THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRÄTIC CENTRALISM In this chapter, my aim is to bring together the themes discussed in 1978-1981 under the topics of democratic centralism, anarchism, and bureaucratism. Based on the press discussion, I will construct a comprehensive theory of democratic centralism in this chapter. In addition, I will use earlier Western research to evalu- ate the theory and to put my findings into a historical perspective. Strictly speaking, there are three analytically distinct elements in the theory of democratic centralism: democratic centralism in the Party, the mass line, and the comprehensive theory of democratic centralism. Democratic centralism in the Party refers to democratic centralism in the original Leninist parlance: open dis- cussion before decision making and united implementation after the decision is made. The mass line, then, describes the grassroots level dialogue between a cadre and the masses and the interaction between policies formulated by higher-levei organs and popular initiative. Democratic centralism as a theory not only includes both of these conceptions,l but also deals with the complexity of the relations within decision-making and implementation processes. Below I refer to this com- prehensive theory, unless otherwise specified. The exact meaning of democratic centralism in chinese parlance is compre- hensible: it refers to the dialectical process of decision making consisting of popular input, decision making, and implementation. Democracy in democratic centralism involves popular initiative in both decision making and implementation. Centralism, then, could refer either to the leadership functions in democracy' the processes of decision making, the decisions themselves, or the discipline in imple- menting and obeying decisions. James Townsend summarizes that the mass line describes the central process in every political system: the conversion of demands and interests ofindividuals and groups into political decisions, and the application and enforcement of these decisions.2 The same is true of democratic centralism in general. Stephen Angle identifies stages of input, policy formulation and adjust- Dick Wilson and Matthew Grenier argue that Mao divided democratic centralism, originally the orthodox Leninist organizational policy, into two distinct elements: democracy stressing the mass line and centralism emphasizing organization (wilson and Grenier 1992,p.28). a Townsend 1980, p. 417. 262 Tlnu S,ttuøux,qnt ment in democratic centralism,3 stages that are actually conunon to the policy- making processes in all modern states. The Chinese use the term democratic centralism to describe various kinds of processes. All of these accord with the general umbrella understanding, but are not necessarily fully compatible in the details. Firstly, democratic centralism was an organizational principle in the best Leninist tradition: it meant party discipline and obeying decisions which resulted from Party-wide discussion. Secondly, it was a method of democratic decision making in general, which required process- ing popular initiative and knowledge into decisions and implementing these deci- sions. Thirdly, it referred to interaction between leaders and the led or the political system and the populace. Fourthly, it was an epistemology combining practical and experimental knowledge with the more general and more comprehensive theoretical understanding. History of democratic centralism in Chinaa I have no means to determine when in the parlance of the chinese communist Party the term democratic centralism acquired all of its present dimensions. The term, in its original Leninist meaning, has been in use since the early days of the chinese communist Party as is evidenced by its appearance in Party documents from that time. As such, it involved inner-Party democracy combining party members' initiative with unified and disciplined execution of decisions.s Later, it encompassed the mass line leadership style. Quoting two separate speeches of the time by Mao Zedong, stuart Schram sees that democratic centralism and the mass line were parallel already in Ya'nan.6 John wilson Lewis highlights a 1945 speech, in which ,ll4¿o zedong put forth the idea that the mass line must conform to democratic centralism.T 3 Angle 2005, p. 528. 4 For a handy general summary of democratic centralism in Mao Zedong's writings, see Chi 1986, pp. 245J48. Nevertheless, I would be cautious about Chi's attempts to view these writings in an undemocratic light. For example, to refute the stance that army units should "ask the lower levels to discuss first, then let the higher levels decide," does not disregard the masses' influence as Chi 198ó, p. 248, tends to clainl since any army in combat situations demands that its soldiers obey military orders, and this quotation says nothing about how democracy should be practiced among civilians in times of peace. 5 S.", e.g., "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" in Mao Zedong, Selected Works, vol. 1,pp.204105. 6 S.hru- 1989, p. 97. 7 Lewis 1966,p.79. Theoretical Implicølions of Democratic Centralism 263 According to Stuart Schram, the concept of the mass line was not invented by Mao Zedong,s but he had utilized and developed practices resembling the mass line far before the ofhcial formulation of the concept. Arthur Steiner maintains that ever since Mao's early organizational activity among peasants in Hunan in the 1920s he had emphasized that the Party must rely on the masses, serve their needs, and draw its inspiration fíom them.g It was Mao Zedong who authorita- tively summarized the mass line style of leadership in 1943 after the Party rectifi- cation campaign in his famous writing "Some Questions Conceming Methods of Leadership". This style of leadership combines leadership and popular participa- tion, a general policy and particular conditions, and leading and leaming. Leader- ship must analyze experiences during the process to acquire even better know- ledge of the situation and formulate even better policies.l0 The 1942 rectification campaign already stressed some epistemological questions closely linked with democratic centralism. It opposed two types of subjectivism, dogmatism and empiricism, the first ignoring practice and the second unable to use perceptual and I partial knowledge in a purposeful and systematic way'l The mass line evolved as a synthesis of insights gained through guerilla ex- periences, when face-to-face interaction was the main form of communication and the Party depended on the masses for survival.l2 The reality of the mass line changed considerably afler the revolution. Brantly Womack emphasizes that the Communist Party no longer was situated in a competitive political environment. This situation fundamentally affected the democratic character of the mass line. l3 As a result of the Party monopolizing power, popular influence faded. Lowell Dittmer remarks that after the revolution, the elite's capability to transmit its mes- sages increased due to new and more effective media, while the masses' abilities to communicate their views to elites did not conespondingly increase. This fact subtly altered the nature of the Party's contact with the masses.l4 John Gardner explains that the revolution could rely on the masses' participation and local knowledge more than on specific technical skills, but after the revolution eco- nomic reconstruction needed expertise and bureaucracy. In addition, Mao Zedong 8 Schram 1989, p. 98. 9 Steiner 1951, p. 423. See also Kim 1969 for Jiangxi Soviet political style and organizational techniques. See especially pp. 78_19 for their relation to the future conception of the mass line. l0 .,Some vol. Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership," in Mao Zedong, Selected Wo¡ks, ilI. ll E.g. "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," in Mao Zedong, Selected Wo¡ks, vol. III' pp. 36- 42. l2 Selden 1972, p. 274; Stan 1979,p.192; Townsend 1967, p 51. l3 Womack 1991 A, pp.68-69,73. t4 Dittmer 1974,p.346. 264 TARU SALMENKAN lvanted to speed up ideologically motivated social change, which could not be realized without resorting to commandism. Since some policies were no longer popular, the Party responded by downgrading the masses' right to discuss and modify policies. As a result, regimentation of the masses replaced genuine mass 15 mobilization. Moreover, Soviet models of administration and enterprise management insulated leaders from workers and stressed discipline over personal activism and incentive. 16 John Bryan Starr maintains that in the communist base areas the mass line did not need to deal with hierarchical relationships among leaders. Hence, the mass line offers no solution to the alienation of the upper echelons of the organi- zation from the masses, since this alienation is not only a question of cadre atti- tudes but also the sheer size of the organization.t1 James Townsend describes how after the revolution, "higher-level cadres no longer maintained the popular con- tacts that were to ensure 'a democratic' style in the absence of popular controls." Although sending cadres to the grassroots and soliciting people's opinions still added to the quality of cadres' relationships with the masses, they could not solve the post-l949 isolation ofhigher-level cadres from the people. In other words, the result was a recurring conflict between theory and reality. Although mass move- ments attempted to recapture the original mass line spirit, they provided only tem- porary solutions and eroded the Party's ability