IRANS FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE INCEPTION OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO THE IZARBXY"IJXN CRISIS MPJIMOUD ABDULLAHZADEH '. Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D in the Faculty of Arts, University of Edinburgh 1983 Volume One I DECLARATION. I declare that this thesis is my ovn twrork, by and it has: > been aoriposed_ myself. Malunoud Abdullahzadeh. ýýýý ýr II When I have applied my mind to politics so that I might examine what belongs to politics with the same freedom of mind as we use for mathematics, I have taken my best pains not to laugh at the actions of mankind, not to groan over them, not to be angry with them, but to understand them. ' Spinoza, Tractaus Politicus (1675-77; chap. 1: 4) las U4 I A" v. ßä,, oIjj. 3 oa 0 ý09s CH4 e.) j. ,L; jJ LS T Ip. cS t5j.. j yTSýLýt, One Zot'cogitates on the way of religion, Another ponders on the path of mystical certainty; But I fear one day the cry will go up, ýOh ' you fools, neither this nor that'is the way: ( The Ruba'iyat Of Omar Khayyam, Translated By Peter Avery and John Heath-Stubbs). III ABSTRACT. The primary objective of this thesis is to study empirically Iran's foreign policy from the inception of the Second World War in September 1939 to the collapse of the Azarbayijan Government in December 1946, with particular emphasis on domestic politics whose international dimensions frequently determined the core of Irants foreign policy. This study reveals a striking consistency in the original pattern of Iran's foreign policy, although after the debacle of Rizä Shah various antagonistic forces appeared on the Iranian political scene as well as the presence of foreign troops in the country. The study begins with an analysis of Rizä Shäh'-s policy of neutrality, which was adopted soon after the outbreak of the war, and Iran's relations with Germany, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain during the last two years of his reign. It is suggested that the policy of neutrality was the best policy to be adopted at the time, and at the same time it was the only policy left to the Iranian Government, because none of the belligerent powers approached the Government with a view of entering into an alliance with Iran. After the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran, a tripartite treaty of alliance was concluded between Iran, Britain, and Russia, according to which Iran officially became allied with those two powers. Under this treaty, Iran declared support for the Allies' cause. But at the same time she pursued her undeclared policy which was to keep her relations with the Axis, IV in particular with Germany, through a number of secret pro- Axis organisations set up inside the country with Berlin connections. I have called this undeclared policy "the last policy of reinsurance with the Axis". When the fortunes of the war began to turn against Germany, Iran also began to abandon the last policy of reinsurance by declaring war against Germany, but at the same time she started a search for another power in order. to compensate for the loss of Germany. In other words, Iran was anxious to keep the original pattern of her foreign policy unchanged - only Germany would be replaced by another thrid power. This time the natural choice for Iran was the United States to take over the position of Germany in Iran's politics. Sensing this "new" third development - Iran's search for a power- the Soviet Union found the moment opportune to set up a regime in the north on the Soviet model. To achieve this aim, the Soviet Government first began with a revival of an old claim concerning petroleum rights in the Dasht-i Kavir-i IChüriyan area, and later, with a demand for an oil concession Äzarbäyijän in avast area in the north, stretching from to Khuräsän. Once having failed to obtain the concession, the Soviet Government encouraged and supported the establishment of the Azarbayijan Government which collapsed after one year. Once more Iran's calculated and diligent foreign policy succeeded to preserve the country's territorial integrity and independence. ýýýý V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to acknowledge my great debt to my Supervisor, Professor L. P. Elwell-Sutton, who kindly and patiently encouraged me and supervised this research throughout. Without his moral support and assistance I would not have been able to overcome my problems. I must also thank my second Supervisor, Professor J. D. Latham, for his help and encouragement. I am most grateful to Dr. Carole Hillenbrand who gave me tremendous moral support during this research. My thanks and gratitude are also extended to Miss I. Crawford, the Secretary of the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Edinburgh University, who was extremely helpful, and Mrs. E. Nuttall for typing this thesis with great efficiency. I would also like to thank the staff of Edinburgh University Library, Tehran University Library, and the Controller, H. M. Stationery Office in Britain, for permission to quote from unpublished Foreign Office documents at the Public Record Office and the India Office in London. Finally, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the financial assistance of the Tahereh Research Centre. v2 (VOLUME ONE) ADSTRACT III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS V INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES X CHAPTER ONE I. Policy of Neutrality 1 II0 Relations with Germany 6 III. Relations with the Soviet Union 15 IV. Relations with Great Britain 27 CHAPTER TWO The Failure of the Policy of Neutrality I. The Anglo-Russian Occupation of Iran 51 CHAPTER THREE The Aftermath of the Occupation 1. The Debacle of Rizä Shah and his exile 78 II. Britain's policy on Restoration of the Qajars. 95 CHAPTER FOUR From Occupation to Alliance 1. The Anglo-Russian Terms and Zones of 105 Occupation II. Internment of Germans 113 III. The impact of the occupation on the internal situation and the introduction of reforms, September-December 1941 122 IV0 Tripartite Treaty of Alliance 146 VII CHAPTER FIVE 1942: The period of Crises 1. The Cabinet Crisis 158 II. The April Crisis and Rupture of Relations with Japan 167 III. The Food and Currency Crisis 173 CHAPTER SIX The Last Policy of Reinsurance The Axis Plot and pro-Axis Organisations in Iran 220 The pro-Axis Organisations 239 The Qashgä'i and the German Plot 258 Qaväm-al-Saltana and the German Plot 273 CHAPTER SEVEN Foreign Interference in the Fourteenth Majlis Elections 289 I. The Return of Sayyid Ziy-ä 298 II. The Fourteenth Majlis Elections 308 (VOLUME TWO) CHAPTER EIGHT Prelude to the policy of Passive Equipoise. 330 I. The Kavir-i Khuriyan Oil Concession and its history 342 II0 The Rejection of the Soviet demand for an oil concession 353 VIII CHAPTER NINE From Appeasement to Resolution Iran's Foreign Policy vis-a-vis the Soviet non-evacuation_Polioy and Interference in Azarbayijan 381 CONCLUSION 474 APPENDIX I I. System of Transliteration 495 2, Personalities 497 APPENDIX II 1. 'Documents from Iran's Foreign Ministry 539 2, Text of Note presented to the Persian Ambassador in Moscow by M, Molotov on August 25,1941 54+3 3'0' The BBC talk of October 5,1941 in 548 Persian, drafted by FuruZhi 553 Z+. The Treaty of Alliance between Iran, Britain, and the Soviet Union, January 29,1942. APPENDIX III 559 1. Agreement concerning the Detention and interrogation and supervision of Persian suspects at Sultanabad (Arak) 560 2. Names of Iranian and Foreign internees APPENDIX N 1. Iran's Political Parties (1939-1947) 572 (1939-1947) 2,. Iran's Labour an&Trade Unions. 592 3. Analytical list of Deputies to the Fourteenth Majlis (March 1944-March 1946) 603 APPENDIX V 611 Further documents related to Chapter Nine DC BIBLIOGRAPHY 633 LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS Table (1): Rials in Circulation 204 Map : The location of the Kavir-i 345 Khüriyan concession X INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES `To carry out this research I had to build up a conceptual framework as a guide line., Like any research of this naturei a number of hypotheses and questions had to be put before and during the research in order to find out their proof and answers by empirical gains. Without this conceptual framework it would have been like wandering about in a Kavir (desert) of documents, whilst lacking a chart or compass to attain the journey's end. The core of this framework was to find answers to the question of how foreign policy originates and evolves, particularly in a developing nation-state. Foreign policy does not originate in a vacuum. Is it the internal politics that dictate it or is it a number of policies formulated as a response to external behaviour in an international system? The answer would be "a combthation of both". But we have to differentiate between the foreign policy making of big powers and that of small, underdeveloped nation states. In the case of the latter groups, foreign policy often originates entirely from domestic politics. The chief objective öf'the foreign policies of these nations is twofold: (a) to preserve their (b) territorial integrity, independence and security, and to achieve, if possible, a greater degree of economic development. Most of these nation states do not even have regional interests, let alone continental or global ones. In those nation states which have highly personalised authoritarian regimes, foreign policy is often formulated as to protect the ruler or the xi elites, govering and also to give them a free hand to deal with internal security. The threats to internal security are domestic in origin or emanate from the attitude of neighbouring powers.