UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Essays on Judicial Behavior Under Institutional Constraint A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Jeremy Daniel Horowitz Committee in Charge: Professor Gary Jacobson, Chair Professor Michael Bailey Professor James Fowler Professor Samuel Kernell Professor David Schkade Professor John Skrentny 2015 © Jeremy Daniel Horowitz, 2015 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Jeremy Daniel Horowitz is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Chair University of California, San Diego 2015 iii DEDICATION I want to thank everyone who gave so generously of their time to provide advice and guidance on portions of this dissertation -- especially Gary Jacobson and Mike Bailey. Thanks also to Judges Nora Manella and Raymond Fisher, wonderful mentors and phenomenal jurists who first set me on the path to studying how and why judges do what they do. This dissertation is dedicated to my family, with my deepest appreciation for their unwavering support. And particularly to Nora, for her steadfast love and encouragement, and to Aaron, Gabe and Zach, for making it all worthwhile. Dad’s done, guys. Let’s go play. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ............................................................................................................... iii Dedication ...................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... v List of Figures ............................................................................................................... vii List of Tables ............................................................................................................... viii Vita ................................................................................................................................ ix Abstract of the Dissertation ............................................................................................ x INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1 The Politics of Non-Precedential Opinions: Analyzing the Effects of Dissents from Denial of Rehearing En Banc in the Certiorari Process ....................................................................... 13 I. Introduction ................................................................................................ 14 II. DDRs: The Clearest Expression of Judicial Preferences ........................... 18 III. Ideology and the DDR-Certiorari Link ...................................................... 20 IV. Measures and Data ..................................................................................... 21 A. Litigant Behavior ............................................................................ 22 B. Supreme Court Interpretation of DDRs .......................................... 26 C. Supreme Court Outcomes in DDR Cases ....................................... 37 V. Discussion ................................................................................................... 41 VI. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 44 CHAPTER 2 Split Circuits: Analyzing Polarization on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Using Dissent from Denial of Rehearing En Banc Coalition Data ...... 49 I. Introduction ................................................................................................ 51 II. Competing Theories of the Rise of Judicial Polarization ........................... 54 III. DDRs: An Increasingly Common Means of Expressing Judicial Preference ...................................................................................... 58 IV. Constructing Measures of DDR Ideology .................................................. 62 V. Polarization in the Circuits? ....................................................................... 69 VI. Assessing Polarization Causes via Presidential Cohort-Based Analysis ... 75 A. Marshalling and Assessing Presidential Cohort Evidence ............. 76 v B. Applying the Cohort-Based Results to the Polarization Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 90 VII. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 94 CHAPTER 3 Legitimacy, Ideology and the Use of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court ................................................................................................... 104 I. Court Legitimacy and the Importance of Precedent ................................. 107 II. Using Precedent to Maintain Legitimacy ................................................. 113 III. Measuring Precedent Centrality, Justice Ideology and Other Relevant Concepts .................................................................................... 118 A. Measuring Precedent Centrality: The Hub Score ......................... 119 B. Measuring Justice Ideology and Court Ideological Movement .... 129 C. Measuring Salience, Contentiousness and Separation-of- Powers Implications ..................................................................... 132 D. Other Case-Specific Elements ...................................................... 136 IV. Assessing Legitimacy and Precedent Centrality: Testing the Hypotheses ............................................................................................... 140 A. The Effects of an Ideological Shift ............................................... 140 B. What Role Does Ideology Play? ................................................... 144 C. The Effect of Contentiousness and Salience ................................ 146 D. Separation-of-Powers Concerns ................................................... 148 V. The Quest for Legitimacy: A Constraining Force?: ................................. 150 Appendix: Calculation of the Hub Scores ............................................................ 156 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 165 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2-1: Mean DDR coalition/panel author GHP differential when judge participates in DDR, by circuit (minimum: 5 DDR coalitions) ............ 70 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1-1a: Certiorari petition rates by party of DDR author, by Supreme Court era ................................................................................ 23 Table 1-1b: Certiorari petition rates by party of DDR author, by circuit ................ 24 Table 1-2: Rate of certiorari grant by party of DDR author .................................. 28 Table 1-3: Logistic regression model of factors affecting certiorari decision -- DDR cases .......................................................................... 33 Table 1-4: Logistic regression model of factors affecting certiorari decision -- non-DDR cases ................................................................... 36 Table 1-5: Rate of reversal/vacation by party of DDR author ............................... 40 Table 2-1: Possible explanations for judicial polarization ..................................... 58 Table 2-2: Distribution of concurrences in DDRs ................................................. 60 Table 2-3: Largest differences between judge’s GHP and DDR coalition/ panel author GHP gap (minimum: 5 DDR coalitions) ......................... 69 Table 2-4: Regression results for coalition partners, targets and partner/target gap, by judge ........................................................................................ 73 Table 2-5: Frequency of DDR participation by presidential cohort ...................... 77 Table 2-6: DDR participation per judge-year, by presidential cohort and decade ................................................................................................... 78 Table 2-7: Average DDR coalition GHP score, by presidential cohort and decade ................................................................................................... 81 Table 2-8: Mean panel author GHP, by DDR participant presidential cohort and decade ............................................................................................ 83 Table 2-9: Mean coalition partner/panel author ideology gap, by DDR participant’s presidential cohort and decade ........................................ 85 Table 2-10: Presidential cohort, circuit and decade effects on DDR participation polarization ...................................................................... 87 Table 3-1: Mean hub score by justice, 1953-2004 ............................................... 124 Table 3-2: Embeddedness scores by issue area ................................................... 137 Table 3-3: Ideological shift and precedent strength ............................................. 141 Table 3-4: Opinion author/majority coalition ideology effect on precedent strength ............................................................................................... 145 Table 3-5: Effect of variable changes on hub score percentile ranks .................. 147 Table 3-6: Coordinate branches and precedent strength ...................................... 149 viii VITA 1994 Artium Baccalaureus