INTERVIEW Major General Peter W. Chiarelli Commander of the Multi-National Division, Baghdad (MND-B) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II The 1st Cav in Baghdad Counterinsurgency EBO in Dense Urban Terrain Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis street. For a city the size of Baghdad, we Major General Pete Chiarelli, really needed about 23,000. Many decided Commander of the 1st Cavalry Di- not to come to work. vision, Fort Hood, Texas, deployed In the area of infrastructure improve- America’s First Team to serve as part ment, there was much that needed to of the MND-B in Baghdad for OIF II be done. An $18.4 billion supplemental from March 2004 until March 2005. was “on the table.” But because of the “Task Force Baghdad” conducted deteriorating security situation, very little full-spectrum effects-based opera- had been spent. In some areas of Baghdad, tions (EBO) in a city of 200 square many of the same conditions that Soldiers miles packed with six to seven million found when they arrived right after the end people. Its mission was to “conduct of major combat operations in March of full-spectrum operations focused on 2003 still existed. stability and support operations and In the area of governance, we had to secure key terrain in and around neighborhood and district advisory Baghdad, supported by focused and council [NAC and DAC] meetings that fully integrated information [IO] and were absolutely critical. They were part civil-military operations, in order to of an excellent program established by the enable the progressive transfer of Photo by Fred W. Baker III W. Photo by Fred CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority]. authority to the Iraqi people, their But those meetings were suspended in institutions and a legitimate Iraqi tense before. Overall, it seemed things national government.” early April because people were afraid had been improving. to attend them. At its largest (just before the January Everything changed on the 4th of April. And in the area of emphasis we call 2005 Iraqi national elections), TF At about 1705, 2-5 Cav [2d Battalion, “economic pluralism” (you could call it Baghdad had 12 US brigade-sized 5th Cavalry], 1st Cavalry Division, was long-term economic development), the elements, 62 US battalions, 322 US completing its transition with the 2d ACR overall unemployment rate in Baghdad companies, 3 Iraqi brigades, 7 Iraqi [2d Armored Cavalry Regiment]. 2-5 Cav was 39 percent, and in the northern two- battalions and 58 Iraqi companies, was mid-stride in transferring authority totaling more than 40,000 Coalition when a fi refi ght broke out in Sadr City. thirds of Sadr City, it was 61 percent. Soldiers. Eight Soldiers were killed and 51 were So, that’s where we stood about the 15th This interview was conducted on 29 wounded. of April. Welcome to Baghdad. June at Fort Hood, Texas. Fighting then broke out throughout Ed Baghdad in just about every Shi’a neigh- borhood and some Sunni areas; it was a QPlease describe your enemy. tough fi ght. And the 1st Cav Division What was Baghdad like when you There were two types of the enemy. got there? would not offi cially assume control from Q the 1st Armored Division for another 11 AThe fi rst is the insurgency, which is made up of Iraqis or people who Well, it depends on what day you’re days. So in terms of combat operations, things changed. have lived in Iraq who want something talking about—literally. When I A From the standpoint of Iraqi security different. arrived in Baghdad to stay on the 31st of forces, we had seven Iraqi battalions at that The insurgency itself has three major March, things looked pretty good. We had time. On 4 April, they each were running groups. Of course, there are elements of a few issues: the shutdown of Muqtada about 700 to 800 people strong. By the the former regime, the Ba’athists who al Sadr’s newspaper, The Al Hawza, and end of the fi rst week of fi ghting, they were are followers of Saddam Hussein. Then the arrest of one of Sadr’s lieutenants down to 100 to 200 per battalion. Most of there are folks who, because of policies prompted eight pro-Sadr demonstrations the Iraqis had decided not to fi ght—had that have been implemented, are either out in the four days prior to 3 April 2004. gone home. of jobs or don’t want to work for the new Things were tense, but they had been We also had about 8,000 police on the government—some are Ba’athists who sill-www.army.mil/famag September-October 2005 3 INTERVIEW forces, those seven battalions I told you about were at their authorized strength (700 to 800 soldiers each) by the time we left. For seven months, we literally embedded 70-man teams in each of those battalions. Our American embeds trained, conducted patrols and strike operations with, and mentored their counterparts on a daily basis. Resourced down to the platoon level, the advisors leveraged the cultural importance of relationships with the Arab people to build trust and rapport and to create momentum toward a truly professional military force. These forces were trained to conduct counterinsurgency operations 24 hours a day as opposed to the culturally desired strike-force mentality. When we left, we think we had seven of the best Photo by CPL Benjamin Cossel, 196th MPAD, Ohio Army National Guard Photo by CPL Benjamin Cossel, 196th MPAD, Iraqi Army battalions in Iraq. SGT Nicholas Bayers, A Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, watches the streets of Sadr City We also embedded a 50-man team with from the roof of a building 27 August 2004 during Operation Iron Fury, an operation aimed the 40th Iraqi Brigade. That same brigade at securing areas within Baghdad’s poorest neighborhood for civil military operations. took over the Sheik Marouf-Tallil Square- Haifa Street area on 6 February 2005. For aren’t allowed to return to their old govern- and Coalition Forces. Now they may have our year in Baghdad, this was one of the ment positions. The last of the insurgency followed the same intent at a particular most diffi cult areas in the city. TF 1-9 Cav are the Sunni and Shi’a fundamentalists time, but we saw defi nite fi ssures in how worked this area for 11 months and re- (such as Muqtada al Sadr). they got along with one another. It was ceived 192 purple hearts. If you followed This insurgency, as compared to other not a monolithic group. It’s very diffi cult the news today, the Sheik Marouf-Tallil insurgencies, did not have then—and I still for the American people to understand Square-Haifa Street area is one of the believe does not have now—any kind of the differentiation between the two types calmer areas in all of Baghdad. well developed political platform. No one of enemy because we haven’t educated One reason is that during our year we says, “When we win, Iraq will become them on it. went after the insurgents while at the a socialist (or capitalist or federalist or This distinction caused us challenges. same time—really simultaneously—we whatever) state.” No one is promising “a For example, when we were making maximized nonlethal effects focused on chicken in every pot.” No one is saying progress against the insurgency, the inter- infrastructure improvements, establishing “‘Mohammed’ will be the new president, national terrorists increased the number governance and increasing employment, king or leader.” There seems to be a single of attacks and the level of destruction, so all enhanced by a robust IO campaign. focus: “We want the Coalition out.” the American people would see the same Additionally, we now have the Iraqi You would think that the three elements of or an increase in violence. It is hard for 40th Brigade controlling that part of the the insurgency would get along with one an- anyone back in America to see the distinc- city trained in counterinsurgency opera- other because they have the same goal—but tion; it all seems like a big fog with the tions—not strike operations. they don’t. There are very few times when attacks continuing to escalate. But those Instead of thinking they can provide they get together on anything. very often are reactions to progress in the security with intelligence-based opera- I call the second category of the enemy battle against the insurgents. tions conducted periodically with units “international terrorists.” These are people Understanding all that makes a big differ- that spend a majority of their days at the who come from outside Iraq’s borders to ence in how you fi ght and win in Iraq. forward operating base [FOB], the Iraqi conduct attacks against the Coalition and battalions we trained assume control and Iraqis. They include folks like Zarqawi, Please describe Baghdad when you conduct full-spectrum counterinsurgent the Jordanian, who was proclaimed to Qleft a year later. operations 24/7, 365 days a year. They be “The Prince of Iraq” by the terrorist conducted strike operations when they had the intelligence, but, more impor- Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian. They We conducted combat operations tantly, they conducted daily patrols and are not “insurgents,” they are “terrorists” Ain Baghdad almost every day. We neighborhood outreach engagements in every sense of the word. stopped attacks against Coalition Forces; instead of staying on the FOB. Alongside While the insurgents often use terror picked up a lot of weapons, small arms the Soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division, as a weapon against the innocent people and ammunition; and created a safer they are doing an excellent job of making in Iraq, during the time we were there Baghdad.