Defence & Security Programme EUROPEAN DEFENCE: CAN THE EU PICK UP THE SLACK? GLOBSEC European Security Initiative 2 GLOBSEC European Security Initiative builds on the expertise acquired and momentum of the GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative (GNAI) seeking to shape policy debates that decrease the imbalance in transatlantic defence capabilities. The primary objective of the GESI Initiative is to produce innovative and straightforward policy recommendations that empower Europe’s defence capabilities and operational readiness for a wide spectrum of challenges. GESI mission is not to support the creation of parallel European military-political structures to NATO, but rather to propose an avenue for a new level of European defence competence. GLOBSEC European Security Initiative Steering Committee General Knud Bartels (Ret.) – Danish Chief of Defence, Staff 2009-2011, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee 2012-2015 General Wolf-Dieter Langheld (Ret.) – Commander Allied Joint Forces Headquarters, Brunssum 2010-2012 Ambassador Rastislav Káčer – Ambassador (Ret.) to the United States and Hungary, Honorary Chairman of GLOBSEC Ambassador Stefano Stefanini – Ambassador (Ret.), Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO and Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano 2007-2010 Ambassador Pierre Vimont – Ambassador (Ret.) to the United States and to the European Union, former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service GLOBSEC Project Team: Alena Kudzko, Deputy Research Director, GLOBSEC Policy Institute John Barter, Vice President for Strategic Partnerships, GLOBSEC Martin Reguli, Defense Programme Manager, GLOBSEC Policy Institute ©GLOBSEC ©GLOBSEC Policy Institute December 2019 3 European Defence: can the EU pick up the slack? by Stefano Stefanini and Martin Reguli The pace of European Defence has suddenly picked up. Sparked by a few root causes, addressed in a previous GESI paper1, the full range of EU defence initiatives2 is now moving towards the implementation stage with the new Commission taking office on December 1st. The Commission’s incoming President, Ursula von der Leyen, has outlined the institution’s priorities. The predominant issue is strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base through the newly created Directorate General for Defence, Industry and Space3. In parallel, the issue of European contributions to transatlantic security and defence – “burden sharing” – will once again be on the table at NATO’s London summit taking place December 3rd and 4th. European Defence was, and is, supposed to be the answer. However, out of concern for U.S. industrial interests, doubts are now being raised by the Trump administration4. Finally, French President Emmanuel Macron has made a strong case for European defence without fully clarifying the extent to which it should be “complementary” to NATO and serve the purpose of allowing Europe to “regain military sovereignty”. For now, these questions are likely to remain unanswered. A more immediate concern though is simply how the EU’s new role in defence and security is shaping up, what the EU brings to the table of European and transatlantic security, and the extent to which initiatives in the pipeline – once implemented – will fill existing gaps in European capabilities and military preparedness. These are the issues addressed in this paper. This paper outlines what the EU can do for European defence: quite a lot and more than meets the eye. For instance, the EU is in the driving seat on force movement which is essential just as much to NATO. No point in more troops or more military readiness, if those troops cannot be moved rapidly when needed. Military mobility across EU borders depends on EU infrastructure and EU regulations. But it must be crystal clear also what the EU cannot do and should not be asked to do. Those limitations are structural. Therefore, European defence has to be a cooperative effort between the EU and other players and formats. Even its most ardent advocates know it. It is no coincidence that the ongoing talk about a “European Security Council”5 originates in two EU capitals (Paris and Berlin) but has a scope and reach that extends beyond the EU. The EU is not a collective defence organisation. It has no nuclear deterrent in a nuclear world; in addition to the P5 (USA, Russia, China, UK, France), there are now at least four nuclear powers – and counting. EU institutions may not want to talk about the nuclear dimension but silence will not make it fade away. There is only one way to offset the loss of a quarter of pre- Brexit EU military assets and capabilities: to engage post-Brexit London in European defence – and the UK needs to give a clear indication of its willingness to be part of it instead of sailing solo across the Atlantic. The same with two non-EU “front-line” states on the European perimeter: Norway in the Arctic North and Turkey in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia flank. Relations with Ankara are at a difficult juncture for a number of reasons, but Turkey is a lynchpin to European security: if it is out of the defensive architecture, Southern 1 European Defence at Crossroads, GLOBSEC European Security Initiative, June 2019, https://www.globsec.org/publications/european-defence-at-a-crossroads-gesi-political-framework-paper/ 2 EEAS (2018, June 27). Implementing the Global Strategy: EU delivers on security and defence. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu-delivers-security-and- defence_en. 3 “The new DG’s activities are focused on the defence market rather than on defence policy per se”. Besch , S. (2019, November 18). Can the European Commission develop Europe's defence industry? Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/node/8173/view-email. 4 “The real transatlantic difference revolves around industrial interests” Brattberg, E., & Valášek , T. (2019, November 21). EU Defense Cooperation: Progress Amid Transatlantic Concerns. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/11/21/eu-defense-cooperation-progress-amid-transatlantic- concerns-pub- 80381?utm_source=carnegieemail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=announcement&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0dOa1 ltTXpZMlk0TVRrMyIsInQiOiJ5V2I5bkVkYmZnYWRjMnZzN2VySDZEUThtVFZOazZPUFI2V1VEUHB6Q1wvaTN6cXk 5MUlTeGIwZ1AzWDlnMFdmNFFkOXdzd0RGUnlTRE14OE55OHBua2w0VVNwYUJ2N3k0dnJWU3loK2NwUG5FdT ZiMlJGOW8xMkJcL1QxcmdteEN6In0=. 5Scazzieri, L. (2019, November 27). Towards a European Security Council? Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/node/8209/view-email 4 Europe and the Mediterranean are simply indefensible. Finally, while the EU can certainly carry out operations within Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), there might be circumstances better met by a coalition of the willing formats, witness French European Intervention Initiative (E2I) initiative. 1. Setting the scene The debate on European defence is now inevitably structured by Emmanuel Macron’s interview to The Economist6. If NATO is “brain dead” (having previously been called “obsolete” by then candidate Donald Trump), is it up to the European Union to fill the gap in European security? The French President does not go that far7. He retreats to the notion of “complementarity” to NATO but still advocates an enhanced European role and responsibility in defence and military affairs. But when he talks about Europe being able to defend itself, he has clearly set his mind on a Europe that is broader than the EU. It certainly includes the United Kingdom. In fact, Macron makes reference8 to four European ongoing projects: the European Intervention Initiative9 (E2I – which is not EU but a coalition of the willing with United Kingdom’s participation); Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)10; the European Defence Fund (EDF)11; the Franco-German decision to develop a future -generation tank and a fighter plane12 (which is not an EU but a bilateral industrial cooperation project). Though a fervent supporter of the EU, Macron consequently has acknowledged that European defence cannot be confined solely to the EU. The underlying problem of entrusting European defence to the EU is that the EU is not a collective defence organisation. Under the Lisbon Treaty, military assistance and cooperation among Member States (MS) is provided on an essentially voluntary basis13. Moreover, the EU budget cannot finance military or defence expenditures14. It is of fundamental importance to 6 The Economist. (2019, November 7). Emmanuel Macron in his own words. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english. 7 The gap between Europe’s defence, which doesn’t have an Article Five equivalent, and NATO is very hard to bridge though, isn’t it? It’s very hard to guarantee each other’s security with the same credibility that NATO has, even allowing for the weakening of NATO that you’ve just spoken of. So how do you get from an idea of collaboration to the guarantee of security, that NATO perhaps can’t provide anymore? How do you cross that gap, and project power too if necessary? EM: First of all, NATO is only as strong as its member states, so it only works if the guarantor of last resort functions as such. I’d argue that we should reassess the reality of what NATO is in the light of the commitment of the United States. Secondly, in my opinion, Europe has the capacity to defend itself. European countries have strong armies, in particular France. We are committed to ensuring the safety of our own soil as well as to many external operations. I think that the interoperability of NATO works well. But we now need to clarify what the strategic goals we want to pursue within NATO are. Europe may be in a position to do so if it accelerates the development of European defence. We’ve decided on enhanced cooperation between several member states, which involves pooling, a solidarity clause between member states. A European Defence Fund has been set up. We have the European Intervention Initiative, designed to be complementary to NATO. But you also need to have stress tests on these issues. France knows how to protect itself. After Brexit, it will become the last remaining nuclear power in the European Union.