1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION S.L.P. (C) NOS.9036-9038 OF 2016) INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ….PETITIONER VERSUS MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S) WITH S.L.P.(C) NOS. 9798-9799 OF 2016) S.L.P.(C) NOS. 17088-17089 OF 2016) S.L.P.(C) NO. 37375 OF 2016) S.L.P.(C) NO. 37372 OF 2016) S.L.P.(C) NOS. 16573-16605 OF 2016) S.L.P. (C) CC NO. 15967 OF 2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19356 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19362 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19361 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19358 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19357 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19360 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19359 OF 2017 S.L.P.(C) NOS. 34752-34753 OF 2016) S.L.P.(C) NO. 15890 OF 2017) 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19363 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19364 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19412 OF 2017 MA 1423 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12247 OF 2016 S.L.P.(C) NO. 33022 OF 2017 S.L.P.(C) NO. 33127 OF 2017 S.L.P.(C) NO. 33114 OF 2017 MA 1787 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10210 OF 2016 MA 1786 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10207 OF 2016 MA 45 OF 2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6239 OF 2017 S.L.P.(C) NO. 16051 OF 2019 DIARY NO. 23842 OF 2018 S.L.P.(C) NO. 30452 OF 2018 CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 4835 OF 2015 S.L.P.(C) NOS. 30577-30580 OF 2015 3 J U D G M E N T ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act of 2013'), is the subject matter of reference to this five Judge Bench of this Court. 2. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr v Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors1, interpreted Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The order reported as Yogesh Neema & Ors v State of Madhya Pradesh2, a two-judge Bench, however doubted the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v State of Tamil Nadu3 (which had followed Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and also held that Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any court) and referred the issue to a larger Bench. Later, in another appeal (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.2131 of 2016 (Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Ors.4) the matter was referred to a larger Bench on 7.12.2017; the Court noticed that: “cases which have been concluded are being revived. In spite of not accepting the compensation deliberately and statement are made in the Court that they do not want to receive the compensation at any cost, and they are agitating the matter time 1 (2014) 3 SCC 183 2 (2016) 6 SCC 387 3 (2015) 3 SCC 353 4 2018 SCC Online SC 100 4 and again after having lost the matters and when proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by filing successive petitions, the provisions of section 24 cannot be invoked by such landowners.” 3. The Court noticed that the reference to a larger Bench was pending, and had been made in Yogesh Neema (supra). The Court also felt that several other issues arose which it outlined, but were not considered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). The Court therefore, stated that the matter should be considered by a larger Bench and referred the case to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (hereafter, “IDA v Shailendra”) a Bench of three Judges was of the view that the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) did not consider several aspects relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Since Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was a judgment by a Bench of coordinate strength, two learned judges in IDA v Shailendra opined prima facie that decision appeared to be per incuriam. 4. Later, in Indore Development Authority v Shyam Verma & Ors (SLP No. 9798 of 2016) considered it appropriate to refer the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to refer the issues to be resolved by a larger Bench at the earliest. Yet again in State of Haryana v Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd) & Anr (CA No.4835 of 2015) referred the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate Bench for consideration of the larger issue. These batch appeals were referred to a five Judge Bench, which after hearing counsel, framed the following questions, which arise for consideration: 5 “1. What is the meaning of the expression paid'/tender' in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013') and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (Act of 1894')? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non- deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct? 2. Whether the word or' should be read as conjunctive or disjunctive in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? 3. What is the true effect of the proviso, does it form part of sub- Section (2) or main Section 24 of the Act of 2013? 4. What is mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act and true meaning of expression the physical possession of the land has not been taken occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? 5. Whether the period covered by an interim order of a Court concerning land acquisition proceedings ought to be excluded for the purpose of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 ? 6. Whether Section 24 of the Act of 2013 revives barred and stale claims? In addition, question of per incuriam and other incidental questions also to be gone into.” 5. Question nos.1 to 3 are interconnected and concern the correct interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Following questions are required to be gone into to interpret the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013: (i) Whether the word “or” in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 used in between possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid to be read as “and”? (ii) Whether proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has to be construed as part thereof or proviso to Section 24(1)(b)? 6 (iii) What meaning is to be given to the word "paid" used in Section 24(2) and "deposited" used in the proviso to Section 24(2)? (iv) What are the consequences of payment not made? (v) What are the consequences of the amount not deposited? (vi) What is the effect of a person refusing to accept the compensation? 6. The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public purposes, which had been in force for almost 120 years, with a view to address certain inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the said Act. 7. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings already initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its repeal, subject to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which begins with a non- obstante clause and overrides all other provisions of the Act of 2013. 8. On behalf of the Union, the States and various acquiring bodies and development authorities, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General (who led the arguments, hereafter “SG”), Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General (hereafter “ASG”), Mr. Anoop Chaudhary and Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. R.M. Bhangade and Mr. Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel, made their submissions. 9. The learned SG, arguing that this Court should overrule the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other judgments which 7 followed it, contended that the Court did not consider the various interpretations of Section 31 of the (repealed) Land Acquisition Act, (“LA Act” hereafter). He urged that the provisions of the Act of 2013, vis-à- vis the timelines and consequences that would ensue if the acquisition proceeding prolongs, were not examined. He highlighted that Section 24 is a transitional provision and such provisions should be given an interpretation which accords with legislative intent, rather than so as to impose hitherto absent standards, upon past proceedings, or proceedings initiated under the previous regime, but which have not worked themselves out. He urged that there is a presumption in favour of restricted retrospective applicability of any provision in an enactment unless a contrary intention appears. It is submitted that designedly, it is the stage of passing of award under Section 11 of the LA Act, that represents the determinative factor in the segregation for the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 2013 or the LA Act. It is urged that the opening part of the provision in Section 24(1) is a non-obstante clause providing for a limited overriding effect of the Land Acquisition Act, in case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act of 2013.