The Poetics of Being Rolf I. Vaernes Cand. Mag., Cand. Philol. This Thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Murdoch University, 2004 Declaration ‘Except where I have indicated, the thesis I am submitting is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for assessment at any other University.’ …………………………………………………………………………… 20.01.2004 2004 © Rolf I. Vaernes All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing from the author. Abstract Rolf I. Vaernes, The Poetics of Being The aim of The Poetics of Being is to inquire into how the apperception of the Being of beings is produced. We will recognize this production not primarily in philosophy, but in a medium accessible to us all, theatre. Although the Romantic tradition of literary criticism from Herder to Bloom has noted that Shakespeare produces an exceptional sense of what is [true], so much so that he is said to create the impression of nature or life, no one has so far attempted to show how precisely Shakespeare affects this experience. Contrary to T. S. Eliot, who is unable to discern any kind of poetics in Shakespeare’s plays, we have discovered an insistent and consistent pattern of inadequation, a kind of mismatch. The thesis argues, that the predominant tropes of inadequation are falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision and substitution. We shall show that these figures of inadequation are the universal means by which Shakespeare, almost imperceptibly, compels the spectator to infer the apperception of what is [true]. On the basis of these tropes of inadequation the thesis makes the fundamental philosophical claim that the cognition of Being through non-Being is a negative form of what Heidegger calls the ontological difference. We call this the negative ontological difference. The thesis demonstrates that with the exception of some Pre-Socratic thinkers, Plato in the Sophist, the work of Pseudo-Dionysius, and the writings of Derrida, the bulk of the tradition of Western philosophy has argued Being in terms of positivities. While the thesis does not question the possibility of realizing the ontological difference in a positive fashion, as does Heidegger’s philosophy of unconcealment, the thesis claims that the negative ontological difference, or ontological contradiction, is the more forceful process by which we become aware of what is [true]. Acknowledgments I would like to thank Princess Mirah for love, encouragements and support, but even more, for like a goddess indicating the true direction for this thesis, for sharing an experience of life without which this thesis would not be possible. I would also like to thank her for sharing her family at the Palace in Karangasem, Bali. My thanks extend to her family, who through their care provided me with what is invaluable to all fundamental research: time. Horst Ruthrof has been an invaluable mentor from the beginning to the end, and I would like to praise him for systematically, forcefully and knowledgeably, guiding me to the completion of this thesis, so effortlessly and cleverly that I at times may have had the false impression that I could have done so without him. Through his kind advice and learned company, I have for the first time in my academic life realized an intention, which would have been impossible if he had not from the beginning known where I was heading better than myself. I am also grateful that he has convinced me that there is even more to learn from people than from books, for he taught me the basic tenet of his own philosophy without saying a word. Furthermore, I would like to express thanks the administration at Murdoch University for guiding me from beginning to end through all bureaucratic hurdles, but especially to director of research Paul D’Sylva for having introduced me to the University itself. I would finally like to thank my parents in Norway for being there when this project was first conceived years ago, and my students for always reminding me that if you don’t make yourself understood there is hardly any reason to speak at all. To Carl Burman I wish to extend my gratitude for showing me that there is always a way if you are more than willing to talk the talk, that is, walk the walk. And perhaps all those I have mentioned are among those Heidegger had in mind when he said, ‘Only those who walk along, know there’s a way.’ For showing me that, I am eternally thankful. Rolf I. Vaernes The Poetics of Being Murdoch University [contents] Abstract Acknowledgements C0 INTRODUCTION 1 C1 THE HERMENEUTICS OF BEING 23 §1.1 Making the Shakespearean Aporia 26 §1.2 Unmaking the Shakespearean Aporia 40 §1.3 The Topology of Being 54 C2 PHILOSOPHIES OF UNCONCEALMENT 72 §2.1 Plato’s Khora 76 §2.2 Aristotle’s Place 81 §2.3 Plotinus’ Mirror 87 §2.4 Nietzsche’s Chaos 91 §2.5 Derrida’s Khora 104 C3 PHILOSOPHIES OF CONCEALMENT 112 §3.1 Derrida’s Death 113 §3.2 Kant’s ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ 125 §3.3 Dionysius’ Mystical Theology 139 C4 THE TECHNE OF BEING 157 §4.1 The Inadequacy of Mimesis 158 §4.2 The Techne of Inadequation 168 §4.3 Instruments of Inadequation 179 C5 THE TRUE PRODUCTION OF BEING 193 §5.1 The Battle for Truth 194 §5.2 The Body of Truth 208 §5.3 Shakespeare’s True Betrayal 217 [contents] C6 THE FALSE PRODUCTION OF BEING 237 §6.0 The History of What is False 238 §6.1 The Topos of What is False 254 §6.2 The Function of What is False 266 §6.3 The Paradox of What is False 278 C7 THE PRODUCTION OF BEING THROUGH DISSIMILARITY 290 §7.1 The Topos of Dissimilarity 291 §7.2 The Function of Dissimilarity 304 §7.3 The Paradox of Dissimilarity 313 C8 THE PRODUCTION OF BEING THROUGH NOTHING 324 §8.0 The Battle for Nothing 325 §8.1 Saying ‘Nothing’ 333 §8.2 Showing Nothing 348 §8.3 Being Nothing 359 C9 THE PRODUCTION OF BEING THROUGH SUBSTITUTION 375 §9.1 The Topos of Substitution 376 §9.2 The Function of Substitution 386 §9.3 The Paradox of Substitution 401 C10 THE PARADOX OF BEING 414 Glossary 426 Bibliography 434 To Princess Mirah, for showing that love is the self-sacrificial desire to unconceal what is true and false, the Being of beings. C0 INTRODUCTION [1] In Shakespeare’s King Lear neither Edmund nor Edgar appear as what they ‘truly’ are. Regardless of the reason the one has for not revealing his intentions and the other his identity, regardless of whether one is ‘good’ and the other ‘evil,’ they have something in common. For it is their false appearance, Edmund as a man with good intentions, and Edgar as an unknown beggar, which grants to these men the unquestionable sense that they are alive. What can be said of Edmund and Edgar equally applies to many characters on Shakespeare’s stage; that their appearance does not correspond to what they really are. Yet surprisingly, these deceptive beings produce in the spectator’s mind a more powerful sense of reality than any straightforward representation. The thesis makes two major claims: one, that Shakespeare’s plays systematically employ false representations to achieve their reality effects; the other, that the success of Shakespeare’s work rests on a general philosophical principle, a negative form of the ontic-ontological difference, to be defined a little later in the introduction. [2] If one were to first glance at the bibliography of this thesis instead of reading the text, one would perhaps have the impression that this work appears to be somewhat random, based on unclassified and uncategorized material. This impression would prevail if one did not note, as Kant does towards the end of The Critique of Judgment, that it is a ‘revolutionary idea’ that binds all parts together. The ‘revolutionary idea’ here is that a negative ontic-ontological difference – that what is presented as ‘not’ is more persuasive than what is as it triggers an ontological leap beyond what is perceived to be untrue to a negative sense of its Being - is produced by art in an exemplary fashion. This ‘idea,’ without which all Introduction 2 elements would appear as they did to Walter Benjamin, as fragments scattered by the winds of History, has carried this project from the beginning to the end. Certainly, we have been in pursuit of an idea, a notion to which no phenomena may possibly correspond.1 However, if the thesis were to make any essential claims, the thesis would certainly have destroyed its intention, not articulated The Poetics of Being. If poiesis generally is ‘to produce something where there previously was nothing,’ as Plato, Aristotle and Heidegger all contend,2 we will expose another techne, where the impression of what truly is, is produced by the encounter with what is not or what is false, the profound apperception of Being created from the cognition of non-beings. It is the task of The Poetics of Being to grasp how the singular impression of [th]is3 negative ontic-ontological difference is produced so laboriously and apperceived so effortlessly that the beholder often seems to believe that she is confronted with the apperception4 of that which is in- different from her own life. [3] Instead of speaking of the ontological difference as such without any qualifications we shall repeatedly say in this thesis that the ontological difference between Being and beings is negative.