Silencing Parliamentary Democracy or Effective Time Management? Time Allocation in the House of Commons by Yves Yvon J. Pelletier 2000 CanLIIDocs 228 Is "time allocation" the best means by which to silence the opposition or does it allow rather for effective time management in the House of Commons? In 1969, the Trudeau government adopted, not without a vigorous reaction from opposition parties, a new procedure that allotted a certain period of time for a debate, reducing the use of closure. Despite promises that this measure would never be used, 150 time allocation motions were adopted by the House of Commons since December 1971. This article analyses the context in which time allocation was adopted and determines which government has used it most often. he centralization of political powers in the hands of of time could be allocated for debate. The partisan Tsenior management within the office of the Prime position when this measure was adopted did not prevent Minister and the central agencies of the federal its use by all federal govemments since 1971, on 163 government cannot alone account for the reduction in the occasions. This article examines the decline of the legislative role of Canadian Parliamentarians. In fact, legislative role of MPs as the result of time allocation and changes to the Standing Orders of the House of determines which government, from Trudeau to Commons by its members over the years have limited the Chrétien, have made most frequent use of it in terms of opportunities of private members to influence the final the number of seats held by the government, sitting days wording of government bills. With growing and bills introduced and passed. intervention by the Government of Canada in the post This article contributes to a new trend in political sci- war economy, the number of government initiatives ence that studies the centralization of powers within the increased rapidly, adding to the work of the House. executive to the detriment of Canada's Parliament. A Accordingly, it became necessary to set up mechanisms number of political scientists state that Prime Ministers to manage the time allocated to debate so that a final take advantage of the loyalty and the inexperience of decision could be made in a reasonable period of time. their members and use his/her persuasion skills to limit, However, a balance had to be struck between the right to if not silence, their opposition to government measures speak for an appropriate length of time and Parliament's on the public stage.' In caucus, however, government right to reach decisions. Since the use of closure upset backbenchers can express their disagreement with the this balance, the Trudeau government adopted a new content of bills and try to influence Cabinet. From this, procedure in the House of Commons whereby a period political scientist Donald Savoie concludes that Cana- dian MPs, even those on the government side, are not elected to govern but rather to ensure that those who do are held accountable for their decisions.2 In addition, in Yves Yvon J. Pelletier was a Parliamentary Intern from 1999-2000. order to maintain Cabinet dominance in the legislative This article is based on his research essay which was awarded the Alf process, government members have rejected the relaxa- Hales prize as the best paper submitted by the 1999-2000 Interns. 20 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW /WINTER 2000-2001 tion of party lires in the House in 1985-86, a decision that vote pitting the members of the government against the would have increased the legislative role of members to members of the other parties. Not surprisingly, the oppo- the detriment of the executive.3 The introduction of time sition members described the amendments to the Stand- allocation is another example of the executive's desire to ing Orders as "the will of the government only". maintain full control over the legislative process in the Following a long debate and just one day before the House of Commons. House of Commons rose for the summer recess, the 6 Towards Tinte Allocation Trudeau government invoked closure on the debate. In response to this motion, the Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, Robert Stanfield, said: The passage of a bill in 1956 on public funding fora pipe- line by a company partly owned by American interests The use of closure to force through mle changes, which set a precedent in the history of Canada's Parliament. are opposed by every member of the opposition, is of course an aggravation, and the use of this method of The St-Laurent government, using its majority in the forcing through rules is so completely foreign to the House of Commons and imposing closure at each stage traditions of this House as to constitute a breach of of the bill, ensured its passage in less than fifteen days. privilege. If the rules can be changed in these Finding his right to speak denied at each stage of the bill, circumstances, and if closure can be resorted to in order 2000 CanLIIDocs 228 Conservative MP Donald Fleming said: "The Canadian to implement these rule changes, and can be used so as to alter fundamentally the very nature and role of the House of Commons has been gagged and fettered in this House of Commons, then we are in a very sorry state debate by a despotic government. You [the government] indeed in so far as democracy and freedom are are jeopardizing the institutions that have proven them- concerned.7 selves the bastions of democratic freedom and destroy- During this brief debate, the opposition members ar- ing the rights of the minority in the House. This gued as one that parliamentary procedure should give all stratagem was rot given birth in any democratic mental- parties equal privilege in a 'United debate and that ity".4 Despite the passage of this bill and the vigorous re- amendments to Standing Orders should be based on a action of opposition MPs and the public, the use of consensus. In the defence of his government's actions, closure in the pipeline debate gave rise to longstanding Trudeau listed the parliamentary reforms his govem- resentment. Clearly, the Pearson government's decision ment had put in place since 1968, such as the funding of a to apply closure to the debate on the Canadian flag in research service for the opposition and the institution of 1964 reinforced the need to pass a new means of time supply days. "Are these the acts of a government which management less stringent than closure. is seeking to muzzle the opposition" Trudeau wondered, Between 1964 and 1969, the House of Commons mod- in the context of replacing a measure that was precarious ernized its Standing Orders by adopting new rules for a and at times inefficients Despite a last ditch attempt by trial period in order to find another way to manage time. the opposition to send rule 75C back to committee with A number of procedural committees examined the ques- instructions to change it, the House of Commons passed tion as well, but in the absence of a unanirnous decision, it on July 24,1969. In a vote of 142 to 84, it agreed to adopt they all agreed that the Standing Orders of the House of the report of the procedure committee. Ironically, the Commons could rot be amended without unanirnous time allocation measure was passed only through the use consent. In June 1969, the government majority on a of closure, the very rule it was to suppose to lighten. newly created procedure committee proposed three new ways to apply time allocation to debate in the House. The First Use of Standing Order 75C Standing order 75A would permit the allocation of a specified period of time, when "there is agreement An important precedent was set in the December 1,1971 among the representatives of all parties"; Standing Or- proceedings of the House of Commons with the presen- der 75B would apply when "a majority of the representa- tation of the first time allocation motion in its current tives of several parties have come to an agreement in form. Under study was Bill C-259, The Incarne Tax Act, a respect of a proposed allotment of days or hours"; and voluminous tax bill of 707 pages, together with the 97 Standing Order 75C, the most contentious of the three, amendments proposed by the opposition, that was de- would permit "[when no] agreement could be reached bated in the committee of the whole for over 25 days. On under the provisions of Standing Order 75A or 75B (...), December 2 and 14, 1971, the House of Commons voted that a minister of the Crown [may] propose a motion for on two time allocation motions under Standing Order allotting time".5 Although the opposition parties sup- 75C, imposing a period of four days to complete debate ported the first two recommendations of the report, in the committee of the whole and three days at third Standing Order 75C was passed by the committee after a reading of the bill. The President of the Privy Council, WINTER 2000-2001 / CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW 21 the Honourable Allan MacEachen, and the Minister of From Precedent to Norm: The Use of Time Allocation Since 1971 Justice, the Honourable John Turner, supported the use of this rule to enable the government to assume its re- From December 1971, when time allocation was first sponsibilities and the House to assume its own by decid- used in the House of Commons, to October 2000, 163 ing on the bill. time allocation motions were presented in the Chamber.