' ' !j! '\! . i . ii'i \ , I SCHOOL DESEGREATION 1N NE ORLEAS, , I A COMPARATIVE SIDDY OF TH FAILUR OF SOCIA CONTOL ,Robert L. Crain and Horton Inger with the Assistance of GeraldA. McWorter This .'research was supported' by the Office' of Education ))partment of Health, Education , and' Welfare Project No. 5-0641-f-l2-1 NATIONA OPINION RESEACH CENTR University of Chicago 5720' South' ' Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60637 I ' Report No. llO-B LIBRA1.Y Hay, 1966 NA'IONAE OPINION RESEARCH bEN''l :University' of Chicago ;;f. FI L E CO PY. ACKNOWLEOOMENTS We are deeply indebted to the many people in New Orleans who per- mitted us to interview them and who gave us access to their personal docu- men ts . This study would not have been possible if they had not been exceedingly gracious and cooperative. The study put us in touch with a group of men and WOmen who were lled upon to perform some courageous acts in a situation of great turmoil and in the face of real personal danger. This is a study of the failure of New Orleans to desegregate peacefully, but it is also a study of the way in which a city on the brink of total disaster managed to save itself. Al- though it is true that there was violence in New Orleans , it is equally true that the city avoided the serious tragedy that Birmingham suffered. The integrated schools were boycotted , but the public school system itself sur- vived. As President Kennedy noted , all Americans should be grateful to the good people of New Orleans , and especially to the Orleans parish school board. We are also thankful for the assistance of Warren Breed , of Tulane University s Department of Sociology, and G. William Foster , Jr., of the Univers ity of Wisconsin Law School. J. David Greenstone and Grant McConnell of the University of Chicago s Department of Political Science , have read and comented on drafts of Chapter II; their help is gratefully acknowledged. Fina lly, we are indebted to the remaining members of our research staff , whose analyses of five other southern cities provided the context in which we studied New Orleans: Paul Peterson , Thoma M. Landye , and James J. Vanecko. W. Wayne Shannon , of the Louis iana State Univers ity Department of Politicat Science , prepared a special study of the desegregation of the Baton Rouge schools , which provided a valuable comparison with our study of New Or leans. Morton Inger and Robert T. Stout did the i erv g in New Or leans. The first draft of Chapter V was written by Gerald A. McWorter. We wish , to thank Rose Thomas and Lillian Rochon , who typed the final version of the repo . ... ' ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ' ... ..... ... ... .... ... ... ..... ... ... ... ... TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGNTS' iii LIST OF TABLES vii LIST OF ILLUSTRTIONS INTRODUCTION Chapter OVERVIEW II. NEW ORLEANSuTHE FAILURE OF AN ELITE III. WHY NEW ORLEAS? IV. TH CORRELATES OF PEACE 107 TH SOUTHERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT l39 VI. CONCLUSIONS l59 REFERENCES 171 . .. .. LIST OF TABLES Tab le Page I.l Percentage of School Districts Desegregated Each Year 1954-64 . III. Number of Signatories and Number of Leaders Signing Four Statements. IV. Ranking of Southern Cities by Acquiescence. 110 IV. Ranking of Southern Cities by Race Liberalism of Their Schoo 1 Boards 111 IV. Ranking of School Boards of Southern Cities by Conflict Tolerance , Social Status , Race Liberalism , and Acquiescence. 114 IV. Rank-Order Correlations between Conflict Tolerance Social Status , Race Liberalism, and Acquiescence of School Boards 114 IV. Ranking of Cities by Elite Ideology and Influence 130 IV. Growth Rate and Educational Level of the Southern Cities. 131 Ranking of Cities by Extent of Civil Rights Activity Concerning Schools. 144 Age and Militancy, for Southern Civil Rights Leaders. l48 Leadership Structures , Militancy, and Action. l5l vii . .. .. .. .. .. LIST OF ILLUSTRTIONS Figure Page IV. Acquiescence and Median Race-Liberalism Scores of School Boards 112 IV. Conflict Tolerance and Liberalism 116 IV. Acquiescence and the Combined Ranking of Conflict Tolerance and Liberalism. 117 tV. Acquiescence by Elite Ideology and Influence. 130 IV. Size of City (l940 Population) and Social Status of Elected School Board. 134 IV. Rank-Order Correlations for Seven Southern Cities 137 Social Status of Negro Community and Typology of Goals of C iv i 1 Rights Movement. 142 Social Status of Negro Community and Civil Rights Leadership S true ture. l55 Soc ial Status of Negro Community and Level of Its Civil Rights Activity 156 INTRODUCTION During 1964 and 1965 we studied the school desegregation processes of seven cities in the Deep South: Miami and Jacksonville in Florida Atlanta and Columbus in Georgia , New Orleans and Baton Rouge in LQuisiana and Montgomery in Alabama. In each of these cities , the school board approached desegregation warily, wondering whether they would find them- selves embroiled in a furious community conflic t that would bring violence in the streets , a boycott of the schools , or the state government 1 s clos ing the schools altogether. Yet only one of these cities--New Orleans--actually had difficulty. In the others , if mobs did gather they were quickly and effectively dispersed. (In Jacksonville the home of one of the Negro plain- tiffs was bombed , and this anomaly prompted us to search for possible simi- larities between New Orleans and Jacksonville. In New Orleans , however , desegregation brought on an intense con- flict which lasted the entire school year. There were daily street demon- strations , a year-long boycott of the integrated schools , continuous harassment of parents who attempted to break the boycott , and an almost constant battle between the state legislature and the federal courts which repeatedly jeopardized the position or the school board and forced the school system into a severe financial crisis. Relatively little is known about the way social control is main- tained in the face of community opposition to governmental action , and almost as little is known about the reasons why this control sometimes breaks down. We grew so fascinated by the difference between New Orleans and the other cities in our study (particularly Atlanta , which desegregated a year later with no difficulty) that we arranged for Morton Inger to return to New Orleans and spend an additional ten days interviewingpartici- pants in the school crisis there. He interviewed forty- one people in all (forty in person and one by long-distance telephone). The interviews ranged from fifteen minutes to five hours in length , arranging one hour and twenty minutes. We must emphasize that this research is not simply a case study of New Orleans: we also prepared analyses of the other six cities (based a total of 120 interviews), although we have chosen not to report them here. And it is the material from these analyses which has afforded the research staff a comparative context for the analysis of New Orleans. Thus , our report is as much a study of why social control prevailed in the other cities as it is a study of why control failed in New Orleans. The report consists of six chapters. Chapter I is an overview of the ways in which school desegregation was resisted (or not resisted) in the South between 1954 and 1964. It provides the reader with an understanding of the alternatives which southerners perceived when faced with court- ordered desegregation. pter II is the longest chapter and is a detailed study of the school crisis in New Orleans. Chapters III and IV are devoted to analyz- ing the data provided in Chapter II, first by examining the evidence for and against several possible explanations for the New Orleans crisis and then (in Chapter IV) making Some comparisons, both subjective and statistical among the seven cities in the study. Chapter V digresses from the main theme xii of this analysis to examine the way in which the civil rights movement differs in the seven cities. Chapter VI attempts to integrate few of the elements of the New Orleans study with our earlier analysis of patterns of decision-making regarding school integration in northern cities , given in our companion volume School Desegregation in the North , Report llO-A. The principal conclusion our analysis has drawn is twofold: first it was not a matter of chance that there was much conflict in New Orleans and little in Atlanta , and second , the roots of the conflict lay in the social structure of the city. At the heart of such an analysis is the study of the men who hold positions of high prestige in the city--the civic elite , as we have called them. In a sense , this study gives support to both sides of the argument concerning whether there is a power structure in Arer ican communit ies. On the one hand , the absence of 'social control in New Orleans can be attributed largely to the failure of the civic elite to become involved in the issue. By avoiding the mos t important decis ion in recent New Orleans history, the elite almost disqualifies itself from con- sideration as a power structure , in the sense in which that term is some- times used. On the other hand , the fact that the withdrawal of ,the elite so heavily influenced the community I s behavior in the issue indicates that the composition and structure of the civic elite was an important factor in shaping the decision-making processes of the cities studied here. Hence we consider the civic elite an important object of study to the social scientist interested in the American city. xiii " - CHAPTER I OVERVIEW On li lack Monday May 17 J 1954--the Supreme Court of the United States presented its decision in the case of Brown et al v.