Rethinking Judicial Responsibility: The Case of Judicial Persecution A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctorate of Civil Laws Marika Giles Samson Faculty of Law McGill University. Montréal ©Marika Giles Samson, 2019 July 2019 Il n’y a point de plus cruelle tyrannie que celle que l’on exerce à l’ombre des lois et avec les couleurs de la justice. ---------- There is no crueller tyranny than that which is perpetuated under the shield of law and in the name of justice. Montesquieu Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains (1734) Abstract This thesis endeavours to develop a model of judicial responsibility in cases where legal proceedings are instrumentalised in a manner or for purposes tantamount to persecution. The phenomenon of ‘judicial persecution’ is situated in the broader literature of judicial instrumentalisation, including political trials, the judicialisation of politics, and lawfare. The thesis suggests that persecutory proceedings are a particularly significant stress test for judges, one that forces them to confront the possibility of their complicity in profound injustice. The first Part of the thesis posits that certain types of abuse of process – apartheid South Africa, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), and the political trials revealed by the jurisprudence under Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights – represent paradigmatic instances of judicial persecution. While the role of judges in such proceedings has been generally underexplored, this thesis argues that those explanations that have been offered, such as judicial impotence in the face of legal obligation, have failed both to address the gravity of judicial persecution and the full scope of judicial function. The second Part uses detailed studies of judicial ethics and judicial doctrine to develop a model of judicial responsibility along three axes: the rule of law, the responsibility to the polity, and the protection of the judicial institution. ----------- • ---------- Ce projet vise à développer un modèle de responsabilité pour les juges impliqués dans des abus de procédure relevant de la persécution. Le phénomène de la ‘persécution judiciaire’ est contextualisé au sein des débats plus vastes sur l’instrumentalisation des systèmes de justice. Cette thèse soutient que la persécution judiciaire confronte les juges à la possibilité de leur propre complicité dans des situations d’injustice profonde. Dans la première partie, plusieurs cas d'abus de droit et de procédure – l'Afrique du Sud à l'époque de l'apartheïd, les poursuites-bâillons, et les procès politiques dans la jurisprudence de l’article 18 de la Convention européenne sur les droits de l’homme – sont présentés comme des cas paradigmatiques de persécution judiciaire. La complicité des juges dans cette persécution est une question généralement sous- i explorée, mais dans les cas où la question a été soulevée, les explications offertes à date, comme celles invoquant une impuissance face aux exigences de la loi, ne reflètent ni la gravité du phénomène ni la portée de la fonction judiciaire. Ainsi, dans la deuxième partie, la thèse s'efforce de développer un modèle de responsabilité judiciaire qui répond adéquatement au défi de la persécution judiciaire. En entreprenant une étude détaillée de la déontologie professionnelle des juges et la doctrine juridique, un modèle de responsabilité se révèle selon trois axes: la protection de la primauté du droit, la constitution politique, et la protection de l'institution judiciaire. ii Acknowledgments This thesis was written with the insightful guidance and counsel of my supervisor, Professor Frédéric Mégret, and the members of my Thesis Committee, Professors Rosalie Jukier and Daniel Weinstock, all of the Faculty of Law, McGill University. Many parts of it were much improved by frequent, sometimes incidental, insights from many other faculty members, visiting lecturers, and research fellows-in-residence, and from feedback received at workshops at the Semaine Doctorale Intensive, the Transnational Law Summer Institute, and the Law & Society Association, as well as panel discussions at a number of conferences. The fellowship and encouragement of my peer community has been invaluable, and I must acknowledge in particular the nigh-on heroic support, critical reading eyes, and patient listening ears of Kate Glover Berger, Alexandra Flynn, Eliza Bateman, Cassandra Steer, and, most valiantly, Jeffrey Smith, who generously read the whole thesis in the final stages. I have also benefited immensely from the friendship and collegiality of the brilliant Tanya Monforte, Sarah Berger Richardson, Francis Lord, Kuzi Charamba, and Jeffrey Kennedy. Professor Alejandro Lorite of UQAM was a thoughtful advisor at a critical juncture. Professors Nandini Ramanujam, François Crépeau, Shauna van Praagh, and Angela Campbell have provided generous mentorship and encouragement. The staff of the Nahum Gelber Law Library has been unfailingly helpful, and the library itself has been an incomparable resource. I am eternally grateful for the financial support of the McGill Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism’s O’Brien Fellowship and the Fonds de recherche du Québec - société et culture, without which I could never have pursued or completed a doctorate. Additional financial support from Professor Frédéric Mégret, the Faculty of Law, and my mum (not really in that order) was frequently essential and greatly appreciated. And I could not have travelled to as many conferences and workshops as I did without my intrepid in-laws, Bev and Pierre Samson, stepping in to lend a hand at home. Crucially, this project could never have been completed without the affection and soul- restoring perspective of my clever, kind, and funny kids, Henry and Sophia. For anyone in the final stretch of thesis writing struggling to remember what they’re really trying to say, I commend having to explain it to a bright and inquisitive 7-year old. Nor could I have asked for a more supportive partner than my brilliant husband Jude who, by taking me on holiday to South Africa in 2006, inadvertently propelled me into graduate study. He has been a patient sounding board for some of the knottiest parts of my thinking. He has consistently stepped up at home whenever I needed extra time to write. But most of all, sharing my life with a profoundly decent man, one who never passes up a chance to make the world a bit kinder and the law a bit more just, has kept me honest and inspired. In the end, though, I dedicate this work to my mum, Nerelle Cooper, who never got to go to university. (I reckon that I’ve now done enough degrees for both of us!) She taught me the importance of treating everyone fairly and with equal respect, and the inherent value of hard work. I would have had neither the moral imagination nor the personal capacity for this project without those foundational lessons. iii iv Table of Contents ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................ III TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... V !"#$%&'(#!%")**+'&,-.*/"&*+'&!(!/0*1-$.-('#!%"*222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222*3* DEFINING JUDICIAL PERSECUTION .................................................................................................... 4 JUDGES AND COMPLICITY ................................................................................................................... 8 DISCERNING THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ......................................................................................... 10 PART I: JUDICIAL PERSECUTION ....................................................................... 14 (4/1#-$*3**.!#'/#!",*+'&!(!/0*1-$.-('#!%"*2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222*35* 1.1 JUDICIAL INSTRUMENTALISATION & LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM .............................................. 15 1.2 THE IDEAL OF LAW AS SEPARATE FROM POLITICS .................................................................... 20 1.3 FORMALISM, LEGALISM, AND POLITICAL TRIALS ...................................................................... 21 1.4 LIFTING JUSTITIA’S BLINDFOLD .............................................................................................. 24 1.5 PERSECUTORY OUTCOMES, PERSECUTORY PROCESSES ............................................................ 26 1.6 JUDICIAL PERSECUTION AND POLITICAL TRIALS ...................................................................... 28 1.6.1 Decisive Trials and the Judicialisation of Politics ................................................. 32 1.6.2 Didactic Trials and Political (Re) Education ......................................................... 35 1.6.3 Destructive Trials, Motivation, and Persecution .................................................... 37 1.7 JUDGES, INTENTION, AND THE “HIDDEN ENGINE” OF POLITICAL TRIALS ................................ 38 1.8 AUTHENTICATION AND CONTINGENCY .................................................................................... 40 1.9 AUTHENTICATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW .......................................................................... 41 1.10 POLITICAL TRIALS,