Truth, Politics, Morality ‘What is the place of truth in politics? Cheryl Misak argues that if we would defend liberal freedoms we must not shy away from the truth. Misak develops and defends a lucid, well-informed and attractive version of Peirce’s pragmatist theory of truth and convincingly shows that if this theory is correct, non-cognitivism in morality may be resisted and Schmitt’s challenge may be rejected as epistemologically faulty. Truth, Politics, Morality will be valuable reading for anyone with serious interests in liberalism, democracy, or truth.’ Henry Richardson, Georgetown University ‘Truth, Politics, Morality is a delight to read. It seems no easy task to write a book on a pragmatist’s account of moral epistemology and its bearing on moral problems that is accessible both to those specializing in moral philosophy, and to those specializing in epistemology, but Cheryl Misak has succeeded admirably. The account Misak gives of knowledge and truth is sophisticated, but readily understood; her discussion of its application to moral inquiry is plausible, and often persuasive. The book is very clearly written, with a lively style.’ Robert L. Frazier, Christ Church, Oxford Cheryl Misak is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. She is the author of Truth and the End of Inquiry (OUP) and Verificationism (Routledge). Truth, Politics, Morality Pragmatism and deliberation Cheryl Misak London and New York First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. © 2000 Cheryl Misak All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Misak, C. J. (Cheryl J.) Truth, politics, morality : pragmatism and deliberation / Cheryl Misak. p cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Truth. 2. Political science–Philosophy. 3. Ethics. 4. Pragmatism. 5. Inquiry (Theory of knowledge) I. Title. BD171.M515 1999 99-16328 121–dc21 CIP ISBN 0–415–14035–8 (hb) ISBN 0–415–14036–6 (pb) ISBN 0–203–16228–5 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0–203–16231–5 (Glassbook Format) For Sophie and Alexander, who make the big things simple Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 1 The problem of justification 9 Carl Schmitt and the aim of substantive homogeneity 9 Rorty and the abandonment of justification 12 Rawls: political, not metaphysical 18 Harmony and the virtues of deliberation 29 Habermas, Apel, and the transcendental argument 35 2 Truth, inquiry, and experience: a pragmatist epistemology 48 Peirce, truth, and the end of inquiry 48 Philosophy, practice, and correspondence 51 Pragmatism and disquotationalism 57 Pragmatism, superassertibility, and pluralism about truth 64 Bivalence 67 The role of truth in inquiry 73 Experience: taking it seriously 78 Holism and radical holism 84 Moral inquiry 90 Convergence and the end of inquiry 95 3 Moral deliberation 102 Truth-seekers and reason-givers 102 Neutrality: three senses 108 The principle of neutrality 111 Public/private 117 Modesty and the philosopher 122 Conflict, difference, and community 127 viii Contents Pluralism, underdetermination, and defeated reasons 136 Schmitt, coercion, and when we have talked enough 147 Conclusion 155 Notes 157 Bibliography 168 Index 180 Acknowledgements This book is in a way the final chapter of my D.Phil. thesis on pragmatism and truth, which was submitted at Oxford University over a decade ago. I had intended then to say something about moral judgement, but David Wiggins, who supervised that thesis, showed me just how far I had to go before I got anything close to right enough. Since then, I have had the pleasure of trying out my thoughts in the Law and Philosophy Reading Group, which meets weekly at the University of Toronto over very civilised and friendly lunches. Its participants number heavily in the list of friends whose comments made for an improved final version: Judith Baker, David Bakhurst, Peter Benson, Alan Brudner, Bruce Chapman, Roger Crisp, Joe Heath, Brad Hooker, Chris Hookway, Bernard Katz, Mark Kingwell, Andrew Kernohan, Jenny Nedelsky, Hamish Stewart, Ernie Weinrib, and Melissa Williams. Donald Ainslie and Arthur Ripstein were especially conscientious in taking me to task. My graduate students at the University of Toronto and audiences at the American Political Science Association, Bryn Mawr College, the C.S. Peirce Society, the 1997 SUNY Buffalo Farber Conference, and the universities of Cambridge, Cape Town, Frankfurt, Oxford, Queens (Kingston), Reading, Sheffield, St. Andrews, Waterloo, Western Ontario, Witwatersrand, and York have also helped me say something closer to what I have to say. Sustained writing time in Heidelberg, Cape Town, and Cambridge was made possible by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the University of Toronto Connaught Committee, and St. John’s College, Cambridge, as by my college discipline representative, Jackie Brunning, and my head of department, Mark Thornton. Glenn Tiller was an excellent research assistant and Adrian Driscoll and Anna Gerber at Routledge were excellent editors. I owe a rather extreme debt to Dr David Mazer and his colleagues in the Intensive Care Unit at St. Michael’s Hospital, Toronto, who spent the better part of April 1998 hauling me out of septic shock. Were it not for them, nothing for me, least of all this book, would have been possible. Thanks also to Dr Louise Perlin and to the ICU nurses, especially Maureen Baye. It is x Acknowledgements heartening to find that superb and humane treatment can be had from a single tier public healthcare system, even one starved of funds by a succession of governments. In an only slightly less literal sense, this book would also not have been possible without David Dyzenhaus. It has had the constant benefit of his critical gaze, careful editing, and felicitious examples. But even more importantly, he makes every day part of the good life. Some of the material here builds on other work of mine and I thank the publishers for permission to draw upon it: Verificationism: Its History and Prospects (Routledge 1995), Truth and the End of Inquiry (Oxford University Press 1991), ‘The Transcendental Turn in Truth and Ethics’, Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society 1994, ‘Deflating Truth: Pragmatism vs. Disquotationalism’, The Monist 1998, and ‘Pragmatism, Empiricism, and Morality’, in S. Lovibond and S. Williams (eds) Nature, Truth and Value: Essays for David Wiggins (Basil Blackwell 1996). Note: Reference to the works of C.S. Peirce References to C.S. Peirce’s Collected Papers take the form of CP n.m, where n is volume number and m is paragraph number. References to his chronological Writings take the form CE n,m where n is volume number and m is page number. MS refers to the Charles S. Peirce Papers on microfilm and NE n:m refers to New Elements of Mathematics, where n is volume number and m is page number. See Bibliography for full details. Introduction The notion of truth has fallen from grace in some quarters of epistemology. In moral and political philosophy it perhaps did not have far to fall, the pull towards relativism and subjectivism there being what it is. And even amongst those not especially inclined towards such anti-objectivist positions, one often senses an anxiety about talking of truth and morals in the same breath. For it can appear that truth-talk encourages zeal, proselytising, and other dangerous attitudes. In this book I shall suggest that the notion of truth is not something from which philosophers have to keep their distance. Against pragmatists of Richard Rorty’s stripe, against non-cognitivists, and against some sorts of neutrality- focused liberals, I shall argue that we ought to explore the idea that moral and political deliberation aims at truth. Not just any conception of truth, however, will do. I shall argue that the appropriate account of truth and objectivity – the appropriate epistemology – is that which is urged by a certain kind of pragmatism. That view has it that a true belief is one which would stand up to the evidence and reasons, were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. The founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce, sometimes articulated this thought by saying that a true belief is one which would be agreed upon at the hypothetical or ideal end of inquiry. We shall see in Chapter 2 that there is a better way of putting the point: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve – a belief which would fit with experience and argument and which would satisfy the aims of inquiry, no matter how much the issue was subject to experiment, evaluation, and debate. Pragmatism thus abandons the kind of metaphysics which is currently in so much disrepute – it abandons concepts which pretend to transcend experience. Truth and objectivity are matters of what is best for the community of inquirers to believe, ‘best’ here amounting to that which best fits with the evidence and argument. On the pragmatist view of truth, when we aim at empirical adequacy, predictive power, understanding the way things work, understanding ourselves, and the like, we aim at the truth. For a true belief is the belief which best satisfies those and other particular aims in inquiry.