RAILROAD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION Report No 3798 GULF, MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY RAMER, TENN JANUARY 25, 1958 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION Washington 3798 2 SUMMARY §§§ DATE January 25, 1958 RAILROAD Gulf, Mobile and Ohio LOCATION Ramer, Tenn KIND OF ACCIDENT Derailment TRAIN INVOLVED Passenger TRAIN NUMBER I C 10 LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER CG dlesel-electric units 812 and 811 CONSIST 16 cars ESTIMATED SPEED 70 m p h OPERATION Timetable, train orders, and automatic block-signal system TRACK Single, tangent, level WEATHER Cloudy TIME 12 47 a m CASUALTIES 1 killed, 44 Ingured CAUSE Broken switch connecting rod 3 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT NO 3798 IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910 GULF, MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY August 20, 1958 Accident near Ramer, Tenn , on January 25, 1958, caused by a broken switch connecting rod 1 REPORT OF THE COMM'SSION JUGGLE, Commissioner On January 25, 1958, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Ramer, Tenn , which resulted in the death of 1 train-service employee, and the injury of 36 passengers, 4 Pullman Company employees, 2 tram porters, and 2 train service employ­ ees l Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Tuqgle tor consideration and disposition 4 3793 Earner^ at. t> Perry, Tenn. r-T.C* 41.02 ml. < > Rarnar 1.42 ml. Point of accident 6.66 mi. Siding 1.59 nil. Ruslor Junction, Tenn. - ——Point of accident P.S; Signal 3400— •8 3 •-a Tangent CM 1.98 mi. I Location o5 Accident and Method of Operation This accident occurred on that part of the Northern Division extending between Ruslor Junction and Perry, Tenn , 51 3 miles In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single- track line over which trains are operated by timetable, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system Trains of the Illinois Central Railroad are regularly operated over this track Near Ramer, Tenn , 10 2B miles north of Ruslor Junction, a siding 1 59 miles in length parallels the mam track on the east The south switch of the siding is located 1 42 miles south of the station The accident occurred on the mam track at the frog of the south turnout of the siding 80 feet north of the pomt- of-switch From the south the track is tangent throughout a distance of 1 98 miles to the point of accident and 5,198 feet northward The grade is level at the point of accident The track structure in the vicinity of the point of accident consists of 115-pound rail, 39 feet in length, laid new in 1950 on an average of 24 treated ties to the rail length It is fully tie- plated with double'shoulder tie plates smgle-spiked, and is provided with 6-hole 36-inch joint bars and an average of 36 rail anchors per rail It is ballasted with slag The south turnout of the siding consists of 115-pound reinforced switch rails 16 feet 6 inches in length, 115-pound rails a No 10 spring-rail frog, and one-piece guard rails The switch stand of the south switch of the siding is of the horiiontal-throw intermediate- stand type and is located 9-feet 1-1/2 inches east of the centerhne of the main track When the switch is hneq for entry to the siding a target consisting of two red discs 14 inches in diameter and each having an opening m the center 4 inches in diameter is displayed at right angles to the mam track When the switch is lined for movement on the mam track the target is parallel to the track Two operating-lever keepers are provided One keeper secures the operating lever in normal posi­ tion for movement on the main track and the other secures the operating lever in reverse position The keepers are so designed that the operating lever can be secured in position by a switch lock The connecting rod of the switch is 1-1/2 inches in diameter and is provided with a clevis at the switch-rod end The clevis is attached to the switch rod by a 1-inch bolt applied vertically The centerhne of the bolt is located 1-3/16 inches from tne end of the clevis Automatic signal 3400, governing northbound movements on the main track, is located 31 feet south of the south switch of the siding The controlling circuit is so arranged that when the south switch of the siding is lined for entry to the siding the signal displays a Stop-and-Proceed aspect The maximum authorized speed for passenger trains m the vicinity of the point of accident is 70 miles per hour Description of Accident No 10, a northbound first-class Illinois Central passenger train, consisted of Central of Georgia Railway diesel-electric units 812 and Bll, coupled in multiple-unit control, 1 express- refrigerator car, 1 baggage car, 1 express-refrigerator carr 1 baggage car, i mail-baggage car, 3 baggage cars, 5 coaches, 1 dining car, and 2 sleeping cars, in the order named The 3rd car was of steel-underframe construction, and the other cars were of conventional all-steel construction Tho 9th, the 11th, and the 13th cars were eguipped with tightlock couplers This train passed Ruslor Junction, the last open office, at 12 34 a m 1 hour 26 minutes late, and while moving at an esti­ mated speed of T) miles per hour the 11th to the 16th cars, inclusive, were derailed at the south turnout of the siamg at Ramer 3798 6 The locomotive stopped with the front end 3,095 feet north of the point of accident Separa­ tions occurred at Doth ends of the 13th to the 15th cars, inclusive The 11th and 12th cars stopped upright and m line with the front end of the 11th car on the main track and the rear end of the 12th car on the siding The 13tn to the 16th cars, inclusive, stopped approximately in line, with the front end of the 13th car 520 feet north of the point of accident and approximately 45 feet east of the main track The rear end of the 16th car stopped on the siding The 13th and the 16th cars stopped up­ right The 14tn car leaned to the east at an angle of about 40 degrees, and the 15th car stopped on its side The < 3th to the 15th cars, inclusive, were heavily damaged The 11th car, the 12th car, and the 16th car were considerably damaged The flagman of No 10 was killed The conductor and the baggageman were injured, Tne weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at 12 47 a m Discussion As No 10 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the enginemen were In the control compartment of the first diesel-electric unit and were maintaining a lookout ahead The con­ ductor was in the 11th car and the flagman and baggageman were in the 14th car The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned properly en route The headlight was lighted brightly The members of the crew said that before the derailment occurred the locomotive and cars were riding smoothly and that there was no indication of defective track or equipment Signal 3400 in­ dicated Proceed and the position of the target of the south siding-switch indicated that the switch was lined for movement on the main track The engineer said that after the locomotive passed the switch there appeared to be unusual slack action in the train He said he then observed fire flying at the rear of the train and that the brake-pipe gauge indicated that brake-pipe pressure was de­ creasing He immediately initiated an emergency application of the brakes The first the members of the train crew became aware of anything being wrong was when the derailment occurred Examination of the track throughout a considerable distance south of the point of derailment disclosed no indications of defective track or dragging equipment Examination of the south turnout of the siding after the accident occurred disclosed that the point-of-frog was damaged by a heavy blow A flange mark appeared on the top of the point rails of the frog and on the heel-riser block, and a corresponding flange mark appeared on the top of the east guard rail indicating that a truck had entered the siding and had become derailed at the frog The siding was destroyed throughout a distance of approximately 500 feet Examination of the switch stand disclosed that the operating lever was lined for movement on the main track and was secured in the keeper by a lock Examination of the switch operating mech­ anism disclosed that the top and bottom portions of the clevis of the operating rod had broken at locations 2-1/8 inches and 3-1/2 inches, respectively, from the end of the clevis permitting the switch rails to move under the train The surfaces of the break of the bottom portion were battered and showed old break Approximately 90 percent of the surfaces of the break of the top portion showed progressive fracture The switch was inspected on December 10, 1957, by a track supervisor, and on January 23, 1958, by a section foreman and no exceptions were taken 3798 After the accident occurred the carrier initiated a program for the inspection of the connec­ ting rods of all main-track switches The clevises of 8 connecting rods which were installed In 1952 were found cracked Caus* This accident was caused by a broken switch connecting rod Dated at Washington, D C , this twentieth day of August, 1958 By the Commission, Commissioner Tuggle (SEAL) HAROLD D McCOY, Secretary interstate Commerce Communion POSTAGE AND FEES PAID SiiaBliington 25,0 C INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION OFFICIAL BUSINESS RETURN AFTER FIVE DAYS .