH MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLES AND A SPACE-BASED WEAPONS PLATFORM WITH KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS P. Cutchis DTI ELECTS ()IT,O I II January 1986 DwRIPTISON WTA App~gved kw pube lcr... Dwdhssm UnIUmad Preparcdfor Strategic Defense Initiative Organization 91-11860 111iiiii11111111/lli 11111i111lli!iH,,I * INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandia, Virginia 22311 IDA Log No. NO 86-30858 The work reported Inthis document was conducted under contract MDA 903 84 C 0031 for the Department uf Defense. rhe publicstion of this IDA Memorandum Report does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nov should the contvrnts bQ construed as reflocting the official position of that agency. [This Mimoranmum Report Is published In order to make aval~able 1 the material It contains fat the use and convenience of interested parties. The material has not necessarily been compi*tely eviluated and analyzed, nor subjected to IDA review. j A release; distbution unlimited. 1 E4 UNCLASSIFIED PAGE REPORT 0 OCUMFNTATION I&. REPORT FSECURiTY Mýý LIIICTO b. RiSTRI-CTIyE MARKINGS UNCLASS IFIED________________________ ~7ECURITY CLASSIFICaTION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION / AVAIA~LT O EPORT Approved for public release; 2b. DECLAS4MFICA7ION I DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE di~str ibu tion uinl imi ted. 4. PERFORMINC ORGANIZATION RIPOT NUMbER(S) S. MONITORING ORG4,.NiZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) IDA Memorandum Report M-144 6a. NAME O0F PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITOR(NG ORGANIZATION Institute for Defense Analyses lfalibe) DoD-IDA Management Office, OUSDRE fic.ADDRESS (City, StOOV, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Cride) 18Cs1 N. Beaiuregard Street 1601 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311 Alexandria, VA 22311 Ba. NAýME OF FUNDING iSPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROV.JREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMIBER ORGANIZATION Strategic Def ense (N aplicablo) MDA 903 84 C 0031 initiative Organization (ISTO) ______________________ 'k.ADD.'ESS (City, Stafte and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING N4UMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT I TASK WORK UNIT Washington, DC 20301-7100 ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. ACC3SSION NO. _________ _________ ________ ___T-3__187____ I1I TITLE (include S*CuHWl CWia cetlonVi Duel Between an ASAT with Multiple Kill Vehicles and a Space-Based Weapo'ns Platform with Kinetic Rnergy Weapons 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S). P. Cutchis 13a. TYPE OF R.PORT I13b TIME COVERED 114. DATE OF REP.R tr (Yeer, MentttDay) Sl. PAGE COUNT Finil 11 FROM Oct. 84 To Der. 851 January 1986 I 38 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 17 COSA In CODES 1S. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue 6n mcwma if nevesavy and identify by block number) PIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Space pl~atform survivability, ASAT kill probability, ASAT kill vehicles, space plati~orm defense missiles, kinetic energ weapons, high energ laser 19, ABSTRACT (Continue an revene it neceuaiy andi identd by b~lock number) iA,mathematical model is described for a duel beltween a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) and a space-based weapons platform defending itself with kinetic energy weapons. The ASAT carries one to six kill vehicles and the space platform may first attack the ASAT bioster with one to three defense_ missiles. If the ASAT kill vehicles collectively survive the boost phase, they are each subject to a post-boost phase attack consisting of one to three defense missiles. A formula for the probabil.ity of killing the space platform with a single ASAT launch is deri-Lved as a function of the vehicle reliabilities, target detection probabilities, kill probabilities, and uumber of participating vehicles. .Formulas are a:lso given for the prcbability of kill if the space platform defends itself with a high-.energy laser or with both high-energy laser and defense missiles. Illustrative examlpl~es are calculated for the case in which the space platform is defended by defense missiles only. It is assumed that all offense and defense reliabilities, detect'-n probabilities, and kill probabilities are equal to 0.90. A sensitivity analysis (cont'd ...) 20. DISTRIOUTION /AVAILABIUTY OF ABSTRACT 121. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OUNCLASS!FIEDIUNLIMITED IM SAME AS Rit". C) OTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED 22&. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 2Z2b. TELEPHONE (Includ .A'ea Coe) Fc.FOI3SYMBOL P. Cutchis I(703) 845-2286 DO FORM 1473, e4 MAR 63 *Pit dition may be used unt.il exhausted, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAQE All other ediftio are obsoitte. UNCLASSIFIED IDA MEMORANDUM REPORT M-144 DUEL BETWEEN AN ASAT WITH MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLES AND A SPACE-BASED WEAPONS PLATFORM WITH KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS P. Cutchis January 1986 IDA INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Contract MDA 903 84 C 0031 'Task T-3-187 / ABSTRACT A mathematical model is described for a duel between a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) and a spaced-based weapons platform defending itself with kinetic energy weapons. The ASAT carries,one-to si,& kill vehicles and the space platform may first attack the ASAT booster withhone-to three>defense *• missiles. If the ASAT kill vehicles collectively survive the boost phase, they are each subject to a post-boost phase attack consisting ofbne-to three>defense missiles. A formular for the probability of killing the space platform with a single ASAT launch is derived as a function of the vehicle reliabili- ties, target detection probabilities, kill probabilities, and numbjq. of participating vehicles. Formulas are also given for -thep probabi lit#_ of-A41l-l'if the space platform defends itself with a high-energy laser or with both high-energy laser and defense missiles. Illustrative examples are calculated for the case in which the space platform is defended by defense missiles only. It is assumed that all offense and defense reliabilities, detection probabilities, and kill probabilities are equal to 0.90. A sensitivity analysis illustrates the effect of a vari- ation in any one of the assumed parameters on the probability of killing the space platform when all other parameters are held equal to 0.90. It is shown that the survivability of the space platform is crucially dependent on a capability to destroy the ASAT booster before it can deploy its miniature kill vehicles. Improvement in parameter values above the 0.9 level, if shared equally by both the ASAT offense and space platform defense, will favor the platform defense.y This conclusion is based on the mathematical model developed,\which does not consider countermeasures, costs, and defense missile inventory exhaustion effects. ii 0 * CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii A. INTRODUCTION B. MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE DUEL 2 C. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 8 1. Firing Doctrine 8 2. Sensitivity of PKL to Common Parameter Value 11 * 3. Sensitivity of PKL to Y 11 4. Sensitivity of PKL to DVp 12 5. Sensitivity of PKL to EpV and EVM 13 D. CONCLUSIONS 13 0 TABLES I. Parameters in Space Platform Survivability Against 3 Direct Ascent ASAT Attack for a KEN 0 Defense II. Expected Number of Missiles Fired 10 FIGURES 11. PKL vs number of defense missiles allocated 16 assuming all paraneter values - 0.90 and NV - 1 2. PKL vs number of defense missiles allocated 17 assuming all parameter values - 0.90 NV = 2 * 3. PKL vs number of defense missiles allocated 18 assuming all parameter values - 0.90 NV - 3 4. PKL vs number of defense missiles allocated 19 assuming all parameter values - 0.90 NV = 4 *5. PKL vs number of defense missiles allocated 20 assuming all parameter values - 0.90 NV = 5 iii 6. PKL v. number of defense missiles allocated 21 * assuming all parameter values = 0.90 NV a 6 7. PKL vs x, assumed to be the common parameter 22 value for all reliability, detection and kill probability parameters NB - 0 8. PKL vs y assuming all other parameter values 23 - 0.90 NB r 0 9. PKL vs y and DVp assuming all otý%er parameter 24 values - 0.90 NB = 2; NM - 2 10.1 PKL vs DVp assuming all other parameter values 25 -0.90 NB- 0 11. PKL vs y and DVp assuming all other parameters 26 0.90 NB - 0 12. PKL vs i and DVp assuming all other parameter 27 values = 0.90 NB - 2; NM 2; NV - 6 13. PKL vs EpV assuming all other parameter values 28 a 0.90 NB = 0 * 14. PKL vs EVM assuming all other parameter values 29 a 0.90 NB - 0 15. PKL vs E assuming Epv - E and all other parameter 30 values - 0.90 NB - 0 Accoesion For NiTIS -RA&I DTIC TAR Unannou0ed 0 Just if la i on_ ___ Distributloxq Avallability Codqs iv •DtI.t SpeoIal DUEL BETWEEN AN ASAT wtrH MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLES AND A SPACE-BASED WEAPONS PLATFORM WITH KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS 0 A. INTRODUCTION The U.S. is currently testing a sophisticated air-launched anti-satellite (ASAT) which carries a miniature infrared homing * vehicle capable of hitting and thereby killing a satellite. A heavier.ground-launched ASAT booster could deploy a number of such kill vehicles dedicated to dest-oying a single satellite. A space-based weapons platform that defended itself against *Q such an attack would be required to engage and kill each of the ASAT kill vehicles separately, unless the booster were to be engaged and destroyed before it could deploy its kill vehicles. The attacker, c! course, could also launch more than one ASAT *Q booster against the space platform. VariouL scenarios might be postulated for the types of engagements considered here. A ground-based attack, for exam- ple, could be a prelude to a nuclear strike. For this case, - commonly referred to as defense su;pression, time considera- tions would preclude the use oi a shoot-look-shoot firing doc- trine by the attacker.