THEODICY AND THE INTERPERSONAL PROBLEM OF EVIL A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts In the Department of Philosophy University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon By TATE WILLIAMS © Copyright Tate Williams, December 2020. All rights reserved. Unless otherwise noted, copyright of the material in this thesis belongs to the author. PERMISSION TO USE In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation. DISCLAIMER This thesis was exclusively created to meet the thesis and/or exhibition requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Philosophy at the University of Saskatchewan. Any reference in this thesis to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the University of Saskatchewan. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not state or reflect those of the University of Saskatchewan and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in whole or part should be addressed to: Head of the Department of Philosophy University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5 Canada OR Dean College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies University of Saskatchewan 116 Thorvaldson Building, 110 Science Place Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5C9 Canada i ABSTRACT The problem of evil in its current state is an argument against the existence of God from the existence of suffering in the world. Theistic response has developed along two lines: theodicy, which attempts to explain suffering by appealing to overriding, justifying goods; and skeptical theism, which calls into question the argument itself, typically on the grounds of our limited capacity to know the reasons for suffering if they existed. In this thesis I compare the current way of framing the problem of evil to the way it was framed by St. Thomas Aquinas, and I find that compared to him contemporary philosophers are thinking about the problem in a very narrow way. For Aquinas, I argue, suffering was as much a challenge to interpersonal connection with God as it was a challenge to God’s existence. I explore this broader way of framing the issue by reformulating the problem of evil as an argument against the Christian practice of trusting God. I conclude by surveying possible avenues of response by Christian theists to this new formulation of the problem of evil, arguing that there are serious barriers to a successful skeptical theistic response. As a result, I recommend theodicy as the most promising avenue. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work is indebted to many people. In particular, my supervisor, Dr. Carl Still, whose guidance made this project possible in the first place, and who took it on despite a very busy schedule, finding the time to meet with me in person to discuss many drafts, thank you. I would also like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Emer O’Hagan and Dr. John Liptay, as well as my external reader Dr Darren Dahl for their helpful questions and challenges. To the Philosophy faculty at the University of Saskatchewan and the St. Thomas Moore College, thank you for your care and instruction. This research was funded through the gracious award of a Graduate Teaching Fellowship from the College of Graduate Studies and Research. Finally, to my wife, Ashley Williams, and family who supported me, thank you for your patience, love, and trust. iii DEDICATION To Gregg I hope we can discuss this some day iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PERMISSION TO USE…………………………………………………………………………i ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………..ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………………….iii DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………………..iv TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………. v I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………..1 1. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY………….4 1.1 The Logical Argument…………………………………………………………………...4 1.1.1 Mackie’s Logical Argument……………………………………………………….4 1.1.2 Plantinga’s Free Will Defense……………………………………………………..7 1.2 The Evidential Argument………………………………………………………………..11 1.2.1 Rowe’s Evidential Argument……………………………………………………...11 1.2.2 Swinburne’s Free Will Theodicy…………………………………………………..13 1.2.3 Hick’s Soul-Making Theodicy……………………………………………………..17 1.2.4 Skeptical Theism…………………………………………………………………...19 2. AQUINAS ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL…………………………………………………..23 2.1 The Metaphysics of Theodicy…………………………………………………………....23 2.1.1 On Good and Evil………………………………………………………………….23 2.1.2 Is There Space to Prosecute the Problem?................................................................28 2.1.3 Humanity’s Highest Good…………………………………………………………36 2.1.4 Aquinas’s Theodicy and Desires of the Heart……………………………………..39 2.2 Aquinas’s Response to the Problem of Evil for the Existence of God…………………..46 3.TRUST AND THE INTERPERSONAL PROBLEM OF EVIL………………………………52 3.1 What is Trust and When is it Justified?.............................................................................53 3.1.1 Baier’s “Trust and Antitrust”………………………………………………………54 v 3.1.2 Anscombe on Believing Someone…………………………………………………57 3.1.3 Doxastic Nature of Trust…………………………………………………………...61 3.1.4 Trust and the Second Personal…………………………………………………….67 3.2 Is Faith Trust?....................................................................................................................72 3.2.1 Foundational Assumptions of the Contemporary Discussion……………………..73 3.2.2 Aquinas and Augustine on Faith…………………………………………………..75 3.2.3 Kierkegaard on Faith………………………………………………………………76 3.3 Trusting God through Suffering – The Interpersonal Problem of Evil………………….81 3.3.1 Suffering is Evidence Against the Trustworthiness of God……………………….82 3.3.2 Theodicy and the Interpersonal Problem of Evil…………………………………..88 WORKS CITED…………………………………………………………………………………94 vi INTRODUCTION The problem of evil is the question of why, if there is a God, is there any evil or imperfection in the world? Within contemporary philosophy of religion, it is raised as an argument for atheism against the existence of God. Unlike many of the questions that philosophers ponder, it is one that is also very likely to be asked outside of the classroom or the pages of academic journals. Indeed, it is a question most alive in emergency rooms, refugee camps, or therapy sessions. For the people who ask it here, within dire circumstances, there is a lot at stake. Over coffee I asked a young minister who had just recently completed his undergraduate degree what he had been taught about the problem of evil. The minister, who was very bright, outlined with clarity responses that theists like himself could give to the argument, responses which were similar to the ones we will examine in chapter 1 of this thesis. After sketching these responses, he remarked off-hand that, of course, none of these answers should be offered to a parishioner who is in the midst of tragedy. I was surprised by this, so I asked him why. I cannot recall his exact words, but the general point stuck with me. People who are suffering tend to find these answers dismissive of their pain. He told me it is like swimming; you need to know how before you are in thrown into the deep end. There is something about our state of mind when we are going through something arduous which makes us think there can be nothing good about what we suffer. However, if we have thought it through with a clearer head, we will be prepared to face trails when they are upon us. 1 Perhaps unfairly, this discussion sparked in me an intuition that theists can do a better job in answering the problem of evil.1 This thesis is an exploration of that intuition. My guide in this exploration is the genius work of the 13th century philosopher Thomas Aquinas. An immersion in his writing, particularly his underappreciated biblical commentary, leads me to conclude that the way that we think about the problem of evil in contemporary analytic philosophy is too narrow. The question of meaning in suffering is one that is raised in contexts beyond the question of God’s existence. Thinking about the problem of evil in these other contexts will change our view on what kind of response is successful. In the first chapter I sketch the contemporary analytic discussion of the problem of evil. I begin with what is called the logical formulation of the problem of evil, represented by J.L. Mackie, then outline Plantinga’s refutation of it, ultimately finding that Plantinga’s argument successfully undermines the logical formulation. With the logical formulation defeated,