BACKGROUNDER No. 2747 | NOVEMBER 30, 2012 Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring Abstract ews reports indicate the Obama The Obama Administration is NAdministration is seeking to fur- Key Points apparently considering further ther reduce the number of deployed reductions of U.S. nuclear forces based warheads in the U.S. long-range ■■ News reports indicate the on the misguided notion that the world nuclear force to between 300 and Obama Administration is seek- ing to shrink the U.S. nuclear is safer when America adopts a nuclear 1,100.1 In contrast, this analysis con- force to levels that would leave deterrence posture based on a minimal cludes that the appropriate number level of effectiveness. In contrast, a the U.S. with a less effective of operationally deployed warheads nuclear deterrent posture to pro- sound targeting policy consistent should range between 2,700 and tect itself and U.S. friends and with a “protect and defend” strategy 3,000. allies around the world. for the U.S. and its allies and friends The targeting policy recommend- indicates that the U.S. should maintain ■■ Instead, the U.S. should retain ed in this report responds to the approximately 2,700 to 3,000 a nuclear arsenal of 2,700 to multiplying strategic threats that the 3,000 warheads on fully mod- operationally deployed warheads and U.S. will likely face as result of the ernized short-range and long- be flexible enough to permit continuous spread of ballistic missile and weap- range delivery systems. updates. These numbers also assume that the U.S. will modernize its delivery ons of mass destruction technologies. ■■ This recommended range of systems and upgrade its command and It reflects U.S. values and strength- warheads is derived from a “counterforce” targeting policy control structure to meet counterforce ens credibility of U.S. deterrence. and a broader “protect and targeting requirements. Increasing The targeting policy and the target- ing requirements that follow from defend” strategy, which are and maintaining the U.S. military’s designed to hold at risk the asymmetric advantage will protect that policy fundamentally drive the means of strategic attack on the ability of the U.S. to shape events, number of nuclear weapons in the both the U.S. and its friends and rather than be controlled by the wills of U.S. arsenal. Further, the analysis allies and the means by which other nations. provides a general description of the foes maintain oppressive control targeting requirements that follow of their domestic populations. from this policy. ■■ This paper, in its entirety, can be found at The nuclear weapon reductions http://report.heritage.org/bg2747 that the Obama Administra- Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Five Principles of tion is examining appear to be Center for Foreign Policy Studies Nuclear Targeting designed to further President The Heritage Foundation The recommended targeting Obama’s nuclear disarma- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE policy is based on five principles. ment agenda, not to strengthen Washington, DC 20002 nuclear deterrence in an effort to (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Principle #1: The U.S. should protect the U.S. and its allies and Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily accept a concept of deterrence reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or friends. as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill that leads to a targeting policy before Congress. that is consistent with a “protect BACKGROunDER | NO. 2747 NOVEMBER 30, 2012 and defend” strategy for the This change in declared policy Principle #2: U.S. policymak- country and its allies. U.S. strate- follows from the recognition that ers need to recognize that in the gic planners should start with a basic destroying enemy population and emerging multipolar strategic concept for deterrence that over- economic centers has little political setting no mechanistic, apoliti- arches the chosen targeting policy. and military utility to the U.S., espe- cal equation will identify what The deterrence posture needs to be cially if it all but invites follow-on must be added to the U.S. nucle- credible both to U.S. allies and to strikes against equally undefended ar force or may be subtracted current and potential enemies of the U.S. population and economic cen- without increasing the risk of U.S. It should reflect the values of the ters. Further, purposeful attacks on inviting extremely destructive American people and the federal gov- undefended populations are contrary strategic attacks.5 Rather, nuclear ernment’s solemn commitment to to the values of the American people. deterrence in this setting requires protect and defend them to the best The earlier concept for nuclear deter- evaluating various factors that may of its ability. rence makes it readily apparent that evolve. These factors include the The Heritage Foundation spelled a U.S. President is highly unlikely to national goals of foes, what danger- out this concept for deterrence in a employ U.S. nuclear forces for these ous regimes value, and their willing- 2008 study.2 Both before and after purposes; therefore, the threat of ness to take risks. To treat the threat the release of the 2008 study, The doing so does not represent a cred- of nuclear war as stemming from Heritage Foundation validated this ible deterrent. the U.S. increasing its security and concept in gaming exercises that An effective nuclear deterrence thereby tipping an imaginary bal- tested it against requirements for posture, as a part of a broader stra- ance, rather than recognizing that crisis and arms race stability in pro- tegic deterrence posture, cannot dangerous regimes inimical to the liferated settings.3 This concept for be separated from credible options U.S. and its allies are the true threat deterrence has become the declared to employ nuclear weapons under of conflict and war, is to incorrectly strategic deterrence policy of the specified circumstances. The old portray deterrence as something United States, as stated in the resolu- deterrence concept is both less effec- far more simplistic than it really is. tion of ratification accompanying tive and immoral. Pursuant to the Failure to maintain a dynamic and the New Strategic Arms Reduction protect and defend policy declared in effective nuclear force because of Treaty (New START).4 the New START resolution of rati- a misunderstanding of deterrence The declared protect and defend fication, the U.S. nuclear force, in or an ideological pursuit of rid- policy explicitly abandons the Cold conjunction with strategic defensive ding the world of nuclear weapons War concept of deterrence based forces and strategic conventional could empower America’s foes and on strategic vulnerability, also strike forces, will seek to hold at risk increase the likelihood of a holocaust. described as a balance of terror pol- the means of strategic attack on the Principle #3: This analysis icy, which held that the U.S. needed U.S. and its allies. The U.S. govern- does not make a precise recom- a nuclear force capable of retaliat- ment needs to commence building a mendation on the number of ing against an attacking force by strategic force, including the portion nuclear weapons that should destroying undefended population consisting of nuclear weapons, under make up the U.S. arsenal. The and economic centers. the new declared policy. exact number of nuclear weapons 1. The Obama Administration’s plans for the U.S. short-range nuclear arsenal are not clear. 2. Baker Spring, “Congressional Commission Should Recommend ‘Damage Limitation’ Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2172, August 14, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/08/congressional-commission-should-recommend-damage-limitation-strategy. 3. Nuclear Stability Working Group, Nuclear Games: An Exercise Examining Stability and Defenses in a Proliferated World, The Heritage Foundation, 2005, http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/11/nuclear-games-an-exercise-examining-stability, and Nuclear Stability Working Group, “Nuclear Games II: An Exercise in Examining the Dynamic of Missile Defenses and Arms Control in a Proliferated World,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 83, July 26, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/nuclear-games-ii-an-exercise-in-examining-the-dynamic-of-missile-defenses-and-arms-control. 4. U.S. Senate, “Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Treaty Doc. 111–5, § c(2), December 22, 2010. 5. Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), p. 75. 2 BACKGROunDER | NO. 2747 NOVEMBER 30, 2012 that the U.S. needs is unknowable, targets. This flexibility and preci- political leadership led by President particularly in a nonclassified setting. sion is necessary because, when an Barack Obama is making a concert- To make a specific numerical recom- employment decision is imminent, ed effort to take the world to zero mendation is to claim perfect knowl- the President will need to meet the nuclear weapons.7 The President edge of the future actions of U.S. foes, specific threat at hand. Of course, the outlined his vision in his April 2009 all scenarios that may require the U.S. will need to plan and construct speech in Prague.8 The 2010 Nuclear U.S. to employ nuclear weapons, and the required nuclear force well in Posture Review (NPR) Report listed a precise understanding of how stra- advance, anticipating a wide variety “Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear tegic defenses and conventional stra- of circumstances, not in response to weapons in U.S. national security tegic strike systems will influence a specific, imminent circumstance.