“We Will Crush You” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-405-2 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org November 2008 1-56432-405-2 “We Will Crush You” The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................................ 1 I. Summary ............................................................................................................... 2 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 7 II. Recommendations ............................................................................................... 9 To the Congolese Government ............................................................................. 9 To the Congolese National Assembly and Senate .............................................. 10 To International Donors ..................................................................................... 10 To MONUC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 10 III. Prelude to Violence: A Climate of Suspicion ...................................................... 13 IV. Crushing Jean-Pierre Bemba and his Supporters ............................................... 16 Military 0perations August 2006 .................................................................. 16 Effect on the second round of elections ....................................................... 19 March 2007 violence ................................................................................... 21 Killings and Summary Executions ...................................................................... 26 Relying on the loyalists ................................................................................ 26 Abuses by the Republican Guard ................................................................. 27 Arbitrary Arrest, Torture, and Ill-Treatment ......................................................... 32 Abuses by the Republican Guard ................................................................. 32 Abuses by the “secret” commission............................................................. 37 Abuses by other security services ................................................................ 44 Harassment, Intimidation, and Destruction of Property ...................................... 46 Against party activists and close Bemba associates ..................................... 47 Against journalists and their defenders........................................................ 49 Government Responsibility ............................................................................... 53 Government Response ...................................................................................... 56 Lukansu commission ................................................................................... 57 Cover-up ...................................................................................................... 59 Judicial investigations of Bemba .................................................................. 62 V. Crackdown on the BDK in Bas Congo ................................................................. 66 February 2007 Violence .................................................................................... 69 Flawed gubernatorial elections ................................................................... 69 Quelling BDK protests .................................................................................. 70 Government response ................................................................................. 72 March 2008 Violence ........................................................................................ 75 Build-up to renewed violence ...................................................................... 75 Police operation against the BDK ................................................................. 76 Cover-up again ............................................................................................ 78 MONUC investigation .................................................................................. 80 Threats against Other Politicians from Bas Congo ............................................. 80 VI. Applicable Legal Standards .............................................................................. 83 International Human Rights Law ........................................................................ 83 International Humanitarian Law ........................................................................ 84 Congolese Law .................................................................................................. 85 VII. The Role of the International Community ........................................................ 88 International Donors ........................................................................................ 88 Economic concerns take priority ................................................................. 88 The Belgians take the lead ........................................................................... 91 The UN Peacekeeping Mission, MONUC ............................................................. 91 UN Human Rights Envoys .................................................................................. 94 The Deficiency in International Attention to Congo ............................................. 95 Acknowledgments ................................................................................................. 96 Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 1 Human Rights Watch November 2008 I. Summary As they beat me with sticks and whips, the soldiers repeatedly shouted, “We will crush you! We will crush you!” Then they threatened to kill me and others who opposed Kabila. —A political party activist detained and tortured in Kinshasa in March 2007 by President Kabila’s Republican Guards The 2006 presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the first in over 40 years, raised hopes for stability and improved governance in this vast, war-torn nation. Yet in the two years following elections, there have been disturbing signs that Congo’s democratic transition is not only fragile, but that the newly elected government is brutally restricting democratic space. The government of President Joseph Kabila has used violence and intimidation to eliminate its political opponents beginning in the immediate aftermath of the election’s inconclusive July-August 2006 first round. In his first interview after his victory in the October runoff against former vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba, Kabila said that he would be “severe” in governing Congo. He has matched his actions to those words. This report focuses on some of the most violent episodes of political repression in Kinshasa and the western province of Bas Congo during the two years following the 2006 elections. The brutal and repressive tactics used by President Kabila and his advisors are emblematic of the resort to violence to stifle opponents. During our research, Human Rights Watch received reports of other incidents of repression, often smaller in scale and sometimes less violent, that are not included here. The violence in eastern Congo, where the Kabila government is in a military confrontation with an insurgency led by former general Laurent Nkunda, has been documented in other Human Rights Watch reports. The government’s lack of popularity in western Congo, and the fear of losing power through a military overthrow, have dominated policy discussions amongst Kabila and his advisors in their first two years of administration. According to many military and intelligence officials and others close to Kabila who were interviewed by Human “We Will Crush You” 2 Rights Watch, Kabila set the tone and direction of the repression. In giving orders, he spoke of “crushing” or “neutralizing” the “enemies of democracy,” “terrorists,” and “savages,” implying it was acceptable to use unlawful force against them. Possibly due to a lack of capacity in the military and law enforcement services, Kabila’s attempts to monopolize power were sometimes disorganized, though his intention to rid himself of perceived opponents was clear. As one disillusioned member of Kabila’s inner circle remarked to Human Rights Watch, Kabila pursued an approach of “winner take all,” leaving no room for other strong political opponents. The worst of the repression took place in the capital, Kinshasa, and in the province of Bas Congo, areas where Kabila failed to win an electoral