JESSICA A. HEYBACH AND ERIC C. SHEFFIELD 6. DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM AS REQUISITE TO POSTMODERN THOUGHT INTRODUCTION In this chapter, we argue that the work of John Dewey – particularly the pragmatic, reconstructive, and aesthetic notions that undergird his philosophy – constitutes a historically and philosophically necessary (though not sufficient) context to bring about the postmodern1 turn in the humanities. We confess that as a general matter, our argument herein is not entirely new. More than a few pragmatists of merit have worked quite successfully to connect American pragmatism to its mostly French first cousin, postmodernism; on the other hand, we are aware of precious little work among postmodern scholars who are wont to connect “post” work to American pragmatism in the same way. In fact, it is much more often the case to hear postmodern-oriented scholars (colleagues and friends of ours) reject Dewey’s work out of hand as naïve, overly optimistic, privileged, and outdated. However, we also want to be clear that this chapter is not meant to be a Dewey reclamation project. As academics and teachers who have read, discussed, and written about Dewey for much of our careers thus far, it is clear to us (if not among our more “post” brothers and sisters) that Dewey’s work is in no need of reclamation: it stands on its own merit and continues to speak to us in important ways today as it did when it first appeared. As to his place among the postmodern pantheon, we agree with Richard Rorty’s assessment that Dewey (along with William James) probably is waiting at the end of the philosophical road for us all. At the very least, Dewey straddled the modern and postmodern worlds while he was alive and was probably more cognizant of that than he gets credit for; at most, he could be seen as a necessary root from which postmodern theory grew. We also want to be clear at the outset that our project here is not, in fact, cannot be (due to space and time limitations) one of fully excavating postmodern theory, its adherents, and its variety of perspectives. Instead we focus on the essential starting point of postmodern theory as succinctly laid out by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. In the Introduction to The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard (1979) distinguishes between the modern and postmodern in the following ways: I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind [science turned philosophy] making © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI:10.1163/9789004405325_006 J. A. HEYBACH & E. C. SHEFFIELD an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. (p. xxiii; emphasis in the original) As to the postmodern spirit, Lyotard writes, “I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it.”2 Herein lies the central critique, or at least hesitation, leveled against Dewey – his unwavering Modernist belief in progress which often demands a metanarrative runs violently counter to postmodern sensibilities about both the self and society. Finally, in preparation for laying out our suggestion here, we are not naïve to Dewey’s critics: Dewey was certainly optimistic as to the potential the new science had for fomenting progress – optimistic about science and progress itself, and maybe overly so. And, that optimism may have blinded him somewhat to the postmodern point: science, like any other system of understanding can potentially lose its critical punch as it becomes more widely and less critically accepted and in ultimately presupposing the very ends it strives to meet – a “philosophy,” as Lyotard says it. On the other hand, we believe this postmodern critique is typically over played in regard to Dewey’s work: Dewey knew better than to have faith in any grand narrative, particularly that of scientific certainty. Rather, Dewey turned in important ways to aesthetics as a means of knowing that which remained evolutionary, unpredictable, and insulated from presupposing its own ends. Thus, “post” theorists might consider that the Dewey canon resists easy answers to the problems of the day, and its arc bends towards an organic aesthetics sourced in the understanding of continual human uncertainty. We also suggest – but take up in no real detail here – that postmodernism itself has become a grand narrative and an unquestioned common sense of sorts, particularly within the academy. And all grand narratives must be continually reflected upon for such dangers. Or, as Dewey said it, philosophical work consists of continual “criticism of criticism” (Boydston, 1981, p. 298). We come back to these matters briefly in our conclusion. And so, what do we argue? We begin with pragmatism’s most eloquent champion: William James. Following this essential grounding in James’ “critical philosophy,” as he calls it, we embark on a trek through several of Dewey’s works – works containing the essential kernels of postmodern sensibilities. Those works include Reconstruction in Philosophy, The Quest for Certainty, How We Think, and Art as Experience. We consider these texts as marking the first postmodern, post-structural, post-foundational turn – the rejection of both idealist and rationalist grand narratives of certainty. Finally, we close with a look back and forward on pragmatism’s potential foundational position with regard to post-modern theory.3 WILLIAM JAMES, TRUTH CLAIMS, AND PLURALISM: THE PRAGMATIC REVOLUTION “Truth happens to an idea” (James, 1978, p. 169). With these five words, and a somewhat humorous story about a squirrel scurrying around a tree, William James 88.