INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. U M I films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send U M I a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact U M I directly to order. University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Order Number 9301503 Soviet decision-making: A comparative analysis of the interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) Granville, Johanna Cushing, Ph.D. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University), 1992 Copyright ©1992 by Granville, Johanna Cushing. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, M I 48106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SOVIET DECISION MAKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVENTIONS IN HUNGARY (1956), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1968), AND AFGHANISTAN (1979) A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University by JOHANNA C. GRANVILLE In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy July 1991 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS Curriculum Vitae Abstract Chapter I. INTRODUCTION.........................................1 II. THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY................ 70 III. THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA........ 177 IV. THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN............ 272 V. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS........................ 385 Bibliography.............................................. 458 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Johanna C. Granville The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 63 Simpson Ave. Tufts University Somerville, MA 02144 Medford, MA 02155 (617)628-7010 EDUCATION Ph.D. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Four Fields of Study: International Security Studies, Diplomatic History and Foreign Policies: Soviet Union and Central Europe, Asia, and United States (November, 1991) M.A.L.D. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Diplomatic History and Foreign Policies: Soviet Union and Central Europe. 1989 B.A. Amherst College, Russian Language and Literature. 1986 Pushkin Institute of Russian Language in Moscow. Spring, 1985 Master’s Thesis: "Leon Trotsky and the Fourth International." DISSERTATION Title: "Soviet Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of the Interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979)." Advisors: Professors Robert Pfaltzgraff, Richard Shultz, and Paul Holman AWARDS Fletcher School Enrollment Fee Scholarship, 1989-90. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Teaching: Teaching Fellow, Harvard University. Conducted weekly discussion sessions, each containing 20 students, presented lectures, prepared and graded examinations and papers. Fall, 1990 "The Russian Revolution" (Professor Richard Pipes), one section "Twentieth Century Russia" (Professor Vladimir Brovkin), three sections 1986-1988 Russian language tutoring, Tufts Academic Resource Center Research Fall 1990 Research Assistant for Professor Hannes Adomeit, Fletcher School of Law and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Diplomacy. Located and analyzed data on Soviet war casualties. Compiled reading lists and syllabi. Monitored Kommunist. Pravda. Izvestia. and other Soviet newspapers/journals for professor’s research on regional conflicts. Summer 1986 Researcher, International Law institute, Washington, D.C. Edited and updated volume, International Business Transactions (trade with COMECON countries). Translated and analyzed Russian articles for book to be published. Summer 1985 Research Assistant, International P.E.N., London, England. Researched and wrote background reports on imprisoned writers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. OTHER EXPERIENCE 1986-1988 Reference librarian, Wessell Library, Tufts University January, 1985 Assistant to Judge’s law clerk, U.S. District Court, Philadelphia. Researched cases, composed briefs, observed trails. January, 1984 Reporter, Fort Saskatchewan Weekly, Edmonton, Canada. Reported on four civic and municipal government meetings. LANGUAGES Fluent Russian and French. Basic Japanese. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT The purpose of the dissertation is to answer two questions: 1) Which factors influence the Soviet leadership to decide to intervene militarily in a country in its sphere of influence? 2) What accounts for the "failure" in Afghanistan as opposed to the "successes" in Hungary and Afghanistan? To address these questions, a theoretical framework is constructed, involving two types of decision making (analytic and cybernetic) and two types of learning (discontinuous and reiterative). Analytic decision making occurs only when information relevant to the immediate situation influences the actor's decision— specifically information about his present goals, policies, and commitments, and benefits, costs, and risks of various options, and those of his opponent. Cybernetic decision making takes place when past circumstances, solutions, and decisions prestructure future decisions. While the analytic decision maker allows no constraint higher than the reality of the immediate situation to guide his decision, the cybernetic decision maker allows an ideology such as Marxism-Leninism to determine his view of the fundamental nature of politics and political conflict. These philosophical beliefs in turn mold the decision maker's instrumental beliefs, such as the best approach for selecting political goals, and for calculating benefits, costs, and risks. The following conclusions are reached. First, there are ten factors that motivated the leaders to intervene. They are: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. geographical realities (the target country borders with the USSR or West Germany); the Soviet perception that the local Communist Party was losing its leading role; pride in past Soviet acquisitions; anticipated assistance from Eastern European countries; an available quisling to "normalize" the target country; auspicious timing due to another crisis that deflected world attention; a favorable cost-benefit-risk analysis; the goal of strengthening the Warsaw Pact; memories of having defeated the target country in the past; and anticipation of US noninvolvement. Second, the intervention in Afghanistan failed, largely due to three causal factors: Islamic fundamentalism, increased US assertiveness in foreign affairs, and the collapse of the Soviet economy. Third, the Khrushchev leadership in 1956 and the Brezhnev leadership in 1979 behaved according to the cybernetic model, while the Brezhnev leadership in 1968 acted in a analytic manner. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study is to answer the question: what factors influence the Soviet leaders to decide to intervene in a country located in its sphere of influence or near its border? And, more specifically, if the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia can be characterized as "successful," and the intervention in Afghanistan as a "failure," what accounts for the Soviet failure in the latter case? A comparison of the these three Soviet interventions may reveal whether and to what extent the purposes for Soviet interventions change, and whether the Soviet leaders choose readily to intervene (as a reflex), or do so only as a last resort (after extensive analysis). These are the most debated questions in recent literature on the subject as analysts ponder the origins and authenticity of Gorbachev's "new thinking." By comparing the three interventions, it may be possible to detect patterns in Soviet motives and methods in the 1956-1979 period that will answer these