Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of Korea's Financial Sector Policies

Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of Korea's Financial Sector Policies

A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Cho, Yoon Je Working Paper Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of Korea's Financial Sector Policies ADBI Research Paper Series, No. 47 Provided in Cooperation with: Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo Suggested Citation: Cho, Yoon Je (2002) : Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of Korea's Financial Sector Policies, ADBI Research Paper Series, No. 47, Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo, http://hdl.handle.net/11540/4152 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111137 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ www.econstor.eu ADB INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER 47 Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of Korea’s Financial Sector Policies Yoon Je Cho November 2002 In the last 50 years, Korea’s financial sector has gone through heavy repression, rapid liberalization, deep crises and finally massive restructurings. However, there is no optimum financial sector policy to be applied at all times and system inertia often prevents the timely adjustment of policy to changed circumstances. Although no agreed international best practice has yet been found to guide successful and rapid economic expansion, financial sector reform should always be tuned to progress in the real sector and the capabilities of financial market infrastructure. adbi.org ADB Institute Research Paper Series No. 47 November 2002 Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons of Korea’s Financial Sector Policies Yoon Je Cho I ADB INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER 47 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Yoon Je Cho is a Professor of Economics at the Graduate School of International Studies, Sogang University, Korea. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University and was the Vice President of the Korea Institute of Public Finance. Prof. Cho has also served for two terms as a senior counsellor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economy of Korea. Additional copies of the paper are available free from the Asian Development Bank Institute, 8th Floor, Kasumigaseki Building, 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-6008, Japan. Attention: Publications. Also online at www.adbi.org Copyright © 2002 Asian Development Bank Institute. All rights reserved. Produced by ADBI Publishing. The Research Paper Series primarily disseminates selected work in progress to facilitate an exchange of ideas within the Institute’s constituencies and the wider academic and policy communities. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the author’s own and are not necessarily endorsed by the Asian Development Bank Institute. They should not be attributed to the Asian Development Bank, its Boards, or any of its member countries. They are published under the responsibility of the Dean of the ADB Institute. The Institute does not guarantee the accuracy or reasonableness of the contents herein and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequences of its use. The term “country”, as used in the context of the ADB, refers to a member of the ADB and does not imply any view on the part of the Institute as to sovereignty or independent status. Names of countries or economies mentioned in this series are chosen by the authors, in the exercise of their academic freedom, and the Institute is in no way responsible for such usage. II PREFACE The ADB Institute aims to explore the most appropriate development paradigms for Asia composed of well-balanced combinations of the roles of markets, institutions, and governments in the post-crisis period. Under this broad research project on development paradigms, the ADB Institute Research Paper Series will contribute to disseminating works-in-progress as a building block of the project and will invite comments and questions. I trust that this series will provoke constructive discussions among policymakers as well as researchers about where Asian economies should go from the last crisis and recovery. Masaru Yoshitomi Dean ADB Institute III ABSTRACT Korea’s financial sector has gone through heavy repression, rapid liberalization, deep crises, and massive restructuring during the last half century. This paper discusses Korea’s financial sector policies in relation to its real sector development, and attempts to draw some lessons from this dynamic experience. The main lessons may be summarized as follows. There is no best financial sector policy and practice that can be applied at all times. Financial sector policy is one of the most important policy measures that a state can employ for the goal of economic development. This policy may evolve graduallyin accordance with the development of economic circumstanceswith ultimate evolution to a fully market-oriented policy. However, the recent global economic environment suggests that interventionist policies should be short-lived. As the domestic economy becomes more sophisticated and more integrated into the global economy, the negative impacts of such policies become more profound. However, system inertia often prevents timely adjustment of policy to one more suited to a changed environment. The outcomes in the real sector of a controlled financial sector, such as high corporate leverage ratios, also prevent the rapid liberalization of financial sector policies. While leaving the distorted incentive structure in the real sector intact, financial liberalization can even intensify the distorting effects of real sector problems. Thus, the sequencing and speed of financial reforms (and more broadly economic transition) becomes a key issue. Financial sector reform should be tuned to the progress of real sector reforms and the development of the financial market infrastructure and regulatory capacities. This sequencing and policy coordination issue is important not only in the process of financial liberalization, but also in the process of financial restructuring. The countries of East Asia, particularly Korea and the PRC, are facing the challenge of how to implement ‘condensed liberalization’ and successful economic transition after having achieved ‘condensed economic growth,’ in this rapidly integrating global economy. No ‘international best practice’ has yet been established to guide successful and rapid economic transition. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS About the Author II Preface III Abstract IV Table of Contents V Executive Summary 1 1. Introduction 7 2. A Brief Historical and Political Background 11 3. Financial Sector Policies and Development: Before Liberalization 15 3.1. The Post-Korean War Reconstruction and Stabilization (1950s) 15 3.2. Strengthening Government Control over the Banking Sector and Export-Led Economic Growth (1961-71) 17 3.3. The First Financial Crisis and Increased Government Intervention for the HCI Drive (1970s) 23 3.4. The Second Financial Crisis and Limited Attempts at Financial Liberalization (1980-86) 27 3.5. The Current Account Surplus and the Shift in the Priority of Policy Loans (1987-90) 34 4. Financial Liberalization and the Crisis (1993-1997) 37 4.1. The Progress of Financial Liberalization 37 4.2. The Impact of Financial Reform 39 4.3. Capital Account Liberalization and the Expansion of Short-term Foreign Capital Inflows 45 4.4. The Financial Crisis 48 4.5. Political Economy of Financial Liberalization and Crisis in Korea 51 5. Financial Restructuring after the Crisis 54 5.1. Measures Taken 55 5.2. Impact of Financial Restructuring 65 5.3. Assessments and Implications 78 6. Lessons 84 V Tables and Figures (in body of text) Table 1. Export Loans by Deposit Money Banks 19 Table 2. Interest Rates, 1964-1971 20 Table 3. Growth of M2, 1965-69 20 Table 4. Key Economic Indicators from 1964 to 1978 22 Table 5. Financial Indicators in the Manufacturing Industry 24 Table 6. Share of NPLs and Profitability among Commercial Banks 25 Table 7. Interest Rates, 1972-1979 26 Table 8. Interest Rates, 1979-1991 28 Table 9. Financial Sector Development, 1979 – 90 31 Table 10. External Funds of the Corporate Business Sector, 1965-84 33 Table 11. Credit Access and Borrowing Costs by Sector 34 Table 12. Proportion of Export Loans Rediscounted by the Bank of Korea 35 Table 13. Share of Loans by Domestic Banks to SMCs and the 30 Largest Chaebols 35 Table 14. Growth of the Financial Sector 39 Table 15. Growth of Financial Markets (outstanding

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