Chapter Five Aristotle's Conception of Morality Terence H. Irwin #1. Features of Morality If we study or teach the history of ethics, we usually learn to be careful about the terms we use to define our subject matter; and in the last century at least, we have learned to be careful about even claiming to study the history of ethics. We may think of ethics or moral philosophy as the study of morality; and from this point of view we examine utilitarian and Kantian theories as rival theories of the same thing. Once we look further back in the history of ethics, however, we apparently should be more cautious. As we move away from our own historical and cultural situation and our own philosophical assumptions, we may not find that other theorists have any concept even roughly cor - responding to our concept of morality. Bernard Williams thinks we find no concept of morality in Greek ethical thought, and offers this general comment: In fact - though we have used the term 'moral' quite often for the sake of convenience - this system of ideas basically lacks the concept of morality altogether, in the sense of a class of reasons or demands which are vitally different from other kinds of reason or demand.1 1. "Philosophy" in The Legacy of Greece, ed. M.I. Finley, (Oxford, 1981), p.251. I want to argue that Williams claim is largely false. To do this I will ask what it means, why we might reasonably be inclined to believe it, and why we have better reasons for disbelieving it. A discussion of Greek ethics and moral theory needs to distinguish two roles for the concept of morality: 1. We might find that it is or is not an explicit or implicit part of the ethical beliefs and practices that e.g. Plato or Aristotle examines. This would be a fact about Greek ethics, the thoughts and practices of ordinary Greeks. 2. We might find that it is or is not part of the theoretical apparatus that a theorist uses to examine and criticize Greek ethical beliefs and practices. This would be a fact about ethical theory. We should not presume that a concept of morality will play one of these roles just because it plays the other. My question is mainly about the second role of a concept of morality in Aristotle; but I will make a few remarks about the first as well. We cannot decide either question about the concept of morality without some initial agreement; but we can agree on clear enough outlines to proceed with the discussion. We tend to identify moral principles (actions, virtues, concerns) with those that refer to the welfare of those affected by them. If someone is moved only by concern for his own welfare, or by a purely aesthetic concern, e.g. to preserve all the works of art in the world, we will doubt if he is moved by moral considerations. If I think of other people without regard to their welfare, I probably do not think of them as objects of moral concern. Our intuitive concept of morality includes a further component that is uneasily related to the concern for the welfare of those affected. We are unlikely to regard a demand as a moral demand, or an error as a moral errors if the agent can do nothing about it, if it is entirely outside his voluntary control. Even though it might be better for all of us if each of us had an innately stronger and healthier physical constitution, we do not regard natural weakness as a moral failing, because it is outside the agent's control. We may wonder why our concept of morality should include this component together with the first, and whether they may not sometimes conflict. But initially we should want to .