1 ThE D(PLICLTI(NS FOR EJCLTI(I OF DIrrrwziT CONCEPTIONS OF Dfl(OCRACY A Theia subsitted to the University of London for the degree of Ph.D. by JaMes Michael Tarrant 10th February 1981 Instite of Education 2 TABLE OF CONT]NTS Abstract 'A Acknowledgements 6 apter I S.1 Education, polities and. democracy 7 S.2 (bi defining democracy 18 8.3 Liberalism and democracy 22 S.4 Boundaries, Institutions, and values 57 S.5 Towards a new analysis of democracy and 'Al education Qiapter II S.1 Introduction 49 S.2(a) Schwnpeter and value-free democracy 51 8.2(b) Education, training and socialization 61 S., Dahi and polyarchy 67 Downs and economic democracy 81 S.5 llock, Biker and the disposal of social 89 responsibility S.6 Knowledge, infoimatiom and the new democrats 100 S.7 Conclusion 107 Qiapter III S.1 Introduction 118 S.2 Locke and the Levellera 125 S.) Rousseau, consent and education 141 S. Kant 160 8.5 Green 173 s.6 J.S. Mill 178 S.7 Conclusion 181 aiapter Iv S. 1. Introduction 190 S.2. Market Democracy and Utilitarianism 191 S. 3. Citizenship, Market Democracy and Education 198 S. Ji. Market Democracy and the aims of Education 205 S. 5. Market Democracy and the Curriculum 21i s.6. Concluding Remarks 223 3 TABLE OF C(?TNTS (Cont 'd) chapter V S. 1 Introduction 229 S.2(a) What should the moral democrat know? 230 S.2(b) Moral democracy and Political Education 2'&l S.3(a) Is Moral Democracy possible? 2& S.3(b) The Moral Democrat and work 21&9 S. The higma of Liberal Democracy 253 Concluding remarks on themes which have emerged in tbis essay 259 4 ABSTRACT An initial attempt is made to draw connections between politics and education. A paradox exists in finding education ultimately dependent upon social and political values. The paradox i. that as a result of a drastic revision of the concept of liberal èemocracy much more can be said about education than was previously possible in its treatment as a self—contained concept. Liberal democracy is essentially a hybrid of two rival value constellations, market and moral democracy. In the second chapter different varieties of market democracy are considered as diverse as elitism and economic democracy. No variant of market democracy entails the intention to educate critical citizens, merely an acquiescence in socialization and training. The third chapter expounds the moral conception of democracy. Thinkers from the Levellere to Green are exiiined in the cause of elucidating this concept. The latter entails the educational aim of a critical citizen. The educational implications of market democracy are developed in chapter four. For the majority of the population material for reflecting upon the values and institutions of society, and diverse forms of life, will be absent from the formal curriculum, either because such material is the province of an elite, or because short—run individual utility i. considered the only u.erthvhile goal. In chapter five a connection is established between moral democracy and the disciplines traditionally thought to be 'intrinsically' worthwhile, on the basis of the opportunities and encouragement the latter provide for reflection upon different forms of life and the critical assessment of institutions and values in society. Adlitionally the drastic curriculum changes 5 which foll.ir frog a participatory democracy are also era.ined, Finally the fundamental Importance .f the moral conception of democracy for the justification and continuation of liberal democracy is noted. This suggests the moral aim must have priority in relation to educational aims and curricula content in a liberal democracy. 6 AIO1T1DGEMENTS I should like to express unreserved appreciation to my supervisor, Pat Mute, for the conscientious efforts made in reading, discussing, and coieuting upon my work. To my wife &isan I am indebted for prodigious support and encouragement such that I was able to complete what would alnost certainly have remained unfinished. 7 haj,ter I - Introduction i. Education, politics, and democracy The traditional divide between liberal and totalitarian democracy has resulted largely in a state of acquiescence in the philosophy of education, in a paradigm of liberal democracy now dangerously redundant. Just as totalitarianism outdates Aristotelian classification of government, so it is also true that the notion of liberal democracy is itself outdated. This is not to say that a contrast still cannot be drawn between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. It is rather that developnents within liberal democracy, occurring to some extent as a result of alarm at the phenomenon of totalitarianism, have produced divisions so great as to amount to rival conceptions of democracy. If, however, philosophers writing about education continue to defer only to the traditional liberal democratic paradigm then the implications of these rival conceptions of democracy for education are entirely missed. As long as liberal democracy is expounded in the light of a contrast with totalitarianism, it appears a coherent whole, and of considerable significance. In such a frame of reference the existence of multi—party systems, secret ballots, independent judiciaries, and quinquennial parliaments appears to be quintessential of liberal democracy. If however one abandons this polarisation of liberal democracy and instead focuses attention upon constellations of values within liberal democracy, a marked rivalry between these sets becomes apparent. The most concrete manifestation of these competing models of democracy is to be found in the preoccupation with controlling the political activity and behavioi r of the vast majority of the population. These rival constellations have been endemic in 8 political philosophy and ethics for a long period of time, (1) but have developed both momentum and sOphi8ticatiOn in recent years. I shall seek to argue in particular for two conceptions of democracy, which I label moral and market theories of democracy. The distinction is novel insofar as it has not been acknowledged previously by philosophers of education, (2) To the extent that the concept of democracy has figured at all in education, and arguably it has not figured very much, the discussion proceeds for the most part as if democracy was an unproblematic concept. (3) Now if one does concentrate on the institutions and procedural principles of liberal denocracy and compares them with totalitarianism, then indeed liberal democracy appears unproblematic. For the rival schemes of democracy I shall identify would all want to endorse regular and supervised elections, independent judiciaries, and an uncensored press. Yet only in the case of what I term moral democracy, do the values actually provide a firm measure of support to such institutions. If these rival conceptions of democracy exist, as I contend they do, then liberal democracy is essentially a hybrid, tenable as long as it is contrasted with totalitariansim, and because of the underpinning provided by the moral conception of democracy. I shall discuss the different strands within the market and moral conceptions of democracy and their implications for education. It will be argued that moral democracy is a preferable conception to market democracy, and its implications for education will be established. My preliminary considerations in this introductory chapter relate to problems in defining democracy, and also to making general points about the link between democracy and education. This enables my positive thesis to be developed in subsequent chapters. 9 Any attempt at an analysis of the concept of democracy faces formidable problems, particularly if it is conducted with an eye to its relationship to education. That there are empirical connections between democracy and education is true, but for philosophy unremarkable. In particular, such connections are found, on examination, to be in the nature of a functional relationship, such that the higher the general level of education within a society, the greater the probability that it will be a democratic society. ('i) The social scientific problems immanent in such an analysis, such as the matter of the direction of causality, are not my immediate concern. 1hat I do wish to point out is that however strong the probability of the above hypothesis, its primary interest is in the conditions for the existence and. continuance of democracy, and not in the meaning of democracy. I regard it as the business of philosophers in this sphere to be essentially concerned in elucidating conceptual connections, leaving empirical issues to sociologists and psychologists; that for example empirical issues are not as value free as the latter claim. This activity is of good philosophical vintage. Nonetheless in elucidating the concepts of democracy and education, philosophers are bound to pay some attention to institutional and empirical features. Some statements may arise which though normative, are also sensitive to empirical considerations. For example political equality might be deemed a necessary condition of democracy. Beyond political equality as a value there is the further consideration of what institutional arrangements are empirically necessary and what arrangements might be merely contingent in realizing that value. (5) An empirically necessary arrangement for realizing that value might be universal adult suffrage. Now 10 the statement about political equality is sensitive to empirical considerations to this extent, that if it were the case that a legislative change occurred whereby only some adults were able to vote instead of all adults, the latter would, ceterus parabus, tell against the value, political equality, and indicate that the term 'democracy' was being incorrectly applied in this case. Iuiother celebrated example of this problem is that of the rational, informed citizen, operating through a sovereign legislature, and postulated to a varied extent in Locke, Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and Green. Research by political sociologists, together with advances in psychology, has made the concept of the rational chooser, the democratic man, and the sovereign legislature, highly disputable concepts.